


JPRS-TAC-89-015  
12 APRIL 1989



# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

19980715 165

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-015

## CONTENTS

12 APRIL 1989

### CHINA

Commentator on Arms Issues in U.S.-West European Relations [*S. Bei; RENMIN RIBAO 29 Mar*] ..... 1

### EAST ASIA

#### INDONESIA

Official Regrets U.S. Stance on Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone [*Jakarta Radio 3 Apr*] ..... 2

#### NORTH KOREA

NODONG SINMUN Demands Korean NFZ, Removal of Nuclear Weapons [*KCNA 7 Apr*] ..... 2

#### NEW ZEALAND

Minister Unconcerned over U.S. 'Snubs' over Nuclear Ships Policy [*Melbourne Radio 30 Mar*] ..... 2

#### VIETNAM

Delegate Speaks at Geneva Conference on Disarmament [*Hanoi International Service 1 Apr*] ..... 3

### EAST EUROPE

#### INTRABLOC

Warsaw Pact Commander on Pact Cuts, NATO Response  
[*P. Lushev; Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA 5 Apr*] ..... 4

#### BULGARIA

CFE/CSBM Delegation Head on Accomplishments of First Round  
[*L. Petrov; RABOTNICHESKO DELO 24 Mar*] ..... 5

Vienna Negotiations Assessed; NATO Criticized [*I. Genov; NARODNA ARMIYA 30 Mar*] ..... 6

CFE/CSBM Delegation Head Sees 'Promising Start'  
[*L. Petrov; RABOTNICHESKO DELO 3 Apr*] ..... 6

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CFE/CSBM Delegation Head Calls First Round 'Encouraging'  
[*L. Balcar; Bratislava PRAVDA 24 Mar*] ..... 8

Austrian Defense Minister Visits, Discusses CSCE, Troop Cuts, CW ..... 9

Arrives in Prague [*CTK 28 Mar*] ..... 9

Meets With Defense Minister Vaclavik [*CTK 29 Mar*] ..... 10

Meets Premier Adamec [*CTK 30 Mar*] ..... 10

#### GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Deputy Defense Minister on Disarmament, Security [*M. Graetz; DER MORGEN 28 Mar*] ..... 10

NATO Accused of Using 'Horse Trader's Trick' in CFE Talks  
[*NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 28 Mar*] ..... 11

East Bloc's Unilateral Disarmament Steps, Defense Assessed [*NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 3 Apr*] .... 12

FRG SPD's Bahr Attends Meeting of FRG, GDR Institutes [*NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 31 Mar*] .. 12

CDE States' Observers Invited to GDR-USSR Joint Exercises [*ADN 5 Apr*] ..... 12

## HUNGARY

- CFE 'Initiatives' To Be Offered With Finnish, Italian Parties [MTI 16 Mar] ..... 13  
Party Aide Links CFE Success, Bloc Dissolution, Hungarian Neutrality [MTI 31 Mar] ..... 13

## POLAND

- CFE/CSBM Delegates Assess First Round [TRYBUNA LUDU 23 Mar] ..... 14  
Premier Rakowski Toasts Belgian Prime Minister During Visit [RZECZPOSPOLITA 30 Mar] ..... 14

## LATIN AMERICA

### ARGENTINA

- Condor II Missile Project With Egypt Reportedly Cancelled ..... 16  
Israeli Pressure Alleged [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS 4 Apr] ..... 16  
Project To Continue [NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS 5 Apr] ..... 16

### BRAZIL

- Brazil, Iraq To Develop Rockets, Missiles Jointly [O GLOBO 19 Mar] ..... 17

## NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

### AFGHANISTAN

- Iranian News Agency Alleges CW Use by Afghan Air Force [Tehran IRNA 5 Apr] ..... 18

### EGYPT

- AL-AHRAM 'Ridicules' Charges on Chemical Weapons [MENA 25 Mar] ..... 18

### INDIA

- Agni Surface-to-Surface Missile To Be Tested in April [Hong Kong AFP 29 Mar] ..... 18

### IRAQ

- Iran Alleged To Be Embarking on Toxic Weapons Projects [INA 3 Apr] ..... 19

### ISRAEL

- Deterrence Said Best Answer to Missile Threat [R. Pedatzur; HA'ARETZ 3 Apr] ..... 19

### LEBANON

- Syrians Reportedly Using Chemical Weapons [Voice of Lebanon Radio 4 Apr] ..... 20

### PAKISTAN

- Daily Notes Successes in Missile, Rocket Development [JANG 21 Mar] ..... 20

### SAUDI ARABIA

- 'Responsible Source' Denies Chemical Weapons Charge [SPA 6 Apr] ..... 21

## SOVIET UNION

- 'Parity' Defined as 'Sufficiency' Despite Numerical Disadvantage  
[Ye. Klimchuk; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 13, 1-7 Apr] ..... 22  
Italy's Malfatti, USSR's Grinevskiy Comment on CFE Talks [TRUD 5 Mar] ..... 22

Soviet Inspectors in UK Under CDE Accords Interviewed on Duties [A. Makhov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Dec] .....	24
General Surikov on Technical Problems Facing SDI [MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 12, Dec] .....	26
Current State of U.S. Debate Over SDI Surveyed [A. Pikayev, A. Savelyev; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 12, Dec] .....	32
General Reviews Progress, Prospects of SDI Program [V. Belous; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 22 Mar] .....	39

## WEST EUROPE

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Commentaries See NATO Policy Disarray at CFE Talks .....	44
Surprise French Proposal [K. Feldmeyer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 18 Mar] .....	44
'WEU' Zone Details [L. Ruehl; DIE WELT 10 Mar] .....	45
Bonn's Growing Discontent [G. Bucerius; DIE ZEIT 10 Mar] .....	46
SPD's Biermann Criticizes NATO Nuclear Strategy [E. Sagflaat; Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET 16 Mar] .....	48
Defense Minister Scholz: 'There Must Be' SNF Modernization [DPA 2 Apr] .....	49
Defense Minister Scholz on Defense, Short-Range Missiles [G. Michler; Cologne Radio 2 Apr] .....	49
Missile Modernization Conflict Viewed .....	53
Effect on Relations with Allies [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 5 Apr] .....	53
CDU on Modernization [R. Moniac; DIE WELT 4 Apr] .....	53
Kohl Says U.S. Conventional, Nuclear Forces Needed To Defend Europe [DPA 3 Apr] .....	53
Companies Supply Iraqi Secret Research Center .....	53
Report in STERN [DPA 2 Apr] .....	53
State Prosecutor Investigating [DPA 2 Apr] .....	54

### DENMARK

Soviet Diplomat Urges Danish Initiative on Baltic Naval Curbs [INFORMATION 8 Mar] .....	54
---	----

### FRANCE

Independent French Nuclear Deterrence Policy Backed [Y. Guena; LE MONDE 3 Feb] .....	55
Government May Propose Eureka Military Research [J. Isnard; LE MONDE 1 Mar] .....	56

### UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Howe's NATO Remarks, Soviet Reaction Reviewed [T. McMullan, C. Moncrieff; PRESS ASSOCIATION 4 Apr] .....	56
Defense Secretary Younger Skeptical on NATO Arms Cuts [P. Harris; PRESS ASSOCIATION 4 Apr] .....	57

**Commentator on Arms Issues in U.S.-West  
European Relations**

*HK3103074689 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese  
29 Mar 89 p 4*

["International Outlook" column by Sai Bei: "An Episode That Has Attracted Attention"]

[Text] The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) issued a statement on 25 March denying the rumor spreading in Brussels that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has reached an agreement on modernizing Europe's short-range missiles. The statement points out that the news is unfounded. This episode indicates that the United States and the FRG not only have a divergence of opinion on the problem of modernizing the short-range missiles, but they are also divided over the policy toward the Soviet Union and the appraisal of the situation in Europe.

Since the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on medium-range missiles, which has been put into effect, the United States has maintained that the Soviet Union remains a threat to Western Europe and insisted that the short-range missiles be modernized so as to act as a nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union, strengthen NATO, and prevent Western Europe from developing a tendency of drifting away in the face of the Soviet Union's detente policy. However, the FRG objected, believing that the modernization of Europe's short-range missiles need not be placed on the agenda until 1992. The United States and the FRG have been at loggerheads over this issue for some time. At present U.S. President Bush is assessing U.S. foreign policies in an all-around way with his senior security advisers. Sino-U.S. relations, arms limitation talks, defense policy, and future demands on conventional and nuclear weapons are among the important subjects under review. The FRG's attitude has an important bearing on U.S. efforts to cook up new policies on these matters. It is not accidental that news of an agreement on the modernization of the short-range missiles is spreading from Brussels at this moment.

The reason for the FRG's insistence on its position can be clearly found in a report carried by THE WASHINGTON POST on 18 March. The report says, "as Bush's

administration is placing U.S. foreign policies on the agenda, the FRG's Government under Chancellor Kohl is trying its best to carry out its policy toward the East European bloc." Clearly the FRG has its own plan for the East European bloc. To carry out this plan, the FRG has been more active in recent months in providing funds for the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc in support of their reforms and in building closer relations with them. The FRG is behaving in a purposeful way.

But the West is worried that the FRG's strategy is not necessarily beneficial to the West even if it proves successful. They are afraid that if the FRG "is bent on playing a possible role in Middle Europe in the future," "it will sooner or later drift away from the West European union and play a vanguard role in a neutral Middle Europe bloc." Well-known American figures even pointed out that it is necessary to prevent the revival of the German Empire, which was all-powerful in Middle Europe before. Clearly if events go along this line, the United States will have to make a great change in its defense and foreign policies. It is possibly for this reason that the United States is eager to understand the FRG's position on the problem of modernizing the short-range missiles.

The remarks by Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Kvitsinskiy, which were quoted by THE WASHINGTON POST, merit our attention. He said that the Soviet Union is not hoping that the FRG will withdraw from NATO for fear that members of the Warsaw Pact will follow its example. It seems that both the United States and the Soviet Union do not wish to have a turbulent Europe. They hold the same view that the military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has relaxed but they refuse to thoroughly change the status quo.

However, with the relaxation of the international situation, the international politics and relations will never be left intact. For a considerably long period to come, the two blocs as well as their members will have to readjust and coordinate their policies and international relations respectively. In this process, it is not likely that the United States will see eye to eye with its allied countries on every issue as it did in the past. This undoubtedly will make it more difficult for the Bush administration to examine its foreign policies.

## INDONESIA

### **Official Regrets U.S. Stance on Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone**

*BK0304125889 Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian  
1200 GMT 3 Apr 89*

[Text] Imron Rosadi, chairman of parliament's Commission I, has expressed his regret over U.S. unwillingness to support ASEAN's initiative to turn Southeast Asia into a nuclear weapon-free zone.

Speaking to newsmen in Jakarta today, Imron Rosadi said the nuclear weapon-free zone is part of ASEAN's struggle to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality. He believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons obviously constitutes an obstacle to efforts to create a peaceful world.

## NORTH KOREA

### **NODONG SINMUN Demands Korean NFZ, Removal of Nuclear Weapons**

*SK0704060689 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0555 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—All the aggression forces including nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from South Korea and the Korean peninsula be converted into a nuclear-free, peace zone in order to remove the most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war in the world.

NODONG SINMUN today says this in a signed article titled "Most Dangerous Hotbed of Nuclear War Should Be Removed First of All."

Noting that South Korea has turned into a most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war first because the U.S. imperialists regard the Korean peninsula as a most favourable region in provoking a nuclear war, the author of the article goes on:

The U.S. imperialists consider that if they ignite a nuclear war in Korea far from the United States, they can rapidly expand its flame to the broad area of Asia and attack even socialist countries without much difficulties, not suffering damages from it.

Vast quantity of nuclear weapons incomparable to any other region in their density have been deployed in South Korea. The U.S. imperialists deployed one nuclear weapon per 400 square kilometres in the NATO region whereas one nuclear weapon per 100 square kilometres in South Korea. This means that South Korea is quadruple the NATO region in the density of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. imperialists have deployed in South Korea all types of nuclear weapons from nuclear shells to neutron bombs they have developed and produced. They have also deployed "F 16" fighter bombers and other means of nuclear delivery.

They plan to ship into South Korea more nuclear weapons and means of nuclear delivery of new type including "B 52" strategic bombers called one of the "three pillars" of strategic nuclear forces and ground-launching cruise missiles and are building special nuclear stores.

They have deployed many nuclear weapons around South Korea and equipped the U.S. seventh fleet in operation in the East Sea of Korea with nuclear weapons.

It is as clear as noonday that the U.S. imperialists would provoke a global nuclear war from the place where their nuclear weapons are deployed most densely and which is favourable to an preemptive offensive. This is another reason why South Korea is a most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war.

The U.S. imperialists have not only deployed many nuclear weapons in South Korea and its surrounding area but also are frantically staging military maneuvers to use them in actuality.

The "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, the largest nuclear war game, staged by them may switch over to a real war any moment.

The danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula can never be unnoticed and accordingly, whether it is removed or not is an important issue related to the destiny not only of the Korean nation but also of the whole mankind.

## NEW ZEALAND

### **Minister Unconcerned over U.S. 'Snubs' over Nuclear Ships Policy**

*BK3003133089 Melbourne Overseas Service in English  
0803 GMT 30 Mar 89*

[From the "International Report" program]

[Text] The news that U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle plans to visit Australia and Asian countries in May has highlighted once again the cool relations between the United States and New Zealand. Mr Quayle has left New Zealand off his itinerary.

New Zealand's minister for external affairs and trade relations and currently acting foreign minister, Mike Moore, told (Jane Row) he regretted the vice president's decision not to visit New Zealand.

[Begin recording] [Moore] I am very disappointed that he is not coming, and I think he is a far more substantial person than the media have made out, and I think if he came to New Zealand, he would find that we are far more substantial and more interesting than maybe his media makes out. So I am disappointed [words indistinct] unable to talk to him to explain our position. We see ourselves as good friends of the Americans, we are

economic allies in every sense, and I am disappointed; perhaps if he had come now we could have saved us a trip, we could have [word indistinct] the America's Cup with him.

[Row] It is being interpreted as a snub because of your antinuclear ships policy. Do you see it that way?

[Moore] I have not had time to talk to the Americans to get any more information, we only know what we read in the Australian newspapers.

[Row] But it is the last in a long series of snubs from the U.S. since that policy?

[Moore] The U.S. have made their position quite clear, and if they don't agree with our policy, that's understood, we understand that. But in other areas such as trade and agricultural reform, we are alongside each other very well.

[Row] The Lange government is dropping in the polls, are you concerned that the snub by the Americans is starting to [words indistinct] electorates.

[Moore] No. What happens, happens. This is a matter we deeply believe in, in this area there is massive public support. We will do what we believe is right.

[Row] There are no signs that you might rethink the nuclear ships policy?

[Moore] Not at all. We have reached a stage in New Zealand now, where even the Conservative Party has a new policy on nuclear visits, they want to renegotiate it, they even may do not want to return to the old days of allowing anybody in. This is a policy that is antinuclear, and it is being interpreted as anti-American; it is not.

[Row] But the outgoing ambassador to New Zealand, the U.S. ambassador to New Zealand has made some pretty scathing comments about anti-American feelings in New Zealand.

[Moore] That is how he feels, I wouldn't quite agree with him. I think New Zealanders are like Americans, we have every...

[Row, interrupting] But he has been there a while, surely he has [words indistinct] a fairly informal view on the subject?

[Moore] Yes. Sometimes, a small country feels it has to assert itself, you could say at times as anti-Australian feeling. We like to make jokes about our big brothers, and we like to have them on and beat them at sports and [words indistinct], it is not anti-American, it is not a racist thing at all. But we are not a trained puppy dog. [end recording]

## VIETNAM

### Delegate Speaks at Geneva Conference on Disarmament

BK0104150989 Hanoi International Service in English  
1000 GMT 1 Apr 89

[Text] Vietnam opposes the use of any kind of chemical weapons and calls for a world free from chemical weapons.

Speaking at the conference on disarmament in Geneva on Tuesday [28 March], Mr Tran Hoan, head of the Vietnamese delegation said that together with other countries in Southeast Asia, Vietnam is striving to turn the region into a zone free of chemical and nuclear weapons. He also pointed out that Vietnam supports Australia's initiative on the nonproliferation of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

## INTRABLOC

### **Warsaw Pact Commander on Pact Cuts, NATO Response**

AU0604132689 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA  
in Bulgarian 5 Apr 89 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, by NOVOSTI observer Yevgeniy Serov: "Mutual Steps Are Required"; date, place not given—special for NARODNA ARMIYA]

[Text] [Serov] The Warsaw Pact member states adopted bold and perfectly sensible solutions on the reduction of their armed forces and military budgets. Can you describe the circumstances that permitted the socialist countries to adopt such initiatives? Also, what are the future, feasible methods of alleviating military tension?

[Lushev] I would like to emphasize in the first place that the decision on the unilateral reduction of armed forces, conventional arms, and military budgets was adopted by the socialist countries outside the context of agreements achieved during negotiations with the other side, namely with NATO. The measures you referred to are not proposals; they are steps adopted at our own initiative. This is the reason why they should not be considered the results of pressure or, let us say, a response to ultimatums imposed by a certain state or coalition of states. On the other hand, if the NATO member states have at last become aware of the need to adopt collective measures to guarantee the security of the European Continent, we would welcome similar steps on their part aimed at reducing those arms which are of priority importance.

The Warsaw Pact member states are reducing their armies because they consider it necessary to confirm in practice the sincerity of their intentions, which are embodied in constructive and peace-loving initiatives. Our unilateral action is a considerable contribution to the disarmament process and is aimed at guaranteeing military detente and creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence on our continent.

The allied socialist states acted as pioneers in implementing the new approach to safeguarding security. By setting an example, they showed that security can and should be built up not by increasing arms but rather by reducing their quantity on the basis of mutual compromise.

The great importance of the unilateral measures adopted by the socialist countries is also determined by the fact that the military doctrine of these countries, which is exclusively defensive, has assumed a specific meaning. Through their unilateral steps the socialist countries have begun to implement the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency. This means that their armed forces have entered an exceptionally important new stage of development: the stage of restructuring, of implementing

their military doctrine in practice. As a result of this, the formations of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and the armed forces of other Warsaw Pact member states will adopt a uniformly defensive nature by 1991.

[Serov] Are unilateral steps by the Warsaw Pact member states in connection with reducing their military potential also possible in the future?

[Lushev] We cannot fully exclude this possibility. Nevertheless, we should take numerous factors into consideration in discussing this question. The most important of these is related to NATO's reaction.

The socialist countries are unable to adopt any further unilateral reductions in the present situation. They would do so if they were really convinced of NATO's readiness to adopt similar steps. However, it is evident that people in the NATO camp are more concerned about implementing their long-term "compensation" and "modernization" programs, and namely about their plans for additional arming [dovuorazhavane].

[Serov] Can you tell me at what level the reduction of armed forces and armaments should assume a bilateral and mutually coordinated nature, one applying to both the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

[Lushev] At the level we have already reached. We propose a reduction of armed forces on the continent to those levels which are absolutely necessary for defense only.

During the first stage, which extends over 2-3 years, imbalances and asymmetries related to the number of troops as well as basic arms are expected to be eliminated. Particular attention should be devoted to reducing the most destabilizing types and categories of weapons such as combat strike-aircraft from front-line (tactical) air forces, tanks, artillery, attack helicopters, and others. As a result of all this, the Warsaw Pact and NATO should meet at the level of equal, collective ceilings, one that should be 10-15-percent lower than the present lowest ceilings for both sides.

Furthermore, poles (zones) of reduced arms levels should be established along the line of contact between the two blocs. At this level one proposes to reduce or limit the most dangerous destabilizing types of conventional arms and to restrict military activities, as well as to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons.

During the second stage—which should also extend over 2-3 years—further reductions will be implemented on the basis of equal percentages and at the level of the equal ceilings attained during the first stage. A reduction of armed forces by approximately 500,000 men on both sides and the withdrawal of certain categories of weapons are expected to take place at this stage. Steps for restructuring the armed forces on the basis of defense sufficiency should be adopted at the same time.

In the third and final stage the armed forces should be organized on a strictly defensive basis, and agreements should be reached on ceilings for all other types of arms and on the establishment of new principles of military organizations that should serve as guidelines for the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states alike.

As the proceedings at the Vienna negotiations demonstrate, some elements of coinciding views were manifested in the course of the negotiations. This applies in particular to certain aspects of the aforementioned reductions. This circumstance justifies our hopes that the negotiations will be fruitful, regardless of all the difficulties and complications involved.

[Serov] As is known, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons was withdrawn from the Vienna negotiations. At the same time, however, the NATO member states intend to modernize these weapons. Do you think that the elimination of such weapons is an absolutely necessary condition for the achievement of stability and security in Europe?

[Lushev] Yes, by all means. The existence of any type of nuclear weapons on both sides inevitably provokes the concern of the other side about the intentions and opportunities for using such weapons. This makes the situation unstable, increases the danger of an intensified arms race, and results in a deterioration of international relations.

The well-known NATO plans on the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons can only accelerate such negative trends. If these plans do not remain only hypotheses but instead become reality, then all the positive changes recently achieved in Europe would be doomed to failure. This would mean restoring the situation that existed prior to the signing of the INF Treaty. The Warsaw Pact member states would not like this to happen.

It is necessary to immediately begin negotiations on this issue. This is the opinion of the USSR and of the other members of the socialist community.

[Serov] How would you describe the future prospects related to the existence of military-political blocs on the European Continent? Can we presume that the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency restricts the use of armed forces to the framework of each country's national territory?

[Lushev] As for the question of military-political alliances in Europe, the opinion of the Warsaw Pact member states has for a long time remained unchanged: The blocs should be disbanded, and this should take place simultaneously on both sides.

NATO, however, does not share this understanding and aspiration. As long as the two blocs exist, it would be expedient to establish closer contacts between them in the interest of guaranteeing peace and security on our continent. Such contacts should extend to all spheres, including

the military sector. It has long since become necessary to discuss our two doctrines in order to transform the concepts and activities of the two blocs into purely defensive ones.

As for the second part of your question, I would like to point out that, as long as alliances of states exist which are linked together by certain mutual commitments, including mutual assistance in particular, then it is possible that these states will employ their armed forces outside their national territories. For example, this may happen in a case in which any member state whatsoever of a particular alliance becomes the object of aggression, and its partners, in accordance with their treaty commitments, come to its rescue.

## BULGARIA

### CFE/CSBM Delegation Head on Accomplishments of First Round

AU2803120689 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO  
in Bulgarian 24 Mar 89 p 5

[Telephone interview with Lyuben Petrov, leader of the Bulgarian delegation to the Vienna talks, by a "representative of RABOTNICHESKO DELO's editorial board," in Vienna: "At the Vienna Talks—Dynamic and Businesslike Beginning"; date not given]

[Text] The first round of the talks on conventional weapons in Europe (the talks of the 23) and on measures for strengthening confidence and security (the talks of the 35) ended in Vienna on 23 March. On this occasion a representative of our editorial board telephoned Lyuben Petrov, leader of the Bulgarian delegation, and requested an initial assessment of the work accomplished up to this point.

[RABOTNICHESKO DELO] What was the atmosphere and conduct of the talks during the first round?

[Petrov] The talks took place in a dynamic fashion and in a good atmosphere. Although there were occasionally sharp exchanges, these were without the mutual accusations that frequently marked past talks. If we compare the talks with the beginning of the Stockholm conference or with the Vienna talks on central Europe, we could even say that the present talks began in an unusual way. Specific proposals were already introduced by the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states during the first days of the talks, and specific debates began. These were accompanied by a comparison of the stands and the search for and the emphasis on common elements, yet without underestimating or minimizing the existing differences. I would like to stress that a futile numerical discussion was avoided. During the last few days both the Warsaw Pact and the NATO member states expressed their desire to create an appropriate working structure for the talks, to already advance at the start of the next session to the discussion of specific issues, and to prepare the first agreements.

[RABOTNICHESKO DELO] What are the main issues on which there are common stands, and what differences exist at the present stage?

[Petrov] Determining the categories of conventional weapons and equipment to be reduced during the first stage is emerging as the main issue at the talks of the 23. A general understanding exists on this issue. The understanding that tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers must be reduced during the first stage also is a common one. However, the socialist countries insist on simultaneously reducing the number of strike and tactical air forces and combat helicopters. This issue is one of our serious disputes with NATO.

As far as the talks of the 35 are concerned, a common understanding exists on the necessity of developing and expanding the Stockholm agreements. However, the representatives of the NATO member states are reducing their proposals mainly to providing significantly more information about ground forces, while we consider it important to also encompass the activity of air and naval forces, as well as to adopt a number of measures that will limit military activity.

[RABOTNICHESKO DELO] Could you say something about the efforts of our delegation?

[Petrov] Already on 10 March our delegation submitted a proposal for a new generation of measures on strengthening confidence and security in Europe. The proposal was prepared together with Hungary, the GDR, and the CSSR, and it was supported by all the other socialist countries. During the past 2 weeks, together with the delegations of the socialist countries we clarified the proposals that we submitted. We now part with moderate optimism for a promising start of the talks, but without illusions concerning the difficulties that we still must overcome. Already during the first days and weeks it was understood by all that we are facing complex and difficult talks.

**Vienna Negotiations Assessed; NATO Criticized**  
*AU3103182589 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA*  
*in Bulgarian 30 Mar 89 p 4*

[Captain Ivan Genov article: "Vienna—A Positive Beginning"]

[Text] The first round of negotiations on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe ended 1 week ago. Thanks to the preceding meeting of foreign affairs ministers, the negotiations began with great elan, stands were promptly and accurately defined, and the debates started without delays and without unnecessary numerical discussions.

The first conclusions that we may draw from these negotiations are related to the fact that the basic platforms of the negotiating sides contain numerous similar or identical factors, which provide favorable conditions for a constructive and effective dialogue. Let us briefly recall that the

proposals submitted by the Warsaw Pact member states represent a long-term program in three stages for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms at levels of reasonable defense sufficiency. The NATO proposals envisage reductions for the following three categories of armaments only: tanks, artillery, and armored equipment. The two proposals have the following factors in common at this stage: the effort to eliminate the lack of balance and the existing asymmetries, to reduce conventional arms to levels which are lower than the lowest ceilings of the past, and as a result of this—to adopt even more intensive reductions. Real opportunities for fruitful solutions do exist in this respect, as a matter of fact.

At the same time, numerous difficulties and differences of opinion exist. The NATO proposal does not include the striking air force. However, it is impossible to eliminate the danger of surprise attack without reducing this typical category of attack weapons. In the sphere of building confidence and security measures, the Warsaw Pact proposed a radical program of renewal, while the NATO initiatives are rather superficial.

Certain statements of high-ranking Western statesmen and military leaders contradict the spirit of the negotiations. President George Bush, in his speech delivered on the occasion of introducing the new U.S. secretary of defense, stated: "Let me make it perfectly clear that it is not the right time for the United States and its allies to engage in one-sided reductions of our armed forces, likely to weaken our own defense efforts. We should make further progress in implementing the plans on the modernization of our strategic and conventional armed forces and get on with our 'star wars' program." A similar statement was made by General John Galvin, commander in chief of the NATO air force in Europe, who said: "As in the past, NATO should continue to base its actions on Soviet military superiority and not consent to any one-sided reductions." It is evident that both statements express disagreement with one-sided reductions. However, considering such statements in their entire context, generally speaking, we would not detect any readiness for disarmament in them, no matter how hard we tried. Such manifestations of "vigilance" containing relapses of the "cold war" are certainly far from creating the most favorable atmosphere for the Vienna negotiations, whose next round is scheduled to open on 5 May 1989.

**CFE/CSBM Delegation Head Sees 'Promising Start'**

*AU0404143389 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO*  
*in Bulgarian 3 Apr 89 p 6*

[Article by Ambassador Lyuben Petrov, leader of the Bulgarian delegation to the Vienna talks: "The Vienna Talks—Agreements Are Possible"]

[Text] The talks of the 23 states on conventional weapons, and of the 35 on confidence- and security-building measures, began dynamically in a businesslike and con-

structive atmosphere. The good start was facilitated by the 6-8 March meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs which enriched the notions and visions on the stands, intentions, and future actions of the participants.

The proposals related to the two sets of talks and introduced by the Warsaw Pact and NATO on the 1st day, and the concrete debate that began, demonstrated many close or coinciding elements but also some differences. While some of the differences can be easily eliminated, the rest require the readiness and willingness to compromise. A promising start: This is how some of the participants assessed the first round of talks.

The proposals submitted to the talks of the 23 reflect the common understanding of the need to reduce the most destabilizing kinds and categories of weapons, to eliminate the asymmetries, determine collective levels for the various kinds of arms of the two alliances—these must be lower than the existing lowest levels—establish a comprehensive and effective system of verification, and so on.

However, there are differences even in the coinciding elements, and some of them are even essential. Therefore, for example, the proposal submitted by NATO envisages reducing only three categories of weapons—tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers—categories in which the Warsaw Pact has an advantage, while excluding tactical (front) aircraft and combat helicopters, areas in which NATO has an advantage. It would be easy to imagine the reaction of the West if the socialist countries had proposed to reduce only those weapons in which NATO has an advantage.

NATO does not envisage reducing the personnel of its armed forces and is indefinitely postponing measures related to giving the armed forces a strict defensive character by dismantling their offensive-strike structures.

In addition, the figures and “concentric circles” (in fact, geographic regions) that NATO uses to divide the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals testify to the intention to obtain unilateral advantages. At the same time, they do not envisage creating reduced-arms zones along the line of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as the Warsaw Pact proposes.

Undoubtedly, determining the regions in the zone of talks is of great importance in achieving equal security for the states. This also corresponds to the requirements of the mandate on removing regional differences. However, the “concentric circles” have been artificially created and preserve the regional inequality with the ensuing consequences for the security of the individual countries or groups of countries. For example, one of these circles unites Iceland and Norway with Turkey and Greece, while Bulgaria and Romania are treated separately. Another circle combines the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, with the CSSR, the GDR, and the Polish People's Republic.

The equal security of the participating states requires not only an equally lower level of weapons but also the redeployment of troops and weapons. Therefore, the socialist countries attach great importance to decreasing the concentration of armed forces and weapons in the region of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and to thinning out their strike elements.

The Warsaw Pact member states attribute great importance to the relative share of the Bundeswehr in NATO's collective forces, and Bulgaria attributes great importance to the relative share of Turkey's armed forces and arms.

Our proposal, unlike NATO's, also determines the stages of the reductions. During the first stage (1991-94) it is proposed to eliminate the asymmetries and to lower the level of arms to an equal ceiling 10-15 percent lower than the lowest existing level. During the second stage (1994-97) the armed forces of the countries will be reduced by an equal percentage, say 25 percent (500,000 troops on each side). In addition, toward the year 2000 (the third stage), the armed forces must be further reduced and acquire a strictly defensive character.

The NATO program does not envisage stages and terms of implementation.

While assessing the documents of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, many Western commentators point out the differences and evaluate the proposals.

Prof John Steibrunner of the U.S. Brookings Institute describes the Warsaw Pact proposals as “solid, superbly argued, and firm.... They encompass more categories of weapons than do NATO's proposals. They begin precisely with the factors that NATO has left out—the aircraft of strike air forces—and then continue with tanks, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and troops. NATO's proposal is more reserved.”

Reducing tactical strike aircraft emerged as the most difficult problem in the talks of the 23.

There are also close and coinciding elements in the documents of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on confidence- and security-building measures.

Adherence to the principle of openness [otkritost] and glasnost has been expressed as a precondition for strengthening confidence between the states and increasing security on the continent. The need to further develop and expand the measures contained in the Stockholm document has been acknowledged. Some of the measures on information, proposed by NATO, coincide with our proposal to create a center for reducing the military threat and preventing a first strike in Europe. The requirements on improving verification, improving the work of military observers and inspectors, comparing military doctrines, and other issues of military policy also coincide.

There are two basic differences: The Warsaw Pact's proposal contains measures related to limiting military activity in peacetime. All measures encompass the activity of naval and air forces.

NATO's proposal excludes naval forces, and relates only partly to air forces. In addition, it contains no limiting measures. In essence, all measures of this proposal are reduced to providing information.

Some NATO representatives described the Warsaw Pact's proposals at the talks of the 35 as "ambitious," and their own proposals as "moderate and realistic."

We are proposing a "new generation of measures on confidence and security." This proposal accords with the positive changes that have taken place in Europe. Who could have imagined at the opening of the Stockholm conference that it would end with such a concluding document, one that without exception was positively assessed by all the ministers of foreign affairs? The Vienna document would have been impossible in 1984 and 1986. The impossible became possible thanks to the new political thinking which the socialist countries and first of all the USSR have implemented in practical domestic and foreign policy. According to the telling sentence of one of the participants—what was taboo yesterday has become possible today.

The documents prepared at the Vienna talks relate not to the next 1-2 years but to the period until the end of the century. They must reflect not only the present situation, but also the trend for improved East-West relations. The needle of the barometer is firmly pointing at "clear" and "warm" weather.

It is very indicative that the conference of the leading figures of the member parties of the Socialist International, which took place at the Hofburg palace on 9 and 10 March, adopted a resolution on disarmament which contains proposals that coincide in many points with the proposals of the Warsaw Pact at the talks of the 23, and which in some points are even more radical. Therefore, it was proposed to mutually reduce weapons and armed forces to a level 50 percent lower than the present NATO level.

In presenting the Warsaw Pact proposals on security- and confidence-building measures on 9 March, the Bulgarian delegation stated that it does not view the proposals as ultimative or as having been frozen, and that we are also prepared to benevolently and constructively consider other proposals.

The beginning showed that complex and difficult talks, perhaps some of the most complex and difficult talks ever, lie ahead of us. They could end without any results. However, there are many indications that an agreement is possible, and that it could be reached at an early stage.

The next round of the talks, which begin on 5 May, will shed more light on this issue.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### CFE/CSBM Delegation Head Calls First Round 'Encouraging'

AU2903072189 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak  
24 Mar 89 pp 1, 7

[Report on an interview with Ambassador Ladislav Balcar, head of the CSSR delegation to Vienna disarmament talks, by Bratislava PRAVDA editor Jozef Janto, in Vienna: "The First Round of Disarmament Talks Has Ended; the Start Is Encouraging"; date not given]

[Text] The first round of two sets of disarmament talks, which are the result of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the CSCE, ended in Vienna's Hofburg Palace yesterday. Representatives of 7 member states of the Warsaw Pact and the 16 NATO member states discussed conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals, and representatives of all 35 countries participating in the Helsinki process of strengthening confidence and security in Europe (the second stage of the Stockholm Conference) held 2 weeks of talks in two of the Hofburg's halls.

The majority of the participants in the Vienna talks agreed that the first round was a useful exchange of opinions and a clarification of the stands of all the participating states. The meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of 33 European countries and the United States and Canada that took place here in the Hofburg, less than 2 weeks ago, provided a positive impetus for the talks.

How does the Czechoslovak delegation assess the course of the first round of the two deliberations, I asked its head, Ambassador Ladislav Balcar. "It is impossible to draw any far-reaching conclusions from the first round of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces involving 23 states, and the 35 CSCE participants," the head of the Czechoslovak delegation said. He then continued: "The talks are the start of a road to greater security and to a much lower level of armed forces on our continent. The length of that road and its concrete results are still unknown quantities. As for the start of the talks at both forums, which have no equal in terms of their depth and the extent of the representation in the historic efforts for disarmament, it can be said that this beginning has been encouraging. As early as today it can be said that pragmatism, the constructive aspects, and everybody's interest in getting things moving without unnecessary procrastination, are prevailing. Right from the start, a dialogue has developed which, although sometimes sharp, is—at the same time—nonconfrontational.

"In the talks of the 23, both groups—that is, the Warsaw Pact and NATO—submitted their proposals. In many respects these differ, but they also certainly have several points of agreement, from which it is possible to proceed further.

"What is involved in particular is the mutual agreement on the need to scrap weapons destined for surprise attacks and for waging extensive offensive operations, as well as the need to limit conventional armed forces to an identical, collective level. The same applies to the unanimity of views on the introduction of strict international verification, including on-site inspection."

#### **And as for differences?**

"Whereas the Warsaw Pact member states propose including active forces in the reductions, as well as all the most destabilizing offensive weapons—tanks, tactical air forces, and combat helicopters—the NATO member states still insist on a selective approach. They demand a reduction only in the number of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. They also leave out the numerical strength of troops. We believe that in the upcoming rounds, together with the clarification of definitions and criteria for this type of immensely complex and demanding process of disarmament, the two sides will find corresponding methods and forms to overcome differences."

#### **And what is the situation at the talks of the 35?**

"Here, too, a broad, constructive dialogue has developed. The fact that two fundamental proposals were submitted as early as the first session has contributed to this. The first one, on behalf of the socialist states, was submitted by the CSSR, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the GDR. The other proposal came from the NATO member states. The two proposals, as well as the discussions that followed, revealed that the CSCE participant states are trying to use the positive experience acquired from the realization of the Stockholm document to work out further, more effective measures to strengthen confidence and security. The approach of the socialist states to this problem is comprehensive and sets itself the objective of achieving the elaboration of a qualitatively new generation of mutually complementary measures. The project also creates scope for applying the military aspects of the CSSR proposal to establish a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO."

"A proposal by the Socialist Republic of Romania contains many stimulating suggestions for the elaboration of measures to strengthen confidence and security. It was submitted at the latest plenary session."

#### **And what about NATO's proposal?**

"The proposal of the NATO member states is marked by a narrowed-down perception of the problems that are being discussed. However, it opens up an opportunity, for example, for assessing the military doctrines of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. I believe that with goodwill on the part of all participants it will be possible to bridge some differences, for example, the narrowed-down view

of our Western partners on the so-called static information concerning the structure and stationing of armed forces. The method of a healthy, generally acceptable compromise must be applied here, too."

Several news conferences were held in the Hofburg yesterday. At the first of them, the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, expressed appreciation for the course of the first round of both of the sets of Vienna talks. Concerning the proposals of the individual sides, he said that they constitute a serious base for further talks. However, while the purpose of the Warsaw Pact proposal for implementing the program to reduce conventional armed forces in three stages lies in reducing their level so greatly that they would be sufficient solely for defensive operations, this concrete perspective is missing in the NATO proposal. NATO has submitted a proposal for reducing the number of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, but it does not say a thing about tactical air forces and helicopters, in which it has superiority.

O. Grinevskiy then characterized the individual stages contained in the Warsaw Pact proposal and stressed that it is necessary to build small bridges between the two proposals as early as during the first stage. Namely, these proposals do not address only a mutual equilibrium in the individual types of weapons, but also radically reducing their numbers. However, one has to come to an agreement on the types of weapons to which this will pertain, but this is a more complex matter. The Warsaw Pact member states rightly point out that tactical air forces, which NATO did not include in its proposal, are a dangerous offensive factor. Another unacceptable fact is that the NATO member states do not speak of reducing the number of troops, O. Grinevskiy emphasized.

The delegations will now return home to assess with their governments the valuable experience they have acquired in the course of the first round. The next round will begin on 5 May and will last until the beginning of June. During the more than 1-month-long break in both forums—which, however, will be filled with work on "domestic tasks"—the individual delegations as well as the two sides will certainly arrive at new points of agreement.

#### **Austrian Defense Minister Visits, Discusses CSCE, Troop Cuts, CW**

##### **Arrives in Prague**

*LD2903013889 Prague CTK in English  
1707 GMT 28 Mar 89*

[Text] Prague March 28 (CTK)—Austrian Minister of National Defence Robert Lichal arrived in Czechoslovakia for an official visit today. He was welcomed by Czechoslovak Defence Minister General Milan Vaclavik and other representatives of the Czechoslovak Army command at the Prague airport.

**Meets With Defense Minister Vaclavik**  
*LD2903134789 Prague CTK in English*  
*1157 GMT 29 Mar 89*

[Text] Prague March 29 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Defence Minister Army General Milan Vaclavik and his Austrian counterpart Robert Lichal voiced here Wednesday [29 March] satisfaction with cooperation which started to develop three years ago and was confirmed during last year's official visit by Army General Milan Vaclavik to Austria.

Also the visit of General Otmar Tauschitz, the Austrian Army general inspector, to Czechoslovakia last December and participation of observers in the joint exercises of the two countries' armies testify to the deepening of mutual relations.

In a friendly discussion, the Czechoslovak minister stressed Austria's part in deepening the process of detente between the European states, working out the final document of the Vienna follow-up meeting which was a basis for the current Vienna talks on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe and conventional arms and troop reduction on the continent. In the spirit of the Czechoslovak initiative to establish a zone of confidence and cooperation along the borderline between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries, also Czechoslovakia wants to work for a successful outcome of the talks.

Milan Vaclavik informed the Austrian minister on troop and armament reduction and changes in organization being implemented in the Czechoslovak People's Army, which reflect the application of the Czechoslovak military doctrine and the principle of strict defence sufficiency in ensuring the country's defence capability.

Both officials voiced interest in further promotion of the two countries' contacts which will strengthen peaceful cooperation and deepen good neighbourly relations, mutual understanding and confidence.

**Meets Premier Adamec**  
*LD3003150789 Prague CTK in English*  
*1320 GMT 30 Mar 89*

[Text] Prague March 30 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Premier Ladislav Adamec received here today Austrian Minister of Defence Robert Lichal, currently on an official visit to Czechoslovakia.

Speaking about Czechoslovak foreign policy, Ladislav Adamec said that Czechoslovakia fully supports disarmament initiatives in Europe and in the world and seeks a total ban on chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia will include in its laws obligations, worked out into details, accepted at the CSCE Vienna follow-up meeting, Ladislav Adamec stated.

The premier characterized the Austrian defence minister's first visit to Czechoslovakia as a concrete contribution of the two states to the development of good neighbourly relations.

Robert Lichal stated that Austria is greatly interested in maximum limitations of offensive military potentials of armies and backs a total ban on chemical weapons. Under an Austrian proposal, an international agency, verifying implementation of the ban, could reside in Vienna.

The two representatives exchanged their views on the protection of the environment in central Europe and dealt with the initiative to summon a meeting of premiers of the countries neighbouring on Czechoslovakia. Ladislav Adamec appreciated Austrian experts' activities at the preparatory meeting.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

**Deputy Defense Minister on Disarmament, Security**  
*AU3003153689 East Berlin DER MORGEN in German*  
*28 Mar 89 pp 1-2*

[Article by Lieutenant General Manfred Graetz, GDR deputy minister of national defense and chief of the Rear Services Main Administration: "Disarmament and Security"]

[Text] The two terms disarmament and security, which comprise an entire package of initiatives—even a concept that has been raised to state policy—have long been known to us, the citizens of the GDR and, of course, to citizens in uniform. After all, the ideal of socialism was and is a world without weapons.

In accordance with this historically based experience, over the past few weeks the Soviet Union and the states joined to it in the Warsaw Pact defense alliance have again submitted unilateral disarmament initiatives in steady continuation of their peace policy. Regardless of the fact that the dimensions and time limits of the verifiable implementation of these proposals are unprecedented, the unilateral moves forward prove that socialist disarmament unites word and deed.

Today it is necessary to profoundly restructure conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe; it is necessary to increasingly restrict them to exclusively defensive tasks, and, finally, to make NATO and the Warsaw Pact structurally incapable of attack.

This goal is served by the above-mentioned, unilateral moves forward by the socialist states in December 1988 and January 1989, and the Vienna talks about conventional disarmament are also moving in this direction. The representatives of the socialist community will do everything to get one step closer to this goal.

While strictly preserving the military balance of power at an ever lower level, measures are necessary to achieve an incapability of attack by both sides. Therefore, this is in line with a new, up-to-date approach to the implementation of military doctrine, whereby the previously dominant principle of preventing war through military means is being put aside more and more in deference to the principle of preventing war through political means. Fully in this spirit, we have always understood and implemented disarmament steps, and we are following the iron principle that war must never again emanate from German soil, but only peace.

However, as reasonable and realistic as this way of thinking and acting is, and as little fertile soil can be found for the lie of the "threat from the East" today, so the opponents of any disarmament are tenaciously intensifying their activities, and this course is nurtured—as Erich Honecker explained at the seventh Central Committee session of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]—"by those circles that gain profits from the arms buildup and who do not like the borders that emerged as a result of World War II and the postwar development in Europe."

Against better knowledge and contrary to the worldwide positive effects of disarmament initiatives that have already been implemented, such as the INF Treaty, they want to stop if possible the incipient process of disarmament and confidence-building, or at least delay it; they want to compensate, modernize and push forward the process of arms buildup. These clear tones, such as the adherence to the strategy of "nuclear deterrence," which has been proved to be everything else but a defensive concept, are followed by the utilization of all results of the scientific-technological revolution achieved to date with the goal of producing weapons of an entirely new quality, which, furthermore, yield even higher profits.

In view of these realities and keeping in mind that the extent of our defense efforts does not depend on wishful thinking but on the degree of the potential threat, it is our most important concern to responsibly fulfill the class assignment of the 11th SED Congress as participants in shaping the policy of the SED, which is aimed at the welfare of the people and the safeguarding of peace.

We must never forget: The threat to peace caused by the most reactionary forces of imperialism has not yet been eliminated. There are still no guarantees of the irreversibility of the initiated positive developments in the world. As long as there are forces that would prefer to eliminate socialism as a social system as quickly as possible and even publicly say so, vigilance and appropriate readiness for defense are necessary. We stand to this, knowing that the socialist way is the only way to solve the basic problem of our time—the preservation of peace and thus of mankind's existence.

### NATO Accused of Using 'Horse Trader's Trick' in CFE Talks

AU3003140489 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 28 Mar 89 p 2

["He." commentary: "NATO's Horse Trader Trick"]

[Text] The first round of talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe has been concluded in Vienna. Negotiations will be continued on 5 May. Both sides spoke of a basically good start. However, differences have emerged between the constructive position of the Warsaw Pact states and that of NATO, whose strategy is aimed at unilateral advantages.

One must admit that those who tried to slow down or even block the process in Vienna were very active. The NATO commander in chief in Europe, U.S. General Galvin, presented his antiquated scenario in a newspaper article: The "threat from the East" continues to exist; for this reason, NATO must stick to the principle of "deterrence", in which connection the "modernization" of tactical nuclear weapons is also necessary.

Defense Minister Scholz stressed the same aspect when addressing the participants in the Easter marches as it were, as well as the 90 percent of FRG citizens who are in favor of modernizing policies and against modernizing missiles: "Security policy," which is equivalent to a renewed arms buildup, is certainly not popular, he pointed out. "However, popularity and populism are the last criteria for a responsible security policy."

In order to prevent the whole idiotic arms race from becoming even more unpopular, NATO, the FRG Government, and the Defense Ministry have resorted to a device that can only be described as a clumsy horse trader's trick. NATO has long reached agreement on the "modernization" of tactical nuclear weapons, officials point out. New land-based missiles are being modified to cover a range of 500 km, and nuclear stand-off weapons are being developed for attack air forces—"without calling for their deployment for the time being." This is really the limit! FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU explained the underlying reasons: The whole thing has been organized "with the climate of disarmament talks between Warsaw Pact and NATO, but also with national elections scheduled for December 1990 in mind."

In addition to that, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney ordered a "Delta Star" satellite, an SDI element, to be launched into space on Good Friday [24 March]. Prior to that, however, he urged the European NATO allies to make increased efforts in the conventional sphere. He stated that one should not delude oneself as to think that "the world has suddenly become more peaceful and secure."

He is certainly right. Considering everything that is happening in the sphere of NATO, one can not delude oneself into assuming such a thing. The consequence is: Disarmament is more important now than ever before! It is imperative for us to continue to be ready to protect socialism and peace....

**East Bloc's Unilateral Disarmament Steps,  
Defense Assessed**

AU0404122989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 3 Apr 89 p 2

["He."-signed article: "Are We Perhaps Exaggerating?"]

[Text] Our reader Gerd Ullrich from Burg asked us this question concerning the unilateral disarmament steps that have been announced by the GDR and other socialist countries.

First of all, one must say that the entire consistent peace and disarmament policy of socialism has been successful. Our proposals and initiatives, and the people's will to achieve peace have set things in motion in a positive direction. The USSR-U.S. INF Treaty has marked the first disarmament agreement: The intermediate-range nuclear missiles will be scrapped. Now the radical reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe is to be negotiated in Vienna. We announced our unilateral advance concessions prior to the Vienna talks.

All these steps are of great importance for our continent, for the peoples of the whole world, and for peace. They correspond to the dictate of our time—and they are showing their effect. A total of 90 percent of the people in the West no longer believe in the lies of a "threat from the East," which NATO has used over the decades to justify its doctrine of nuclear "deterrence," (and which NATO continues to do, although—in the face of the true facts—with considerable difficulties), a doctrine that is aggressive by its very nature. Our incentives have not only helped the simple people to acquire more realistic and reasonable viewpoints and a readiness to negotiate, but also prominent politicians, entire parties, movements, and parliaments.

If our peace and disarmament measures, including the aforementioned advance concessions, are having such an effect, then this demonstrates with how much responsibility they have been designed.

However, one must not have any illusions concerning disarmament issues. We are well aware of the fact that there are strong forces within NATO that welcome our steps with words, but that have so far not been ready for deeds—apart from "modernizing" their own arsenals, meaning to increase the arms arsenals. Some people do not want equality and equal security at the lowest possible level, but rather continue to dream of military superiority, so that they can threaten and blackmail socialism.

This results in a double conclusion. For the sake of preventing a nuclear inferno, we must and will vigorously continue our constructive and exemplary peace and disarmament policy, even though the road to understanding and negotiations is long and thorny. At the same time, we will always guarantee the defensive capability of socialism at the necessary level, as established by the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states, which aims at preventing war. Vigilance remains a necessity, as does being a soldier in socialism. In full agreement with our disarmament policy, this continues to be of significance for humanist reasons and for the preservation of peace.

**FRG SPD's Bahr Attends Meeting of FRG, GDR  
Institutes**

AU0304103289 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 31 Mar 89 p 2

[Text] East Berlin (ADN)—On Thursday [30 March], a 2-day expert meeting between scientists of the GDR International Politics and Economics Institute and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of the University of Hamburg, began in Berlin. Headed by the directors of the two institutes, Max Schmidt and Egon Bahr [of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany], the possibilities for and problems of negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe, and the effects of qualitative armament trends on the disarmament process will be discussed. These talks continue the scientific exchange of opinions concerning paths toward joint security, which has taken place between the two institutes for several years.

**CDE States' Observers Invited to GDR-USSR  
Joint Exercises**

LD0504120389 East Berlin ADN International Service  
in German 1124 GMT 5 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A troop exercise by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSSD) and the National People's Army of the GDR (NVA) is to take place between 15 and 21 April in the areas of Treuenbrietzen, Jessen, Cottbus, Eisenhuettenstadt, and Teupitz. Up to 18,500 members of the fraternal armies will take part in it. The leader of the exercise is the commander of an army of the GSSD.

The exercise is aimed at perfecting the level of troops' training and improving the management and cooperation of troops in defense.

In the annual summary of military activities on GDR territory for 1989, the exercise was announced to all the states of the Stockholm conference. Observers from these countries were invited.

## HUNGARY

### CFE 'Initiatives' To Be Offered With Finnish, Italian Parties

LD1703001389 Budapest MTI in English  
2125 GMT 16 Mar 89

[Text] Rome, March 16 (MTI)—The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Italian Socialist Party and the Finnish Social Democratic Party are to make further initiatives for the Vienna conference on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe to be successful as soon as possible. The representatives of the three parties met in Rome on Thursday [16 March] to make further recommendations in the interest of disarmament in Europe.

In 1987 the three parties issued a joint statement with the aim of promoting the successful conclusion of the Vienna follow-up conference. Now another important phase of European conferences has started in Vienna, all three parties hold it necessary to continue the initiative, and coordinate their opinions and proposals. The tripartite consultation was opened by Bettino Craxi, general secretary of the Italian Socialist Party. The Hungarian delegation was headed by Csaba Tabajdi, deputy head of the CC's [Central Committee] Department of International Party Relations, the Italian delegation by Margherita Boniver, in charge of foreign relations, and Senator Paolo Vittorelli, and the Finnish delegation by R. Valyrynen.

Items on the agenda include the mandate of the Vienna conference of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the evaluation and elimination of mutual asymmetries in armaments, the transformation of the character of military doctrines into the defensive, the establishment of mutual offensive incapacities through the establishment of corridors and zones free from offensive weapons, and further initiatives. The sides also discuss the possibility of involving other democratic forces in the initiatives.

### Party Aide Links CFE Success, Bloc Dissolution, Hungarian Neutrality

LD3103123389 Budapest MTI in English  
0935 GMT 31 Mar 89

[Text] Budapest, March 31 (MTI)—Although there are armies without parties, the world has no apolitical armies. It is rather illusory to speak about this, since each power, irrespective of the social order of the country, considers its self-defence a national interest. Ferenc Szombathelyi, military policy advisor to the HSWP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] general secretary, told MTI.

It is another matter how the various countries organize their army, he went on. From this aspect, the scale is rather broad, since it is connected with the issue of whether or not soldiers can be party members and whether parties are allowed to operate within the army. Communist Party organizations can be found in the armies of all socialist countries, the military advisor said.

The demand for an apolitical Hungarian army stems from the fact that the Hungarian People's Army is regarded by many as the military organization of the HSWP. As long as the social programme of the HSWP is acceptable to the people, its political influence is justified in the Army, he stressed. According to service regulations in force, there can be a single party, the HSWP, a single youth organization, the Communist Youth Union (KISZ), and a single trade union, the Army Committee of the Union of Public Employees, in the Army. The latter may include civil employees of the Army.

Mr Szombathelyi said that 80 per cent of the officers and 1.5-2 per cent of the rank-and-file are members of the HSWP, while the proportion of KISZ members decreased from 40-50 per cent to 35 per cent. The young people who are members of another party or movement in their civil life are not allowed to set up independent political organizations within the Army. When on leave, however, there is no obstacle in the way of their political activity. The Armed Forces cannot, in any circumstances, be allowed to become the scene of party clashes or political struggle, because this would put an end to the uniform conception and the guarantee of operational ability.

On the score that the issue of Hungarian neutrality had been raised by a number of people recently, the military advisor said that the HSWP has held it necessary for a long time to take concerted action for the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO. If the Vienna talks on disarmament are successful, this would be conceivable before the end of the century. It would be a precondition of further steps. The advocates of neutrality think that it would considerably decrease the maintenance costs of the Army. This is a misbelief, since it is quite another thing to keep an army on an advanced level within an alliance system than to maintain an effective, rather than "operetta", army relying on our own resources. Mr Szombathelyi remarked that Hungary's security should be guaranteed not only by military force, but mainly by political means—a sound economic policy, for instance, which is also a factor for preserving sovereignty.

Mr Szombathelyi pointed out that most recently the HSWP Political Committee had taken a stand on some military policy issues. It was a timely task, since the world situation has changed and a new security policy is taking shape in Europe. Furthermore, the economic load-bearing capacity of the country has also changed and a number of contradictions emerging within the Army had to be eliminated.

For instance, the balance between development and maintenance has been upset. At present, 20 per cent of the military budget is allocated to development and 80 per cent to maintenance. In the long term, this proportion cannot result in an advanced army. In the current technical revolution, when prices increased by 5 to 15 times in ten years, it is untenable to allocate a mere 20 per cent to development and that our military equipment should be much less advanced than desired. For this reason, Hungary

should develop an army with a smaller, but more effective, staff and equipment to match, while the burdens on the budget should not increase but, if possible, even decrease.

The structure, location and direction of the People's Army should be reconsidered in the light of the doctrine of reasonable and sufficient defence. The 8.8-per/cent cut in troops announced recently can be regarded as the starting point of a new way of thinking, the military policy advisor to the HSWP general secretary said.

## POLAND

**CFE/CSBM Delegates Assess First Round**  
*AU2803143789 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish*  
23 Mar 89 p 8

[PAP report: "Businesslike Talks in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna—On the eve of the end of the first round of the conference of 35 states on confidence- and security-building measures, and of the CSCE talks involving the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO member states on conventional armed forces in Europe, representatives of four participating countries—Poland, the United States, Bulgaria, and the FRG—agreed that the first round had proceeded well and in a businesslike manner, and that this round permits hopes for a successful second round, which will commence on 5 May.

Ambassador W. Konarski, head of the Polish delegation, said that apart from presenting the proposals called for by the program of the first round of talks, the first round has also begun an exchange of detailed arguments and an explanation of stances. From the Polish point of view, the talks are developing favorably, and right now what is important is to give them as much substance as possible. This has been made possible by the consensus that has been reached on the proposals presented to date. There is still a series of points on which no agreement has been reached, as well as difficulties of a technical nature, to be discussed. One of these is the incorporation of air and naval forces into the subject matter of the talks, said the Polish representative.

Piotr Switalski, a member of the Polish delegation, also spoke. He referred to NATO's readiness to discuss military concepts and doctrines at CSCE seminars. He was pleased by the fact that, in this way, the Western member states are implementing the initiative expressed by the Warsaw Pact member states at the 1987 Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee and contained in the Polish plan, known as the Jaruzelski plan, to reduce arms and increase confidence in Europe.

## Premier Rakowski Toasts Belgian Prime Minister During Visit

*AU0604135389 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish*  
30 Mar 89 p 5

[Speech by Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic, at a dinner given in honor of Wilfried Martens, prime minister of the Kingdom of Belgium, in Warsaw on 29 March]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Prime Minister!

Esteemed Mrs Martens!

Dear Belgian guests!

I would like to say that it pleases me greatly to be able to play host to you, Mr Prime Minister, your wife, and the persons accompanying you, including Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans. [passage omitted]

Peace, which is mankind's highest ideal, is indivisible. Efforts to ensure lasting peace are not and cannot be the exclusive domain of great powers. We believe, as Belgium does, that all small and medium-sized states can and should make their own original contribution to the process of detente, the building of confidence, and the development of cooperation between peoples.

This belief lies at the core of Polish disarmament initiatives, among which the plan for reducing weapons and increasing confidence in central Europe occupies an important place. We consider the Jaruzelski plan to be open-ended, and we are prepared to develop and enrich it by way of dialogue with all the partners concerned, including Belgium.

The attention and interest of Polish foreign policy have traditionally focused on matters concerning our continent. We attach great hopes to what we see happening in Europe: the revival of a sense of a European identity and the process whereby Europe is becoming a continent of peace, detente, and cooperation between states that retain their separate political, cultural, and national identities.

Great expectations accompany the commencement of negotiations on reducing conventional forces and on new confidence-building measures. We are taking part in them, guided by the belief that there is a need to reach agreement on all these issues in our own interest and in the interests of Europe and the world. We are to trying to play an active part in creating an appropriate climate and conditions that would be conducive to success in these negotiations. Our desire to engage in constructive cooperation is confirmed by, among other things, our unilateral decisions concerning reductions and changes in the Polish Armed Forces.

At the same time, we think the time has come to agree on a formula for negotiations and to work out a concept for reducing tactical nuclear capabilities so that they cease to

constitute a "grey area" that is covered neither by negotiations nor by disarmament regulations. We hope that

Belgium is also aware that there is a pressing need to change thinking on this issue. [passage omitted]

## ARGENTINA

### Condor II Missile Project With Egypt Reportedly Cancelled

#### Israeli Pressure Alleged

PY0404212089 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS  
ARGENTINAS  
in Spanish 1405 GMT 4 Apr 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 4 Apr (NA)—It has been learned today that Israel will reportedly deliver 12 A-4Q planes to the Navy and sell other planes to the Air Force in return for Argentina's decision to end its partnership with Egypt for the development of the Condor II rocket, which has reportedly been successfully tested in Patagonia.

At the end of 1988, the development of the rocket caused the international powers on the International Missile Technology Control Committee to react because the rocket is a joint Argentine-Egyptian project that could endanger Israel.

According to the PAGINA 12 newspaper, the rocket was successfully tested on 3 March over a 504-km distance in Patagonia.

According to Defense Ministry and Air Force sources, the development of the Condor II is a peaceful project that seeks to launch a satellite into orbit and has no military objectives whatsoever.

The newspaper said today that Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena, who is now in Israel, has reportedly promised to break the accord with Egypt in order to allow Israel to join the Condor II project.

This decision may encourage the foreign powers that are committed to the security of Israel to lift the veto that has made it impossible for Argentina to receive the 12 A-4Q planes, which are valued at \$68 million and which have stayed in Tel Aviv since the Malvinas War.

The A-4Q planes, which were bought and paid for by the Navy, were to have been assigned to the "25 de Mayo" aircraft carrier, but the delivery of the planes was canceled in the wake of the conflict with Great Britain.

Another issue in the Israeli-Argentine negotiations may have to do with the Air Force's need to buy new equipment. The Air Force has been unable to replace its planes because of the veto of the foreign powers.

The reconsideration of the Condor II project may facilitate negotiations with Israel over the purchase of Dagger planes for the Air Force.

Concerning the Condor, the protest of the 5 powers of the Control Committee—the FRG, France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy—which were joined by Canada and Japan, is based on the fact that the Condor can become a guided missile.

The technology for flight orientation and guidance has reportedly been provided by FRG and Italian firms.

The difference between a rocket and a missile is that the rocket cannot be guided.

#### Project To Continue

PY0604134989 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS  
ARGENTINAS  
in Spanish 1951 GMT 5 Apr 89

[Text] Buenos Aires, 5 Apr (NA)—Argentina will continue to develop the Condor II rocket with Egypt despite the promise by the Israeli Government to lift the ban on the delivery of 12 planes that were purchased by the Argentine Navy before the Malvinas conflict.

The Israeli embargo would be lifted only if Argentina modifies its agreement with Egypt.

This information was leaked to NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS by a high level military source, who added that the rocket is designed to place satellites in orbit and will not be used for military purposes.

According to the source, the Israeli Government has asked Argentina to stop its association with Egypt over the technical development of the Condor II.

According to a commentary by the Buenos Aires newspaper CLARIN today, some international observers maintain that Israel could use the issue as an argument "to justify a preventive military strike against Iraq."

It was learned that the Condor II project has the financial support of Iraq and is being developed using FRG and Italian technologies.

The source told our news agency this afternoon that the agreement with Egypt for the development of the Condor II rocket "is very difficult to break overnight," and that the project will therefore continue.

According to the newspaper commentary, if built, the Condor II will have a range of between 800 and 1,200 km. It will be guided by equipment that will enable it to act as "an intelligent missile" capable of selecting and discriminating between several targets, and reaching them with efficiency.

## BRAZIL

**Brazil, Iraq To Develop Rockets, Missiles Jointly**  
*36990006 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese*  
*19 Mar 89 p 46*

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos, Sao Paulo—Over the next few years Brazil and Iraq may join in a wide-ranging program of scientific and technological cooperation to train Iraqi engineers and researchers, and to develop aircraft, rockets, satellites, and weapons.

Negotiations are now beginning. They involve the Brazilian Air Force, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Embraer [Brazilian Aeronautics Company], Orbita Aerospace Systems, Engesa [Specialized Engineers, Inc], the Aerospace Technology Center [CTA] and the National Institute of Space Research [INPE].

As of now, the most promising part of the program is the joint development of satellites and missiles. The remote sensing satellite, expected to be developed using INPE's technology, will have civilian and military applications.

The terms of the agreement, however, have not yet been defined. Iraq is also interested in acquiring technologies relating to rockets and missiles capable of launching satellites, and is disposed to finance part of the Brazilian Space Program in exchange for the technology.

The initial understandings relating to this cooperation were reached last December when a contingent from the Brazilian Air Force visited the various Arab countries. Shortly thereafter, the Iraqis consulted with Major General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, a former director of CTA and of the R&D division of Orbita Aerospace Systems.

Hugo Piva did confirm that an initial understanding was reached with Iraq relating to a satellite program. He added, however, that the idea has not evolved further because INPE must first discuss the matter with the Government, before negotiations between the two governments can begin. INPE's director, Marcio Barbosa, is aware of the proposal, but he prefers to wait for additional contacts with General Hugo Piva so that documents relating to the matter can be exchanged.

## AFGHANISTAN

### **Iranian News Agency Alleges CW Use by Afghan Air Force**

*LD0504162889 Tehran IRNA in English 1525 GMT  
5 Apr 89*

[Text] London, April 5, IRNA—The Afghan Air Force has reportedly dropped chemical bombs on a caravan that was seeking refuge in Pakistan.

According to AGENCE AFGHAN PRESS [as received] monitored in London, the poison gas attack was made on Monday at Khush Gunbad village in the subdivision of Gowshah, Nangarhar Province.

One correspondent on the Jalalabad front was said to have found 10 women and children killed during the chemical bombing and at least 24 others, including elderly people, injured. No further details were given.

The regime of President Najibullah has previously been accused of deploying chemical weapons to prevent the mujahidin from coming to power.

## EGYPT

### **AL-AHRAM 'Ridicules' Charges on Chemical Weapons**

*NC2503072989 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0621 GMT  
25 Mar 89*

[Text] Cairo, 25 Mar (MENA)—In today's commentary, AL-AHRAM paper takes up a statement by the U.S. State Department official spokesman closing the file of accusations against Egypt over its potential ability to manufacture chemical weapons. The paper believes the objective behind that naive media campaign was to jam President Mubarak's tour of Europe, an aim that proved to be an absolute failure.

The paper ridicules such an attempt and adds that if some parties had deliberately started this campaign to infuse the atmosphere with lies and doubts, why have these same parties failed until now to address the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons in which there is enough evidence to support any objective campaign? The paper adds: If Egypt, which is a signatory to the treaty for the nonproliferation of chemical weapons, has been the subject of a campaign of lies on this, then why should not Israel, which has not yet signed the nonproliferation treaty, be the target of a truthful campaign over chemical weapons?

In conclusion, the paper stresses that such trifles cannot affect Egypt, which has experienced similar trifles before. Egypt, by everybody's testimony, is committed to its declared policy of peace and development.

## INDIA

### **Agni Surface-to-Surface Missile To Be Tested in April**

*BK2903135689 Hong Kong AFP in English  
1328 GMT 29 Mar 89*

[Text] New Delhi, March 29 (AFP)—Indian experts have begun a countdown on a new surface-to-surface (SS) missile to be tested next month, the PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) said Wednesday. The SS missile, codenamed Agni (fire), would be launched from a test range in the Chandipur area southwest of Calcutta in the eastern state of Orissa, the news agency said.

PTI did not give the exact date of the launch in April but said local residents from several villages in the area would be moved 2.5 kilometres (1.5 miles) away as a precaution. They would be given a week's notice to move, V.S. Arunachalam, scientific advisor to the Defence Ministry, was quoted as saying. He told reporters at Chandipur that the evacuation was necessary as the missile's technology was not foolproof.

Previous plans to launch the SS missile have been aborted due to fierce resistance from some 10,000 villagers in the area who have expressed fears that the test might lead to large-scale destruction of crops.

Agni is India's first attempt at launching a military rocket with the capability of an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). It has a range of 2,500 kilometres (1,550 miles), defence officials here said.

Mr. Arunachalam said New Delhi would not be able to afford more than three tests of the IRBM-class missiles in a year and described next month's test as a "technological demonstration."

More than 300 experts and defence scientists were said to be preparing for the launch from reinforced sunken bunkers.

Several vital components of the SS missile, capable of carrying atomic warheads, have been brought to Chandipur from a defence laboratory in southern Hyderabad city and would be fitted at the test site, Mr. Arunachalam said.

The missile, developed by the state-owned Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), features a first-stage solid propellant engine and a second-stage liquid-fuel motor.

In July, India unsuccessfully tested a locally-built Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) which crashed into the Bay of Bengal 150 seconds after take-off.

The conventional first-stage engine with a range of 1,500 kilometres (932 miles) used in the Agni missile is similar to the one used in the Satellite Launch Vehicle-3 class rockets.

The Agni's launch comes 13 months after the successful test-firing of a short-range SS missile, which made India the fifth country after the United States, the Soviet Union, France and China to have developed such a weapon.

The SS missile, codenamed Prithvi (earth), had a flight-range of 250 kilometres (155 miles) and formed one of the mainstays of India's ambitious integrated guided missile development programme which has developed a family of missile systems since 1983.

## IRAQ

### Iran Alleged To Be Embarking on Toxic Weapons Projects

JN0304140089 Baghdad INA in English  
1150 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Text] Baghdad, Apr 3, INA—Iran is embarking on a clandestine project for production of toxic gases and chemical weapons as part of the well-known Al-Razi [name as received] chemicals complex in south Iran, the Iranian opposition Mojahed radio has said.

In a broadcast monitored here today, the radio added that the new chemical complex, located in the town of Mahshahr, would boost the chemical factories of Barjisni [name as received], Iran cylinder [as received] for producing chemical-loaded capsules to be adjusted to rockets and missiles, as well as other plants in Tehran and Esfahan.

Another secret chemical project, in Bahshwir, [name as received] will produce poisonous gases under the direct supervision of the Khomeyni Guards "Ba'thet 22" chemical unit, the radio stated.

In Damghan, east of Tehran, a plant is designed to produce chemical weapons and materials which enter in the components of Scud missiles. Another factory, Ghaniabad, at Raja'in highway, produces chemical-loadable shots, the radio said adding that the Khomeyni regime intended to expand Al-Razi and Al-Yayan [name as received] chemical compounds to produce chemical weapons.

## ISRAEL

### Deterrence Said Best Answer to Missile Threat

TA0304115689 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
3 Apr 89 p 11

[Commentary by Re'uven Pedatzur: "Investing in Deterrence"]

[Text] The addition of surface-to-surface missiles of impressive quality in massive quantities to the arsenals of the Arab countries has, to a large extent, changed the

concept of those involved in the regional conflict with regard to the balance of power between Israel and its neighbors. This mainly refers to Israeli decisionmakers and senior military officers, who recently began to give high priority to the existence of missiles on the other side of the border, which threaten not only the Golan Heights, but also the center of Israel.

After studying remarks by the defense minister, the chief of staff, and Israel Defense Forces [IDF] generals, it appears that in their evaluation, surface-to-surface missile procurement by the Arab countries erodes Israel's military superiority, and the potential use of the missiles creates threats that Israel did not face in the past.

It seems, as the leaders of the defense establishment admit, that Israel does not have the military means to neutralize the missiles once they have been fired at targets in Israel.

After analyzing the threat to Israel, the British military affairs weekly JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY determined that Israel had decided to change its military strategy by participating in the U.S. Star Wars project.

The weekly is referring to the development of the Arrow antimissile missile by Israel Aircraft Industries [IAI]. The Israeli military answer to the Arab surface-to-surface missile, according to JANE'S, is procurement of a weapons system capable of downing enemy missiles.

In presenting the change in Israeli strategy this way, the British weekly made two mistakes: First, the operational concept on which the Arrow is based was developed by IAI according to U.S. Administration demands and not IDF operational demands derived from a change in military doctrine.

Second, the defense establishment does not intend to finance the Arrow project in the foreseeable future.

The overall cost of this project is several billion dollars, and General Staff officers have already made it clear that, in a period of military budgetary cuts, such large sums cannot be diverted for the purchase of a weapons system to down enemy missiles.

"Surface-to-surface missiles dispatched at civilian settlements," senior officers claim, "never determined the outcome of a war. Their main damage is to the morale of the civilian population."

All the above is certainly correct, but it provides only part of the overall picture. It is obvious that the existence of long-range missiles capable of highly accurate hits on almost all strategic targets in Israel is a military problem of the highest order.

That is why the IDF cannot ignore the military aspect of the missile race in the region and must provide suitable answers to the growing threat.

In the final analysis, the IDF is basing its answers to the Arab surface-to-surface threat on three levels:

- the Air Force's capability of carrying out raids deep in enemy territory.
- the development of early warning systems against the dispatch of missiles toward Israel.
- deterrence.

It is no secret that the Air Force is capable of attacking the missile launching bases in the Arab countries, even those deployed deep in the rear. This military solution, however, has two main limitations. One is cost. It should be assumed that the launching sites will be defended by highly concentrated and varied anti-aircraft systems. The Air Force would have to pay a heavy price for its success. The second limitation is even more serious: In order for the missiles to be destroyed before launch, the Air Force has to be given the attack order even before a war has started. That means that this solution increases the possibility of an Israeli-initiated first strike, with all the political repercussions involved.

Another solution, to which Chief of Staff Dan Shomron referred in the lecture he gave several weeks ago at Tel Aviv University, is the building of an early warning system that would provide the rear guard with information on a missile launching only minutes before they hit their target. This would be part of a defensive strategy.

This is a slightly hard-pressed solution that might save lives, but would not prevent an attack on military installations and the disruption of the IDF's activities. According to the chief of staff, the warning system would provide information on the missile and its path.

It seems that the most effective answer continues to be, as in the past, deterrence. The Arab leaders' fear of an Israeli attack if they dare to use surface-to-surface missiles has the best chance of preventing Al-Asad, or even Saddam Husayn, from ordering the launching of missiles at Tel Aviv or Haifa.

The state of Israeli deterrence is based to a large extent on vague information at the disposal of the IDF. Israel has never confirmed that it has the Jericho surface-to-surface missile, but reports on tests carried out on the Jericho-2 over distances of 820 km were widely published in July 1987. The launching of Ofeq-1 has aroused speculation that Israel has a medium-range ballistic missile.

Israel has not changed its military strategy with regard to the Middle East arms race, but the message sent across the border is unequivocal: We are capable of making you pay so dearly for the launching of missiles against our rear guard that any such decision would be irrational.

## LEBANON

**Syrians Reportedly Using Chemical Weapons**  
*NC0404131289 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic*  
1215 GMT 4 Apr 89

[Text] Diplomatic sources have noted that Lebanon is experiencing the worst wave of violence in 14 years. According to military experts, the Syrian occupation army used phosphorous bombs against several Lebanese areas during the past 24 hours, particularly last night, causing destructive fires in homes and institutions and killing or wounding several persons. Such incendiary bombs, which are life-threatening, are prohibited by international charters.

In another development, security sources have told the Voice of Lebanon that the fire which broke out in the Al-'Ibadiyah area at 2300 last night involved prohibited chemical material. This, according to the sources, forced the Syrian occupation troops to evacuate the inhabitants of Al-'Ibadiyah township and adjacent villages, for fear of the consequences, particularly because the fire blazed until this morning.

The security sources noticed that the Syrian soldiers were using gas masks. They noted that the foul smell reported in certain areas was due to the fact that the Syrian supplies of these materials were burned, causing the smell to spread to these areas.

Experts are in possession of samples of this lethal and toxic material and are ready to show them to diplomats and Arab and foreign reporters.

## PAKISTAN

**Daily Notes Successes in Missile, Rocket Development**

*BK0304074789 Lahore JANG in Urdu 21 Mar 89 p 1*

[Text] Islamabad, (by special correspondent)—Pakistan has manufactured a surface-to-air missile [SAM] which is capable of destroying enemy aircraft and surveillance planes flying up to an altitude of 8 kms. This is yet another achievement by [Pakistani scientist] Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and his colleagues. The success achieved jointly by the Pakistan's Ministry of Defense production and scientific and nuclear research organizations has made Pakistan's air defense considerably impregnable. These missiles will be displayed during the 23 March Pakistan Day parade at the Race Course Grounds in Rawalpindi. Hatf, the surface-to-surface missile capable of hitting the target up to a range of 300 km, will also be displayed during the parade.

It has been learned that Pakistan's national organization of space research, SUPARCO [Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission], has almost completed the arrangements for testing a new rocket booster. The success of such a test will enable Pakistan to launch its

own communications satellite into orbit. SUPARCO is expected to test-fire the rocket [booster] by August or September. This booster can deliver a rocket up to a distance of 400 miles. The test will constitute the first of a 3-phase program for launching indigenously-designed and built lightweight satellites into the orbit. The production of rocket boosters for all the three phases are in different stages of completion.

SUPARCO has also achieved the capability to manufacture various types of rockets, and their hardware, software, and relevant parts are all built indigenously by Pakistan. Special computers have been installed for design work, and micro- and mini-computers have been linked with the mainframe computer to deal with detailed statics. Moreover, SUPARCO scientists are engaged in producing propellant fuel to provide power to the satellite rocket booster. It has also been learned that Pakistan has carried out four successful tests of its first satellite Badr-A. Badr-A is more sensitive and modern compared with any other satellite in the world.

A report by Pakistan TV says Pakistan has developed a multistage rocket capable of delivering scientific equipment to a very high altitude. This was stated by SUPARCO Chairman Salim Mahmud while talking to the television reporter. Dr Salim Mahmud said that SUPARCO has been launching various programs and all of them are progressing very well. He said that there has been considerable progress in rocket manufacturing, and tests in this regard have been carried out since the beginning of this year, 1 January 1989, adding that a big rocket booster will also be test-fired in the current year.

Dr Mahmud said that all these tests are aimed at delivering various equipment to the highest possible altitude and also sending light satellites into near-earth orbit. He said that the people will hear more information in this regard in the coming months and there will be more progress.

### SAUDI ARABIA

#### 'Responsible Source' Denies Chemical Weapons Charge

LD0604185189 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1800 GMT  
6 Apr 89

[Text] Riyadh, 6 Apr (SPA)—A responsible source has denied a story published in the 5 April CHICAGO TRIBUNE claiming that the Kingdom is among the groups with access to the necessary resources for the manufacture of chemical weapons.

In a statement made to SPA today, Thursday, the responsible source said that what the paper alleged is not true. He added that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had previously clearly declared its position on this issue. It today reaffirms this position, he said, emphasizing that the Kingdom opposes the use of chemical weapons.

The source concluded his statement by saying that by signing the treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and lodging its documents of ratification with the international quarters concerned, the Kingdom has become committed to this treaty before the international community.

**'Parity' Defined as 'Sufficiency' Despite Numerical Disadvantage**

18070583 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian  
No 13, 1-7 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by Colonel Ye. Klimchuk, candidate of historical sciences and docent: "When Was Parity Established?"]

[Text] I believe that it is more correct to define military-strategic parity not as equality in arms but as guaranteed sufficiency of forces to destroy an aggressor if he were to encroach on the USSR.

It is essential to dispel a myth that was introduced at one time by L.I. Brezhnev. He said that military-strategic parity had been established at the turn of the seventies. This definition found its way into all the dictionaries and also the published speeches of many state figures, but much here is strained and does not agree with the historical facts.

I think that the early sixties should be considered the correct time for the establishment of military-strategic parity.

By the early sixties the apparent strategic imbalance between the USSR and the United States was at first glance indisputable: according to former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, in 1962 the United States had 17 times more nuclear warheads than the USSR. However, for an objective assessment of the state of affairs it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Soviet nuclear forces at that time were based mainly on rocket vehicles, in which we had an obvious superiority. We recall our first artificial Earth satellite and the launch of the first man into space, and also the fact that it was in 1960 that the Strategic Rocket Forces were set up in the USSR. We also recall that development of the U.S. SAFEGUARD ABM system was initiated only in the mid-sixties, that is, at that time the territory of the United States was defenseless against Soviet missiles.

By 1961 the U.S. strategic nuclear forces were based mainly on bombers (of the 1,746 carrier vehicles for nuclear weapons 1,654 were B-47 and B-52 bombers and others). When analyzing the potential of those bombers it is not out of place to remember the status of the Soviet air defenses in the early sixties. Declassified Pentagon documents show that at that time in plans for war against the USSR the U.S. military were hoping that the overall effectiveness of the Soviet air defenses would be lower than during the second world war. However, in modeling attacks against the USSR in 1957 the U.S. leadership had discovered with surprise that total losses by the Americans would be 55 percent of available air forces, that is, they would be catastrophically high and might cause a panic among flight crews, who would refuse to fly their missions (These facts and those cited below are taken from the Soviet periodical press).

Even the predictions of the American command were too optimistic. In the event of war with the USSR the U.S. Air Force would expect an even greater defeat because low-level flying was disastrous for it. Thus, the automatic anti-aircraft gun mounts adopted by the USSR air defense forces in the fifties would have enabled them to take out a B-47 with a single shot. The probability of destroying aircraft with first-generation winged missiles was also quite high.

The U.S. Air Force later encountered Soviet missiles in Vietnam's air defense system and the American journal AIR FORCE SPACE DIGEST wrote that "they are the most deadly weapons that have ever been used against aircraft."

The remaining 92 nuclear weapon carriers (ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles) could in principle have carried out a strike against the USSR. But even here there was plenty of food for thought for the U.S. leadership, for in his speech to the 22nd CPSU Congress Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy said that the USSR had successfully solved the problem of destroying missiles in flight and that ABM forces had been created.

Thus, despite the 17:1 superiority of the United States in the field of strategic nuclear arms in the early sixties, R. McNamara had every reason for the dismal conclusion that in the event of a strike against the Soviet Union "dozens of its weapons would survive and would be launched against the United States." In other words, by the early sixties the USSR had the capability of using a retaliatory strike to destroy an aggressor, which, as mentioned above, also constitutes the essence of military-strategic parity.

**Italy's Malfatti, USSR's Grinevskiy Comment on CFE Talks**

18070574 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Mar 89 p 3

[Interview with Franko Maria Malfatti, president of the parliamentary delegation of Italy at the West European Union, by P. Negoitsa, Rome correspondent for TRUD: "How an Agreement on Disarmament Will Be Reached"; comments by O. Grinevskiy, ambassador at large; first paragraph is TRUD introduction]

[Text] On 6 March, negotiations will begin among 23 states—the participants in the Warsaw Pact and NATO—on ordinary armed forces in Europe. What can be expected from the negotiations in the West? How will the recent Soviet foreign policy initiatives be evaluated? Franko Mario Malfatti, president of the parliamentary delegation from Italy at the West European Union, answers these and other questions related to the problems of disarmament for P. Negoitsa, our Rome correspondent.

[Malfatti] We hope that both sides will make efforts in the negotiations, more effectively than in the past, to eliminate the existing imbalance of forces in Europe. In

addition, we must come to an agreement on a dislocation of armaments which would eliminate the possibility of "surprise attacks," which for the countries of the Atlantic Union have always remained a topic for attention and uneasiness.

[Negoitsa] You speak of an imbalance, despite the fact that M.S. Gorbachev announced from the rostrum of the UN the Soviet Union's decision to remove, in a unilateral procedure, a considerable contingent of troops from Eastern Europe and to cut them back.

[Malfatti] In evaluating the speech of the Soviet leader in New York as important and positive, and the announcement on the reduction of armed forces as a sign of a movement in the right direction, we in the West still feel: this alone is not enough to even out the disproportions in the ordinary types of armament, where the superiority of the USSR is obvious.

[Negoitsa] But you, Mr. Malfatti, surely know about the table of data recently published in the Soviet press....

[Malfatti] Yes, I know about it. This is the first such publication, if I am not mistaken, in the Soviet press. It was given a positive evaluation in the West. We, however, do not agree with the content of the table.... The truth for us lies in the fact that the Soviet Union still has strong advantages over the West with respect to ordinary types of armament.

[Negoitsa] That is why Italy intends to house American F-16 fighter-bombers in its country?

[Malfatti] It is not quite that way. The question of the F-16 was discussed in the Italian Parliament, and received the support of the majority. Our line is maximally clear: rejecting the airplanes, which are not, incidentally, new ones, but those already existing in the armament of NATO in Spain, would lead to a weakening of the unilateral order of the West's elements of defense. Giulio Andreotti, minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy, informed the leaders of the Soviet Union of our position. As far as I know, the Italian Government and Parliament are empowered to solve defense problems, and do not plan to return to a discussion of the F-16 problem.

[Negoitsa] How do you evaluate, Mr. Malfatti, the position of FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, that the West should delay a bit in housing the new short-range missiles?

[Malfatti] We will wait a while with the evaluations, until the Chancellor and Government of the FRG take a final position. For my part, I should like to note the following. It is a question of the type of armament, of which the Soviet Union has 1300 systems, while the West has only 88....

[Negoitsa] With what intentions will Italy come to the opening negotiations:

[Malfatti] Our intention is this: that the participants in the negotiations do not repeat the Vienna discussions

that lasted over ten years, but yielded practically nothing. Our volition and contribution will be directed toward having the negotiations take place dynamically and end with positive results. For us, this means creating a new situation of mutual security, when everyone who signs the agreement will adhere to its premises and at the same time be guaranteed safety for his country. A new equilibrium should be ensured only at a maximally low level of armament and armed forces.

\*\*\*

**O. Grinevskiy, ambassador at large, expresses his opinion on the questions touched on by F. Malfatti. He heads the Soviet delegation in Vienna at the negotiations on conventional armed forces, as well as on measures strengthening trust and security in Europe.**

The negotiations opening in Vienna on reducing conventional armament in Europe will, doubtless, be more complex than any preceding ones on questions of disarmament. The large number of participants and the extensive area of reductions indicate this, as well as the unprecedented number of varieties and types of armaments included in the subject of the negotiations and the multitude of various types of factors—from political to geographic—that in one way or another appear in the delegate's field of vision.

Success can be achieved in these negotiations only if all the participants, from the very beginning, show the purposefulness and readiness to do everything depending on them to issue, in a short time, practical reductions in armament, with strict adherence to the balance of interests of the parties. In this connection one cannot help but note F. Malfatti's statement that Italy is in the mood for dynamic behavior at the negotiations and for the achievement of practical results. This fully coincides with our intentions, as does the conception of the USSR and Italy of the purposes of the Vienna forum—"to create a new situation of mutual security, in which everyone who signs the agreement will adhere to its premises, and at the same time guarantee the safety of his country," and to ensure a new equilibrium "at a maximally low level of armament and armed forces."

To achieve these goals, the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Pact propose eliminating the existing imbalances and asymmetries in Europe with respect to the basic types of armaments, carrying out radical reductions in troops and armaments, and taking widescale measures to prevent the threat of a sudden attack and to restructure the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization strictly on the basis of defense. In striving to create the maximally favorable conditions to ensure progress and facilitate the achievement of an agreement, we announced major unilateral cutbacks in the conventional armed forces in Europe. They considerably reduce the existing imbalance and asymmetry in

certain types of ordinary armaments. F. Malfatti feels that "this alone is insufficient to even out the disproportions." One can agree with this in the sense that it is not only the USSR that has disproportions, but also NATO. The purpose of the negotiations lies precisely in eliminating them on both sides.

F. Malfatti speaks of the "obvious supremacy of the USSR in conventional types of armaments." The Soviet Union acknowledges that it actually has supremacy, for example, in tanks, tactical rocket launchers, and air defense interceptor planes, and expresses its readiness to eliminate it. In Russian this is called "forcing an open door." One must not, however, forget about NATO's advantages with respect to the number of strike planes in frontal (tactical) aviation, military helicopters and anti-tank missile complexes, not to mention the double supremacy of NATO with respect to the number of naval forces, which do not enter into the topic of the negotiations, but constitute a border part of the military balance in Europe.

Incidentally, the data published by the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact on the size of their armed forces shows exactly the overall picture of the ratios of the military potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a broad context, including the naval forces. They are not intended for use in full volume as initial data for future negotiations. They reflect, however, the real picture, which indicates as a minimum the state of the overall approximate balance of forces existing in Europe, and the fact that the process of cutbacks should be mutual.

As far as the F-16's are concerned, their rebasing from Spain to Italy, that is, closer to the Soviet borders, we perceive as the manifestation of a course toward creating additional threat factors, while the task of the forthcoming negotiations is the direct opposite. This decision of the Italian Parliament, then, can in no way be called a contribution to the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the negotiations, especially now, when the USSR has announced a unilateral cutback of over 800 military aircraft.

Finally, concerning tactical nuclear weapons. It should be borne in mind that in the interview it was a question only of tactical missile launchers, which are only one of the components of the overall nuclear balance on the continent. NATO has almost a 12-fold supremacy on its side with respect to the number of ships equipped with cruise missiles, and an advantage in the size of the frontal (tactical) air force and navy air force, capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

We are prepared to eliminate the imbalance existing on our side with respect to tactical missile launchers, along with all the other imbalances in this class of armament, and to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in general. We propose that separate negotiations begin with this question. The cutback and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would be implemented parallel with adopting

effective measures to avert the threat of a sudden attack. Plans for its modernization can only complicate the atmosphere of the Vienna negotiations. They are fraught only with the threat of a new circuit in the qualitative pursuit of nuclear weaponry.

The delegations of the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Vienna will be faced with a disarmament task that is unprecedented in its complexity. Therefore, I should hope that all the participants in the negotiations take responsible and realistic stands and, as F. Malfatti says, do not follow the path of "repeating the Vienna discussions that lasted for over ten years, but yielded practically nothing."

### **Soviet Inspectors in UK Under CDE Accords Interviewed on Duties**

52000017 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Dec 88 p 3

[Interview by Captain 2nd Rank V. Kocherov with Colonel Anatoliy Viktorovich Makhov under the rubric "Topical Interview": "When Doubts Appeared, Four Soviet Military Inspectors Were Sent to Great Britain"]

[Text] *Our correspondent met with one of the Soviet military inspectors—an officer in the Foreign Relations Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Colonel Anatoliy Viktorovich Makhov—some time after their return and asked him to answer a few questions.*

[Kocherov] Anatoliy Viktorovich, what was the reason for the inspection trip to England?

[Makhov] Doubts arose regarding the observance of the Stockholm agreements by Great Britain. Initially they were in accordance with the requirements of the Stockholm Conference document, that is, for two years they had informed us of their plans for holding major exercises with 40,000 troops on their territory. Nothing was mentioned about the last one in the declaration for this year, however. We thus decided to invoke our right of inspection. The more so as certain military activities in various parts of England were known from newspapers (as was later revealed, the British had decided to hold a series of small exercises in place of one large one, and there is no need to make notification of that).

[Kocherov] So you up and went to Great Britain?

[Makhov] Of course not. A diplomatic note was sent to Great Britain with an inspection request in which was reported the reason for the request, the location of the area to be inspected with geographic coordinates, information essential to the issuance of diplomatic visas to the inspectors, the preferred point of entry, the place for the beginning of the inspection and the methods of conducting it (from the ground and the air) along with other information. Some 23 hours later the British gave a positive reply. We were permitted entry into the country.

[Kocherov] But in what capacity? The point is that in a brief report printed in the newspapers, including the central ones, you were called observers rather than inspectors for some reason.

[Makhov] I think that happened either through confusion or ignorance. In accordance with the documents of the Stockholm conference, every state that announces its military activities is obliged to invite military observers to exercises in which 17,000 or more men take part. As concerns inspectors, they do not come at the invitation of the receiving side, but are sent by decision of their own government in the event that doubts arise as to the observance by this or that state of the confidence-building and security measures agreed to in Stockholm. The inspectors come in, as a rule, 36 hours after the issue of a request and work very intensively over the course of 48 hours. The results of their work should be a conclusion—whether or not the military activity being inspected is of a threatening nature.

[Kocherov] And so you are an inspector. What qualities should an inspector possess?

[Makhov] First and foremost good military training, a profound knowledge of the provisions of the Stockholm documents and a knowledge of the language. I, for example, had been able to work in England before, first as an aide to the air attache and then for almost five years as an air attache. And also, finally, the success of the work depends on the physical training of the military inspector.

[Kocherov] The inspectors don't have to bear any crosses, as far as I know. They are technically well provided for, probably.

[Makhov] As I have already stated, 48 hours are allotted for the inspection after arrival in the inspection region. The area of that region is roughly 150 by 150 kilometers. We actually did have all-terrain vehicles and helicopters at our disposal. The burden proved to be tolerable nonetheless. I would like to say at least that we had to eat on the run, as they say, for two days, and there was about six hours in all for rest, discussion of the results obtained and subsequent actions.

[Kocherov] And what about the inspection process itself?

[Makhov] Before setting about the review of the inspection region, we met with the commander of the ground forces of Great Britain and the commander of the southwestern military district, who briefly related the nature of the military activity in that region, showed it on a map and cited the quantity of troops taking part in it...

[Kocherov] About the troops, by the way. At the beginning of our discussion you mentioned that the grounds for the inspection was the appearance of doubts. The British were trying to hide something?

[Makhov] Not quite. At that time the command of the southwestern military district actually was conducting the exercises "Drakes Dram," one of the series of small exercises mentioned before. The representative of the British command reported that to us before the start of the inspection. We took the information into consideration. It only remained to be convinced of its trustworthiness on the spot, which we did over the course of the allotted time. We discovered at the same time another exercise on the Salisbury Plain proving ground under the name of "Panthers Poe" that was being conducted by a motorized infantry brigade from the southwestern military district (the British had informed us of the location of the brigade). Some discrepancies with what was related to us before the beginning of the inspection by representatives of the British armed forces command were moreover revealed.

[Kocherov] Specifically what?

[Makhov] Subunits other than those indicated were also involved in the "Drakes Dram" exercises, it was revealed. According to our initial calculations, the overall number of troops in that region could have reached 17,000 and, consequently, the invitation of foreign military observers to this exercise would be assumed. A verification that was performed, however, dispelled this doubts. Based on visual observations and in the course of a multitude of discussions with soldiers and officers in the region being inspected, we became convinced that Great Britain had not violated the requirements of the Stockholm conference.

[Kocherov] How did you report the results of your work to England?

[Makhov] After our information was analyzed at the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was transmitted to the Soviet government and sent in the form of a diplomatic note of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to Great Britain and the remaining 33 participating states in the Stockholm conference.

[Kocherov] Anatoliy Viktorovich, how many inspection trips have been made abroad by Soviet military inspectors in all?

[Makhov] Five in all. Turkey and the FRG in 1987 and Norway, the FRG and England this year.

[Kocherov] And all of those inspection verifications went as smoothly as the one in England?

[Makhov] No. By way of example, the inspection on the territory of the FRG at the beginning of this September showed that a quantity of troops was concentrated there that should have been declared in advance as much as two years earlier, which had not been done. There is

probably no need to say what threat a large concentration of troops represents for the adjoining states. A diplomatic note with the corresponding evaluations was sent to all of the states that had signed the Stockholm agreement.

[Kocherov] What could you say about the attitude toward us on the part of the British officers and soldiers?

[Makhov] We did not encounter ill-will anywhere. On the contrary, we constantly sensed an acute interest in us and our activity. We tried to make the maximum use of the opportunity for interchange with the British soldiers and officers. True, there was awfully little time.

[Kocherov] Did you find any reflection of the activity of Soviet military inspectors in the mass media in Great Britain?

[Makhov] The Ministry of Defence in England distributed a press release the night before our flight in. Journalists at the airport expressed a desire to converse but, taking into account the shortage of time, we refused. We did have such a meeting upon the completion of the work, however. Almost all of the leading newspapers of England wrote about our inspection activity—TIMES, GUARDIAN, DAILY TELEGRAPH, INDEPENDENT and others—and there were reports in various television features as well.

[Kocherov] Why don't we go about it the same way? Candidly speaking, I cannot remember an instance where I or any of my colleagues in the foreign department received an invitation to meet with military inspectors from abroad.

[Makhov] We should probably think about that.

[Kocherov] A final question, Anatoliy Viktorovich. Is military inspection an element of monitoring or of mistrust?

[Makhov] The introduction of inspections into the arsenal of verification methods is a result of the reinforcement of trust among the states participating in the European-wide process. Inspections conducted on a voluntary basis will undoubtedly foster the development and strengthening of trust and make it possible to know each other's intentions better. And that can only be to our common advantage.

#### **General Surikov on Technical Problems Facing SDI**

*18160005h Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 pp 78-87*

[Article by Major General of Aviation Boris Trofimovich Surikov, candidate of technical sciences: "'Star' Illusions"]

[Text] The program of research into and development of a broad-based system of ABM defense of the United

States with space-based components garbed in the so-called "strategic defense initiative" (SDI) has become a central component of military policy for the R. Reagan administration. That Washington intended in its military-strategic concepts an orientation toward the need for realization of the idea of strategic defense became known for the first time from the "Strategic Arms Modernization" military program announced by Reagan back in October 1981. It was emphasized in an explanatory White House note thereto that the "priority" measures included "the vigorous performance of expanded R&D, including the development of the technology for the corresponding space-based systems."

Reagan's well-known speech of 23 March 1983 said nothing directly about ABM space-based assault weapons, but the President put the emphasis on the need for a solution of the problem of defense against strategic missiles based on the high level of development of American military technology. He maintained that the United States would be able to "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our (American—author) territory or the territory of our allies." Work groups were set up to develop plans in the ABM field in June 1983.

In January 1984 Reagan signed Directive 119 concerning research, development, testing and engineering aimed at the gradual provision of a highly efficient territorial system of ABM defense of the United States. This directive initiated a vast and extremely dangerous program of basic and scientifically applied research and also engineering development efforts, which, the supporters of SDI believe, are to lead to the successful solution of the problem of ABM defense and disruption of the evolved parity of arms of the two leading states in favor of the United States.

The version to the effect that the idea of the SDI program belonged to Reagan personally and that his "star wars" speech caught even the President's closest advisers unawares was released upon the American and international community. However, this assertion does not correspond to reality. It is known that the basis of the SDI program were documents of the High Frontier and Heritage Foundation conservative organizations, which have close ties to the military-industrial complex. The President's "kitchen cabinet"—representatives of business circles chiefly of the country's Western states such as J. Coors, K. Bendtsen, W. Wilson, J. Kuhm and others—have participated directly in the development of the SDI program.

The idea of SDI is supported by representatives of the aerospace industry and leading military-industrial contractors of the Pentagon and also by some scientists who have tied themselves firmly to the U.S. military-industrial complex. It is these circles which prepared the SDI program. It is no accident that the idea of the creation of an ABM system using directed energy weapons was put forward back in 1982 with the participation of E. Teller,

"father" of the hydrogen bomb. It was reported that it was K. Bendtsen who advised the U.S. President to declare the SDI program a most important national assignment.

The SDI program was opposed by many politicians, scientists, journalists and people of the most diverse spheres of activity who clearly recognized that the extremely costly and strategically and politically dubious "star wars" program could bring mankind closer to nuclear catastrophe. Persuasive papers were put out in the period 1984-1987 containing scientific criticism of the SDI program which had been prepared by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the U.S. Congress' Office of Technology Assessment, a team of scientists of Stanford University headed by the well-known physicist S. Drell and a working group of the American Academy of Sciences and Arts and Cornell University headed by Prof F. Long. A series of studies was published by the top physicist Prof R. Garwin. The objective report of a large research group (J. Pike, chairman) on the scientific and technical aspects of directed energy weapons was submitted to the American Physical Society in April 1987.

The SDI program has also caused heated debate in states allied to the United States, primarily in West Europe. The attempts to involve West European states in realization of the "star wars" program are causing well-founded fears in sober-minded Europeans for the fate of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Scientists of France, the FRG, Great Britain and other West European countries have already released a series of objective reports convincingly criticizing the SDI program from the military-strategic, technical, economic and political viewpoints.

The SDI program differs fundamentally from all research and experimental ABM work performed in the United States previously. It attaches extraordinarily great significance to fundamentally new nontraditional techniques whose realization is attended by very high strategic and technical risk, which, however, its supporters believe, will make it possible in the foreseeable future to "acquire first-strike potential". They maintain that the successful realization of the SDI program should permit the United States in the foreseeable future to achieve "absolute superiority" both in the quantity and quality of the latest strategic and tactical arms and on this basis provide in the event of a war with the USSR for the West's assured achievement of its policy goals.

The U.S. administrations which, before Reagan, involved themselves in the problem of ABM defense proceeded from the fact that, in the event of the United States or the USSR refraining from the deployment of ABM systems, the other side would respond to this only with limited experimental work at test ranges. The Carter administration and its predecessors recognized that the ABM Treaty was a fundamental basis in international law of strategic stability and deterrence. The basis of this approach to the problem was the parties' understanding of the fundamental proposition according

to which the existence of powerful territorial ABM systems in the United States or the Soviet Union would contribute a most dangerous element of disequilibrium and uncertainty to the correlation of the two powers' strategic forces and military-political plans. The United States also was of the opinion that any American ABM systems (territorial, zonal, target) could force the Soviet Union to build up for the purpose of maintaining parity its strategic offensive arms to a level making it possible in a retaliatory strike to inflict on U.S. targets the desired damage given appreciably less expenditure than the United States would incur given the deployment of this ABM grouping or the other. The Reagan administration displayed a fundamentally different attitude toward the ABM problem.

In performing the R&D to substantiate the optimum structure of a broad-based system of the ABM defense of the United States with space-based components a future U.S. Administration will have to formulate the precise tactical and technical demands on this global system with regard for a precise forecast of the development of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the likely strategy of their combat use in retaliatory operations. The program's executants have been set the difficult problem of determining the main spatial and operational parameters of a territorial system of the ABM defense of the United States and ways of its further gradual realization. In addition, a plan for the optimum realization of the "star wars" program for a long period with regard for the requisite efficiency of a broad-based system of the ABM defense of the United States (99.9 percent) and also the technological, strategic, economic and political limitations has to be comprehensively substantiated.

The conceptual R&D stage being realized at the present time in respect of the SDI program is aimed at ascertaining as quickly as possible specific advanced ABM technologies in order that a future U.S. Administration may in the 1990's select among them those which should be realized in ground-, ground-space- and space-based ABM systems. It is planned in the 1990's also demonstrating the efficiency of the ABM facilities proposed by the U.S. military-industrial complex and their applicability from the economic viewpoint.

The supporters of the SDI program maintain that a highly efficient territorial ABM defense of most important industrial and military facilities of the United States will be possible in the foreseeable future with the appearance of advanced technology, which will allegedly make it possible to deploy a broad-based system of the country's ABM defense providing for the efficient destruction of missiles at different positions corresponding to the boost (initial) guidance phase, the post-boost phase, the mid-course phase (flight of the warheads up to entry into the dense layers of the atmosphere along ballistic trajectories) and the terminal (atmospheric) phase of the flight of the ballistic missile warheads. In principle each ABM echelon is to be geared to the intercept of practically all strategic targets employed by the contending side in a

retaliatory-counter strike (launch of ICBM's following detection of a launch of the enemy's missiles). The greatest significance here will be attached to the first space echelon providing for the maximum possible kill of ICBM's or SLBM's in the boost or acceleration phase of the flight. The construction and functioning of the other ground- and space-based ABM groupings is to provide for the possibility of the successive destruction of the strategic missiles which have broken through the first echelon under the conditions of the enemy's concentrated use of decoys and preventive nuclear explosions in near-Earth space aimed at blinding the ABM sensors and actively influencing the space-based ABM componentry with the aid of the efficient antispace defense facilities of the contending side.

For the purpose of creating space- and ground-space-based ABM systems the "star wars" program is investigating and verifying experimentally elementary particle accelerators, continuous and pulse lasers, electrodynamic accelerators of matter or "railguns" and kinetic weapons based on traditional missile interceptors. Let us briefly familiarize ourselves with the essence and prospects of the creation of these weapons and also the strategic and political consequences of practical realization of the "star wars" program under current conditions.

Accelerator or beam weapons based on the use of a directed flow of elementary particles are seen by the supporters of SDI as a potential space-based ABM weapon inasmuch as, in the event of their creation in the future, the destructive impact of a particle beam on missiles and warheads outside of the atmosphere will be possible. The methods of boosting elementary particles (protons, electrons and neutrons) to relativistic velocities are sufficiently well studied and are employed extensively in the experimental physics of many countries. However, the search for ways to create ABM accelerator weapons, which has been under way in the United States for over 10 years now, has confronted the supporters of the "star wars" program with a number of most complex fundamental and engineering problems such as obtaining beams of very great energy given a low angular spread and also the tasks of a sharp reduction in the mass and dimensions of the accelerators.

There are no disagreements among specialists on the question of the possibility in principle of the achievement in the foreseeable future of particle energy sufficient to decommission missiles' electronic equipment or reentry vehicles and also their warheads. However, obtaining in accelerator weapons the necessary energy represents only a small part of the difficulties which stand in the way of the birth of space-based ABM accelerator weapons. Specialists point as a basic problem to the difficulty of obtaining large currents in the accelerators and ensuring the accurate targeting of the particles on targets flying at great velocity and also the difficulty of estimating destruction of the missiles or their warheads. The problem of achieving the necessary beam-retargeting speed remains unsolved. One

further problem is that the electronic equipment of the missile and its warhead could be more resistant to the impact of the beam weapon thanks to the use of semiconductors based on gallium arsenide, whose radiation-resistance is appreciably higher than in current semiconductor materials.

Physicists know also that proton and electron beams diffract without loss in a vacuum, that is, beyond the atmosphere. A particular feature of these beams is also the fact that they are subject to the influence of internal electrostatic forces of repulsion and external factors. Neutralization of the bulk charge of the high-energy beam would not produce the requisite effect inasmuch as, thanks to the directed velocity, such a beam would continue to preserve the properties of the electric current and interact with the Earth's magnetic field, which is nonstationary and subject to irregular fluctuations. In addition, each neutral hydrogen atom flying almost with the speed of light could easily lose its electron in the residual gas in the upper layers of the atmosphere. The beams of atoms would become protons here, which, as is known, are sensitive to the influence of the Earth's geomagnetic field. For this reason neutral hydrogen beams may only theoretically be used in a space-based ABM echelon only at an altitude of over 200-250 km. Whence the relatively simple method of protection against the accelerator weapon of ICBM's and SLBM's—the flight of the strategic missiles along a flat trajectory and also the use for protection of the warheads and ICBM's of gas screens, which would complicate their destruction by space-based ABM accelerator weapons.

Lasers—technical devices creating the electromagnetic coherent radiation of a strictly determined wavelength—have come to be employed quite extensively in warfare. The radiation may be realized in the infra-red, visible, ultraviolet and gamma-range electromagnetic spectrum. Generally, the efficiency of the laser weapon depends on the amount of energy delivered to the target, which, in turn, depends on the capacity of the laser installation, distance to the target and the accuracy of sighting. The efficiency of ABM laser weapons would, in addition, depend on the precision of target selection in a complex interference situation. Laser weapons could destroy targets either by thermal or percussive pressure. The latter is characteristic of pulse lasers.

As follows from material of a study group of the American Physical Society published in April 1987 in the United States, the prospects of the development of ABM laser weapons are highly uncertain. The power output of chemical lasers with an acceptable quality of beam has to be increased at least 100-fold compared with that achieved on experimental installations before hydrogen fluoride or deuterium can be used as an efficient space-based ABM weapon intended for killing strategic missiles in the boost phase of the flight. For the atomic iodine lasers an increase in the output parameters of the ABM weapons of the order of  $10^5$  is essential, which cannot be accomplished in the foreseeable period.

Specialists have shown that the energy of the pulses of excimer lasers for ABM purposes have to be increased by a factor of 10,000 compared with the available models. Only on this condition is their use in a broad-based ABM system possible. Ground-based ABM excimer lasers have to generate at least 100 megajoules of energy in an individual pulse or in a series of pulses of a total duration ranging from several microseconds to several hundred microseconds. To repulse a massive strategic missile attack a rate of fire of approximately 10 pulses per second at each ABM complex is essential, for which it is additionally necessary to solve a multitude of most intricate engineering problems.

The nuclear-pumped X-ray laser represents a nuclear charge placed inside a plastic casing into which a bundle of the thinnest metal wires is built. When the charge is detonated, the electronic structure of the atoms of the metal wires is destroyed and, under certain conditions, laser radiation results. This process has already been observed during underground nuclear tests performed in the United States at the Livermore National Laboratory. However, it has yet to be proven that the creation of a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser of military significance is at all possible. The essence of one of many problems is that for the formation of a narrow concentrated beam the X-ray laser must use a long bundle of the thinnest wires. For the accurate orientation of the beam toward the target it is necessary to ensure the rigidity of this constitution, which it is extremely difficult to realize in practice.

Specialists justifiably consider one further task of the utmost complexity the precise sighting of the X-ray laser rods at the moment of initiation of the nuclear explosion, when the preliminary detonation of a conventional charge for combining the two subcritical masses of the fissionable materials will invariably cause vibration of the rods, which instantly upsets the precision sighting of the X-ray laser on a missile moving at great speed. Many physicists maintain that it is altogether impossible to hit a remote target with a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser owing to the impracticability of the high accuracy of sighting on a small moving object.

Considering the numerous problems revealed during the R&D on directed energy weapons, the supporters of the "star wars" program believe that for the immediate future practicable means of intercepting ballistic missiles could be kinetic weapons, which are initially to constitute the basis of a broad-based multi-echeloned system of the ABM defense of the United States. At the present time a relatively broad class of kinetic weapons systems is being investigated within the framework of the SDI program. The R&D program includes the development of both traditional chemical fuel interceptors and relatively new weapons based on the principle of the electromagnetic acceleration of the kill components.

The best-known of the conventional kinetic weapons is the MKV miniature interceptor—the basic component of the ASAT air force antisatellite complex. It can in

principle be used also for destroying from space strategic missiles in the boost phase. However, such an intercept could be accomplished only beyond the dense layers of the atmosphere inasmuch as at low altitudes the operation of its infra-red homing system would deteriorate considerably owing to the heating by the inflowing air stream of the interceptor's nose cone. According to preliminary estimates, the minimum altitude of the operational use of the MKV interceptor would constitute approximately 100 km. Obviously, the use of this interceptor against an ICBM, whose boost phase ends at an altitude of 80-90 km, is altogether impossible, and for this reason the prospects of the deployment of an ABM space echelon based on MKV-type interceptors are highly dubious.

Multilevel research is also being conducted in the United States at the present time on a broad front geared to the substantiation and realization of new ideas in the sphere of electrodynamic weapons capable of withstanding tremendous acceleration, special microelectronics, power supply sources, new control algorithms and database tools providing for the tracking of a multitude of ballistic targets and electrodynamic miniature interceptors, facilities for the operational control of a large number of interceptors and designs and propulsion systems for interceptors launched at a high initial velocity. However, the realization of these ideas also is attended by the solution of a multitude of most complex technological problems, any one of which will for many years impede the creation of operational space-based ABM complexes. Thus nor can space-based electrodynamic weapons, specialists believe, be developed in the United States in the foreseeable period.

The Pentagon is insistently advertising the successes allegedly scored in respect of the "star wars" program. Specifically, former U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger maintained repeatedly that far greater progress had already been made in this program than the SDI supporters could have imagined at the time it was being drawn up. SDI Organization Director J. Abrahamson even described the results which have been obtained recently as "incredible" and "radical" breakthroughs. In a whole number of the approximately 2,000 contracts given out to companies by the Pentagon there has in fact been a certain partial success in some technologies. However, practice has confounded the unjustified hopes of the supporters of the SDI program of the possibility of impressive technological breakthroughs. This has forced the Pentagon to make an appreciable adjustment to the SDI program.

This has affected to the greatest extent such a technical field as directed energy weapons (laser and beam). For example, it was maintained in 1985 that it would be possible at the start of the 1990's to conduct an experiment pertaining to the destruction by chemical laser from space of a missile in launch. Today the viewpoint on these weapons among the supporters of the SDI program has changed fundamentally. Subsequent work

has been oriented not toward the solution of the problem of combating ICBM's but toward the creation of active laser sensors intended to provide for the selection of targets in the ballistic phase of the flight, although the simplest experiments on chemical laser kills of ICBM's in the boost phase also are not precluded.

There are other such examples. Considerable attention in the program of the development of directed energy weapons is being paid today to the free-electron laser. Aside from the tremendous difficulty of the creation of a powerful ground-based free-electron laser, the question of the possibility of the manufacture for it of most complex ground- and space-based optical systems is particularly acute. Within the framework of the "star wars" program in California experiments are being conducted vigorously on the development of materials and coverings for special heat-resistant large-aperture mirrors. According to the claims of the leader of this program, J. Stanford, the results of this work are negligible. More than 98 percent of material samples for the operational mirrors tested thus far has proven totally unsuitable for operation and has been destroyed given short-term irradiation, although the capacity of the experimental laser here has been many orders of magnitude below that required.

In neutral particle beam technology the SDI program has shifted also from the search for ways of developing experimental active ABM weapons in space to the ascertainment of the possibility in principle of the use of high-energy beams for the active selection of nuclear warheads flying on a ballistic trajectory under the cover of a multitude of decoys. Speaking about electrodynamic weapons, the supporters of the SDI program point to the accomplished increase in the rate of fire of the railguns and the development of electronic components for miniature interceptor homing systems. However, specialists do not consider these components of electrodynamic weapons complex.

Considering the highly modest results obtained in respect of the "star wars" program in the 5 years of research and experiments, its subsequent gradual realization with regard for priority is being broken down into two main technological directions. One incorporates a continuation of R&D in respect of a number of complex basic and applied fields geared to the very distant future. This applies primarily to all the technology geared to the creation of highly efficient directed energy weapons and other support facilities.

The second part of the SDI program includes work on the relatively rapid creation and upgrading of the existing traditional ABM interceptors. These measures are oriented toward the maximum acceleration of the development and subsequent gradual creation of an operating territorial system of ABM defense of the United States with limited operational potential. These efforts also, however, may ultimately be geared to the possible realization of the idea being actively discussed in the United

States of the deployment of ABM grouping facilities, that is, protection of ICBM silos and also operational control and communications centers against limited strikes.

The financial and technological limitations which the supporters of the SDI program have encountered combined with a change in the domestic policy situation and in connection with presidential election have forced the Pentagon to look for resourceful gambits which might enable this program to acquire a kind of immunity for the future. A most obvious such move has been the speediest transfer of the SDI program from the research phase to the engineering development, testing and production phase, which, in accordance with the mechanism which has taken shape in the United States, enables the Pentagon to strengthen appreciably the SDI program's legal position owing to the broader political interest not only among the appropriate companies of the military-industrial complex but in the Congress also. At the present time the Pentagon is endeavoring to impart powerful impetus to the SDI program making practically impossible its subsequent cessation or significant limitation by future U.S. administrations.

Thus in September of last year then U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger approved the recommendations of the Arms System Purchasing Council and adopted the decision to accelerate in accordance with the "star wars" program at the "demonstration and appraisal" stage six of its main projects, the results of which, the Pentagon believes, should provide for the operational deployment of the first echelon of a future system of the ABM defense of the United States with space-based components in 1994. In accordance with this decision, it is planned in the United States continuing the creation of ABM facilities and conducting demonstration tests of the following systems, which it is contemplated incorporating in the first echelon of a territorial ABM system: space-based systems for detecting and tracking strategic missiles in the boost phase; space-based systems for detecting and tracking targets in the ballistic phase; ground-based systems for detecting and tracking targets in space; systems for intercepting targets in space with the use of space-based ABM interceptors; the HEDI long-range experimental ABM interceptor for destroying warheads beyond the atmosphere; operational control and communications systems using advanced computer and communications equipment.

Despite the appreciable and forced simplification of the proposed version of a territorial system of ABM defense of the United States, the possibility of its deployment is highly doubtful. Together with the above-mentioned technological difficulties the main problem in the simplified ABM outline is considered the possibility of rapid deployment of the space-based echelon. Even if light ABM interceptors with the necessary tactical and technical specifications for ABM battle platforms are created, although many specialists doubt that this will be the case, the ways of ensuring the high efficiency of a space-based ABM echelon in the event of the use by the

contending party in a retaliatory strike of ICBM's with an abridged boost phase and rapid separation of the warheads are unclear, as before.

The Pentagon's publicity for the facilities incorporated in the "demonstration and appraisal" stage has not removed from the agenda the problem of the creation of an efficient and dependable battle-management system, which specialists consider a most complex component of the "star wars" program. The supporters of SDI maintain that the job of battle management given the use in a space-based echelon of light ABM interceptors intended for the destruction of ICBM's and SLBM's only in the boost phase is a relatively simple task. However, the forced abandonment of superfast directed energy weapons and the switch to traditional kinetic weapons in the form of space-based light ABM interceptors have made immeasurably more complicated the problem of future presidents adopting a decision on the operational use of an ABM space-based echelon.

Thus, according to American specialists' current estimates, if a probable enemy creates high-velocity strategic missiles with a boost phase duration of 80-90 seconds, which is technically feasible, in order to ensure the requisite efficiency of an ABM space-based echelon a future U.S. commander in chief's decision to conduct combat operations will have to be made in 10 seconds, which is practically unrealistic.

Such strict time limitations on the start of combat operations give rise to the need for the formation of a new class of programs of battle management using in the ABM space-based echelon autonomous automatic systems of the adoption of the most important decision at the start of combat operations. Consequently, the Pentagon has been confronted with the need for the creation of a supercomplex battle-management system. The fate of the American people, and of the entire international community, is thus made dependent on the soundness of the development of battle-management programs and the dependability of supercomputers with AI elements, which are to be used in the ABM space-based echelon.

The use of light ABM interceptors on space-based battle platforms also leaves unsolved the problem of their vulnerability in orbit. The versions of protection of the battle platforms in the form of fake operational facilities and the imparting to the battle platforms of the capacity for maneuvering in orbit to avoid an attack by the enemy's anti-ABM missiles planned by the Pentagon would seem ineffective. The maneuvering of ABM platforms in orbit would require their provision with an extra fuel reserve, which could provide for only a limited number of maneuvers.

There arises the legitimate question: why are the U.S. military-industrial complex and the Pentagon so persistent in pushing the "star wars" program? There are several reasons here, we believe. The SDI program was a

consequence of a broad range of political, military-technical and economic requirements of the U.S. military-industrial complex. The SDI, its ideologues believe, should strengthen appreciably the positions of the United States in relations with the USSR, permitting, in the event of its successful realization, dealings to be had from a position of military superiority.

The SDI, as its supporters mistakenly believe, will serve as an efficient method of undermining the Soviet economy by "excessive" military preparations—particularly with regard for the association with the SDI of West Europe and Japan. However, the Soviet Union's retaliatory measures will be asymmetrical, and we will not repeat what the United States is doing in respect of the "star wars" program. The Soviet Union has, specialists estimate, a wide spectrum of comparatively inexpensive versions and methods of counteracting a broad-based system of the ABM defense of the United States with space-based components capable of devaluing it and rendering it inefficient.

The giant threat of SDI to all of mankind has been comprehensively studied by the American analyst Robert English, who in February 1987 published an article in the journal *NEW REPUBLIC* entitled "Aggressive Star Wars". He emphasized that the offensive potential of the new generation of kinetic weapons and directed energy weapons being developed within the framework of the SDI program was of frightening strategic significance. If precision space-based kinetic weapons are created, they could be used to destroy targets not only in space but on Earth also. He rightly emphasized that such systems of space weapons using "space-to-earth"-class missiles could wipe out ICBM's in their launch silos. Obviously, with the appearance of space-based strike arms the time warning of a missile attack from ABM orbital battle platforms would be reduced to several minutes. R. English expressed concern in connection with the deployment of a space-based echelon of ABM defense of the United States and with the fact that the party which sensed a danger to itself in an unclear situation would abandon the "launch on attack" doctrine and would be guided by the "launch in a crisis" doctrine.

Being powerful and accurate, an ABM space echelon, American specialists estimate, could be highly efficient for destroying aircraft at base also. Space-based strike weapons could also wipe out a whole number of such particularly important ground- and sea-based targets as command posts, communications and battle-management centers, large naval surface targets and economic facilities (oil, gas and chemical enterprises, nuclear power stations, power plants and so forth).

A ground-to-space and orbital-based laser system capable of destroying ICBM's in the boost phase would also have an opportunity of very efficiently wiping out artificial Earth satellites and ground facilities. Space-based laser systems would cause the combustion of fuel depots and numerous fires on enemy territory. Nuclear-pumped

X-ray lasers also could destroy artificial Earth satellites in distant orbits, and, when trained on the Earth, create a powerful electromagnetic field putting various electronic systems out of action.

Conservative forces of the right in the United States see the SDI as the logical culmination of the unceasing search for U.S. strategic superiority. "If we can," C. Weinberger maintained in Congress, "obtain a system which is efficient and could render the arms of the Soviet Union inefficient, we would then be able to revert to the situation which we were in when we were the sole country which possessed nuclear weapons." All this imparts to the SDI a particularly dangerous, aggressive intent, which is all the more obvious in that the United States has repeatedly turned down the Soviet proposals concerning a mutual renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".  
"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

**Current State of U.S. Debate Over SDI Surveyed**  
*18160005g Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian*  
*No 12, Dec 88 pp 67-77*

[Article by Aleksandr Alekseyevich Pikayev, junior scientific associate of the Problems of Disarmament Department of the World Economy and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Aleksandr Georgiyevich Savelyev, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate of the Problems of Disarmament Department of the same institute: "The Strategic Defense Initiative: Supporters' Arguments and Opponents' Objections"]

[Text] Debate has been unabating for 5 years now in connection with a most acute and complex problem of current international relations—the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program. Advanced by U.S. President R. Reagan in March 1983, it has had extensive repercussions both within political, military and S&T circles in the United States itself and elsewhere. This is connected largely with the ambitious nature of the proclaimed goals, the planned abrupt change in U.S. military strategy, the unpredictability of the possible consequences and a whole number of most serious objections, of which the opponents of SDI are giving advanced notice. Even today the program has become a considerable barrier in the way of the achievement of agreement between the USSR and the United States on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Even today it has forced the Soviet Union to examine with all due responsibility the question of possible countermeasures in the event of the United States' deployment of broad-based ABM defenses. In the immediate future SDI threatens to undermine the existing international accords in the sphere of limitation of the arms race, specifically, the

1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty, which is without a time limit, and also, possibly, a deterioration in the entire climate of international relations.

As a result of the 5-year debate a clearer idea of the actual place of SDI in U.S. military policy has begun to crystallize out. The original idea concerning the creation over America of an impenetrable "astrodome" has been gradually pushed into the sphere of pure rhetoric, and the actual purpose of the program has become the development of a predominantly ground-based ABM system of limited efficiency designed to protect not the population but facilities of the strategic forces. Washington has been forced to abandon attempts to portray the SDI as an alternative to the arms reduction process. Assertions that SDI is a guarantor of a reduction have come to be put forward as a new argument in support of it. As the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms progress, it is becoming increasingly hard for the U.S. Administration to evade serious discussion of the question of prevention of an arms race in space. And although this process is of a highly contradictory and limited nature, it obviously reflects the success of the increasingly realistic viewpoint within the American strategic community.

A policy of an increasingly in-depth analysis of the problems associated with SDI may be traced in Soviet publications of recent times. The initial dramatic tone in their presentation has given way to a large extent to balanced and sober assessments. At the same time the multifaceted nature of the question concerning the non-militarization of space and the rapid shift in the line of reasoning and its contradictory nature may frequently, as before, be confusing and lessen the effect of certain works devoted to SDI. It would seem necessary, therefore, to afford the reader an opportunity to once again independently assess the arguments of the supporters of SDI, who justified this program both immediately it was announced and in the course of the evolution of the debate on this problem, and also the counterarguments of its opponents.

**1. A broad-based ABM system will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete and make it possible to abandon nuclear deterrence and switch to a strategy of "mutual assured survival".**

This proposition was the first and principal argument of the supporters of SDI. As a whole, it is intended to lend attractiveness to this program in the eyes of the public at large. Appeals were often heard in the rhetoric of representatives of the U.S. Administration in 1983-1984 for the "extermination of missiles, and not people" and for "saving the living, and not avenging the dead". The supporters of SDI thereby appealed to people's natural fear in the face of the threat of nuclear annihilation and endeavored to portray the "initiative" as the sole means of ensuring real security.

It should be acknowledged that initially the rhetoric concerning "assured survival" achieved certain goals. According to a number of public opinion polls at the end of 1984-start of 1985, SDI was supported by 51-53 percent against 35-38 percent of the U.S. population. But whereas it was possible to disorient the U.S. public at the initial stage, a more informed audience greeted such arguments with skepticism. A number of authoritative studies conducted in the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries repudiated the myth of the feasibility of the creation of an impenetrable ABM defense and also of the possibility of the renunciation on this basis of nuclear weapons as such.

First, and even the most fervent SDI supporters have been forced to agree with this, a system of defense against ballistic missiles leaves open the question of other nuclear delivery systems—aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery and others.

Second, the dialectic of the development of means of defense and offense testifies that, given their parallel improvement, only the temporary and comparatively limited predominance of the "shield over the sword" is possible. In this case, however, the U.S. Administration was talking about an efficiency of a defensive system close to 100 percent. The creation of "impenetrable" defenses is impossible because the opposite side would adopt active countermeasures against an ABM defense, which, in particular, the Soviet Union has declared repeatedly at the highest level. These countermeasures would reduce to nothing, if not all, many of the advantages which the United States wishes to derive by way of the creation and deployment of a broad-based defense system.

Third, these countermeasures could be considerably less complex and far less costly than space-based ABM components. In the opinion of former U.S. Defense Secretary J. Schlesinger, offensive weapons are at the present time three times cheaper than defensive weapons.

Fourth, there are tremendous technical difficulties in the way of the creation of the "astrodome". For example, even according to the most optimistic forecasts the potentially most efficient weapons systems based on the directed transfer of energy (laser and beam weapons) could not be deployed in effective combat strength for 25-30 years.

**2. If the creation of a highly efficient defense against ballistic missiles is impossible, why is the Soviet Union displaying such strong concern in connection with realization of the SDI program?**

The propaganda effect of this argument is quite powerful. However, it employs only a superficial aspect of the phenomenon. The creation of an impenetrable "astrodome" would hardly be the result of realization of the SDI. But an ABM system of limited efficiency is

quite a realistic proposition. Also realistic is the fact that efforts within the framework of the SDI program could contribute to the appearance of new weapons systems which do not even pertain to defensive systems. This would mean a continuation of the arms race and would force the USSR to take retaliatory steps. In addition, realization of the SDI would inevitably lead to the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty with all the negative consequences for Soviet-American relations ensuing therefrom. Such a development of events would be contrary to the ideas of the creation of a nuclear-free world, which the Soviet Union is advocating, and it is because of this that it has every reason to express its objections to the SDI.

It should be noted that American propaganda is attempting to portray the objections to the SDI on the part of the USSR as fear in the face of "American technical superiority". It is concluded from this that "since the Russians are afraid of SDI, this program should, consequently, be continued." In this connection the West calls attention to the large number of publications on "star wars" subject matter in our country, where the exotic arms and space wars of the future are frequently depicted with inordinate hullabaloo.

The realities of our era are more prosaic: in the foreseeable period the creation and, even more, broad-based deployment of such systems are impossible. The shift in SDI research toward "traditional" weapons based on the use of missile interceptors and ABM radars testifies to this also. Nonetheless, continuation of the SDI program cannot fail to disturb all who aspire to a more stable world and security built on mutual trust and a lowering of the levels of military opposition, and not an increase in arms—defensive or offensive.

**3. Even if a highly efficient ABM defense is impossible, a system of limited efficiency would be useful also. In the event of a nuclear war starting, it would make it possible to escape total annihilation and permit the survival of at least part of the population.**

Despite all its obvious bankruptcy, this argument was for some time employed quite actively in SDI supporter circles. The calculation here was based on that same natural fear of man in the face of nuclear catastrophe. Affording a certain part of the population "hope" of survival, the authors of such statements have been attempting to instill in the public the idea that nuclear war is not that terrible. It would probably be highly destructive and would entail considerable casualties. But as progress is made in ABM technology, the hypothetical losses among the population would allegedly constantly diminish.

Such an assertion is not taken in any way seriously by very many people in the West's scientific and political circles. At the present time the USSR and the United States have the potential of assured mutual destruction many times over. Therefore in order for an ABM system

to protect if only a small part of the population it would have to be of extraordinarily high efficiency, of over 75 percent, most likely. But even such a system could not avert the catastrophic consequences of the explosion of even a negligible number of the stockpiled nuclear weapons. Authoritative scientific research of recent years conducted independently in the United States, the USSR and other countries shows as clearly as could be the inevitability of the destruction of flora and fauna on Earth (including man) as a result of the abrupt ecological changes united by the "nuclear winter" concept.

**4. Broad-based ABM defenses of even limited efficiency would contribute to a strengthening of deterrence since it would increase the degree of uncertainty for the opposite side, as a result of which first-strike incentives would be reduced.**

The dubiousness of this argument is acknowledged by a number of supporters of SDI even, including U.S. President R. Reagan, who in his speech on 23 March 1983 was forced to affirm that "a combination of defensive and offensive arms could contribute to the pursuit of an aggressive policy, and no one wants this." Indeed, the side which renounced the deployment of an ABM defense might perfectly justifiably fear that the opponent's partially efficient defense system was intended to intercept a retaliatory strike weakened as a result of an attack inasmuch as it would be incapable of intercepting a first strike. In a period of crisis such a situation could objectively contribute to the increased likelihood of the outbreak of war. This is connected with the fact that the possessor of such an ABM defense of limited efficiency would be inclined to attribute to the probable adversary an aspiration to deliver a preemptive strike for the assured breach of the defenses. As a result of this the "protected" power would have an extra incentive to nuclear aggression. The situation could be even more acute were both sides to possess partially efficient ABM systems. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union declines a symmetrical response to the SDI, that is, the creation and deployment of broad-based ABM defenses.

**5. An asymmetrical response would put the Soviet Union in an obviously disadvantageous position. Its territory would remain vulnerable to limited low-yield nuclear attacks while the USSR would not have the opportunity to respond with an adequate (limited) strike against American territory inasmuch as the partially efficient U.S. ABM system would intercept such a strike.**

The supporters of this viewpoint believe that under these conditions the USSR would be faced with the choice of either launching a retaliatory strike against U.S. targets protected by ABM defenses—without a guarantee of their destruction—or against more vulnerable inhabited localities—with a likely following American attack on Soviet cities. Such an alternative could allegedly force the Soviet Union in the course of a conflict to accept U.S. terms.

But the USSR has traditionally regarded the logic of limited nuclear war as baseless. In accordance with the defensive Soviet military doctrine, the development of the USSR Armed Forces, nuclear included, is geared primarily toward the prevention of war. A symmetrical response is fraught with a far greater danger of the outbreak of nuclear war and would require substantial outlays here. For this reason such a response would be contrary to the very essence of Soviet military policy.

The said proposition of the supporters of SDI is vulnerable even from the standpoints of limited nuclear war also. The uncertainties connected with a retaliatory strike are such not only for the victim but also for the aggressor. Under the conditions of an asymmetrical response the latter may forecast merely the results of his strike, whereas of far greater significance to him is the estimate of the degree of retribution. A retaliatory strike would not depend here of the "rational" decisions of the aggressor but would be determined by chance and unpredictable factors—miscalculations in respect of the estimates of the efficiency of the ABM defenses and malfunctions in the system itself. For this reason broad-based ABM defenses deployed by one party could not return nuclear war to the sphere of rational policy.

**6. The deployment of a target ABM defense to protect strategic arms and the control and communications system would contribute to their increased survivability and serve to strengthen deterrence.**

This idea would seem to be a most serious argument of the supporters of SDI. Indeed, the increased survivability of strategic arms and the control and communications system would increase confidence in the dependability of the forces of a retaliatory strike against a nuclear aggressor and could objectively contribute to a reduction in the incentive to launch a preemptive strike.

At the same time it should be noted that both various types of strategic arms and the control and communications system may be protected with the aid of ABM defenses to a varying extent. The easiest task is the defense of ensilo'd ICBM launchers. But the United States has only 20 percent of its strategic warheads deployed on ICBM's. In the event of the United States wishing to protect strategic aviation bases, SSBN's and the ramified control and communications system, it would have to deploy an system of antimissile defense, practically indistinguishable from a partially efficient defense system, of the country's territory with all the attendant destabilizing characteristics which were examined in the preceding question.

The start of such deployment would inevitably be seen by the opposite side as the creation of the first echelon of a broad-based ABM defense, as a result of which it would be forced to embark on the implementation of counter-measures, which would lead to an intensification of the

arms race. The arms limitation process would be undermined also since such actions would be contrary to the 1972 ABM Treaty limiting the deployment of "traditional" defense systems to just one area with a radius of 150 km.

The problem of the survivability of strategic forces is truly important. But it may be solved by far less complex and costly methods without such serious consequences for strategic stability. This question could be solved primarily in accords of the parties aimed at a reduction in and the elimination of the most destabilizing weapons systems. Possible also are measures of a military-technical nature—dispersal, transition to mobile systems and so forth. As a whole, however, this problem could, given mutual interest, be resolved comparatively quickly and without a further arms buildup.

**7. ABM defenses would strengthen American guarantees in NATO inasmuch as, in the event of a conflict arising in Europe, the United States would be able to use nuclear weapons with less fear of the devastating consequences of a retaliatory strike against its territory. All this would serve the goals of deterring nonnuclear aggression against the West European countries.**

The authors of this proposition are artificially attempting to link the problem of preventing war (both nuclear and conventional) with the results of realization of the SDI program. They are relying here on the traditional idea of Western strategy to the effect that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is the principal means of maintaining peace. But the logic of such reasoning is unconvincing. After all, were the United States to feel freer in the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, unafraid of the consequences of such a step, the greater would be the probability of these weapons being activated. SDI not only would not bring Europe (or the United States also, incidentally) greater security but would increase the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war in precisely this region.

**8. SDI would contribute to the parties' transition to more "stabilizing" strategic nuclear systems—bombers and cruise missiles.**

First of all, there are no guarantees that SDI would "abolish" strategic ballistic missiles. On the contrary, it would be a powerful incentive to the continued upgrading of these arms, including a strengthening of passive protection, and also the formulation of new launch tactics and the creation of means of "deceiving" and suppressing ABM defenses.

At the same time the proposition that strategic bombers and cruise missiles are "stabilizing" weapons systems gives rise to serious doubts also. Their natural "merit" is their comparatively low flight speed and aviation's capacity for returning to base in the event of cancellation of the decision to launch an attack. However, from the

viewpoint of strategic stability a most important indicator is not flight speed but time of warning of the attack. Given the use of cruise missiles, however, this time could be far less than the warning of a launch of ground-based ballistic missiles. The concealment of the flight of aircraft and cruise missiles, in whose design Stealth technology would be incorporated, would also lead to an undermining of stability, considering the fact that these weapons systems have the capacity for destroying such important strategic facilities as radars, command centers, route communications centers and the strategic arms themselves. None of this ties in with the concept of "stabilizing" arms, and their continued upgrading would merely increase the threat of war.

**9. The United States would not deploy broad-based ABM defenses were their cost to prove higher than the cost of possible countermeasures and were they to prove vulnerable to a probable enemy's counterweapons.**

This proposition, which was put forward by P. Nitze, special arms control adviser to the U.S. President and secretary of state, is a kind of subterfuge of the SDI supporters in the face of the growing criticism of this program. The U.S. leadership is attempting here to pretend that after tens of billions of dollars have been spent on the "initiative," it could easily abandon its far-reaching plans. It is doubtful whether under such conditions the U.S. Administration would be able to acknowledge that these immense outlays had been made to no purpose. Even now statements to the effect that "the nation's security is worth any price" are being heard. Therefore this argument cannot be seen other than as a purely propaganda statement not supported by the actual facts. Were the United States to abide by such logic, many programs in the sphere of military organizational development would not be realized. The high cost and vulnerability of weapons have never been an obstacle in attempts to acquire military superiority.

**10. The destabilizing consequences of the deployment of ABM defenses could be avoided were the USSR and the United States to engage in these actions in parallel on an agreed basis.**

The appearance of this argument is quite symptomatic: many supporters of SDI have been forced under pressure of criticism to admit that the United States' unilateral actions in realization of this program would be of a destabilizing nature. But would stability be strengthened were both sides, even on an agreed basis, to take the path of the creation and deployment of broad-based ABM defenses with space-based components? Nothing testifies in support of such a conclusion. After all, the essence of the arms race would not be altered by whether it is conducted "according to rules" or not. Nor could the destabilizing nature of ABM defenses be changed by political declarations and accords. It would be manifested if only in the fact that the two ABM systems partially deployed in space would create a real threat both to artificial Earth satellites and to one another. This

threat would be an objective reality and could at any moment manifest itself in the most disastrous manner, increasing tension and suspicion in relations between the two countries. Together with this such an accord between the USSR and the United States would most likely be perceived in other countries as an endeavor to ensure the "superpowers'" own security at the expense of the rest of the world. And this would be fundamentally at variance with the Soviet Union's new political thinking, a proposition of which is the conclusion that in the modern world security may only be general and cannot be achieved to the detriment of the security of other countries.

**11. The SDI would not be contrary to the ABM Treaty, being a purely research program.**

The question of the ABM Treaty is a most complex and contradictory sphere of the struggle of the supporters and opponents of SDI. The latter uphold the true content of this document unequivocally prohibiting the creation, testing and deployment of mobile-ground- and sea-based, air-launched and space-based ABM systems and components. The supporters of SDI, on the other hand, are resorting for the purpose of confusing the essence of the question to maneuvering, frequently contradicting their own statements. Thus in March 1986 General Abrahamson, leader of the SDI program, asserted the "complete conformity" of the "initiative" with this treaty. But in November 1986 he was speaking of the need for the "modernization" of this document. Big disagreements in the United States have also been caused by the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, in accordance with which it is only the deployment of "exotic" ABM interceptor systems which is banned, but development and testing are allowed.

In order that there be total clarity on this issue the Soviet Union proposed to the United States in 1987 discussion at the Geneva negotiations on specifically which actions and programs fall under ABM Treaty restriction, and which are authorized. Such an agreement could have contributed to a strengthening of the treaty's terms, in which, according to a number of statements, the United States is interested. But the U.S. leadership turned down this proposal, which testifies to its endeavor to continue a policy of loosening and weakening the treaty for the purpose of eliminating this most considerable obstacle in the way of implementation of the plans for the militarization of outer space. The U.S. Administration frequently also resorts in its tactics to "accusations" against the USSR of "violations" of the ABM Treaty and the implementation of a program similar to President Reagan's "initiative".

**12. Work analogous to the SDI has been going on for many years in the Soviet Union. Therefore the United States must undertake its own program to prevent a "surprise" in the ABM sphere on the part of the USSR.**

This assertion began to be put about by the U.S. leadership following the development of work on the SDI. It was intended to justify R. Reagan's "initiative" in the

eyes of the American public in the face of the growing criticism of the program. One cannot fail to be struck here by a manifest contradiction in the pronouncements of SDI supporters. Thus on the one hand the "strategic defense initiative" is portrayed as a panacea against nuclear weapons. It is proposed moving along the path of creation of broad-based ABM defenses in parallel with the USSR and also "sharing secrets with the Russians". On the other, the United States has been "forced" to undertake this program inasmuch as similar work is being performed in the USSR. There is no mention here of the "stabilizing" and "salutary" impact of ABM defense on strategic stability. On the contrary, an "accusation" is being leveled at the USSR in connection with its aspiration to military superiority.

The expansion of glasnost in the Soviet Union has made it possible to bring clarity to this issue also. Thus in his interview with the American NBC national television company at the start of December 1987 M.S. Gorbachev declared in this connection that "it is hard to say what the Soviet Union is not doing. Practically everything that the United States is doing." It was also emphasized here, however, that the Soviet Union is engaged in basic research which is covered by SDI research in the United States.

Such acknowledgment of such research in the USSR increased the Western community's trust in Soviet policy. The West began to treat with greater trust the Soviet leadership's statements to the effect that, despite the work that is being performed, the Soviet Union does not intend to mirror U.S. actions in the strategic defense sphere.

If the United States really fears a "Soviet SDI," it would be far simpler to accept the USSR's proposal pertaining to a strengthening of the ABM Treaty terms with frank and comprehensive discussion of all issues connected with this problem.

**13. SDI is a guarantee of the Soviet Union's compliance with the ABM Treaty.**

This argument is directly connected with the pronouncements of SDI supporters adduced above to the effect that the USSR is engaged in a program similar to the SDI. For this reason the United States, in making efforts in the ABM sphere, is creating assurances that the USSR "will not dare" violate the ABM Treaty in the face of American superiority in the said sphere.

The illogicality of such "arguments" is quite apparent: if the creation and deployment of ABM defenses is a stabilizing action, why must the USSR be "accused" of implementing such a program (which, incidentally, needs to be proved)? If not, why is the United States engaged in SDI? After all, from the viewpoint of stability the response to the deployment of ABM defenses should be asymmetrical steps in other fields of military development. Stability would not be stronger here, of course,

than prior to the deployment of ABM defenses but it would at least not be completely undermined by the symmetrical actions of the opposite side.

Finally, in the very near future even a number of SDI projects will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty, which is admitted even by the supporters of this program demanding changes to this document. Thus in accordance with the "logic" of the defenders of SDI, the guarantee of the Soviet Union's compliance with the ABM Treaty is its violation by the United States.

**14. SDI is a guarantee that the USSR will comply with an agreement on a limitation of and reduction in strategic offensive arms.**

This "idea" is one further example of the ABM supporters' maneuvering in the course of the debate in connection with the SDI. It is "concluded" here that if the United States has a broad-based strategic defense system, a possible violation of an strategic offensive arms agreement would be of no real benefit to the USSR. For this reason the Soviet Union would, it is claimed, do no such thing.

The supporters of this viewpoint are attempting to maintain that the USSR seeks one-sided advantages in arms limitation agreements and is prepared at any moment to violate them in the event of it deeming this to its advantage. But if to guarantee compliance with treaties designed to lower the level of military confrontation and strengthen stability it is necessary to adopt measures to increase arms in other spheres, the very point of such agreements is lost. For this reason SDI is not a guarantee in this context, on the contrary: the United States' continued attempts to achieve military superiority by way of the creation and deployment of broad-based ABM defenses with space-based components guarantees merely that the arms race will assume an uncontrollable nature. The prospects of the conclusion of new agreements in the sphere of offensive and defensive strategic systems would be highly doubtful here.

**15. Even an ABM defense of limited efficiency would solve the problem of verification of agreements in the arms limitation sphere since a negligible violation could not afford the violator real advantages.**

The so-called "problem of verification," which in the recent past was actively employed by the United States for propaganda purposes, proved when put to the test to be entirely contrived. The course of the negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms in Geneva shows that the Soviet Union's readiness for far-reaching measures and forms of verification, as far as on-site inspection, is in practice giving rise to resistance on the part of the United States.

ABM defenses would not facilitate but complicate questions of verification if only because a possible countermeasure is the priority development of such nuclear

delivery systems as cruise missiles. It is these systems which are the most difficult to monitor owing to the concealment of basing (on ships and submarines), difficulty of counting and existence of nuclear and nonnuclear versions, that is, the "dual capability" of these weapons.

Questions connected with the verification of agreements which are concluded are very important. They are of no less importance to the USSR here than to the United States. Given mutual interest, methods and forms of verification may perfectly well, as practice shows, be agreed such that no party suspects possible violations of agreements in the disarmament sphere. The general principle of such verification could be quite simple: the deeper the cuts, the stricter the verification.

**16. Regardless of future results, the SDI program is even now bearing certain fruit: thanks to it, the Soviet Union returned in 1985 to the negotiating table and was forced to adopt a serious attitude toward the negotiations.**

This assertion is contrary to the elementary sequence of events: the "strategic defense initiative" was put forward by President R. Reagan in March 1983. The negotiations in question, on the other hand, were suspended in November the same year in connection with the start on the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

In 1985 the USSR returned to the negotiating table following an all-around assessment of the consequences of the American actions in the firm belief that only political steps could solve the security problem. A whole number of peace initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union in recent years testifies to this also. As far as a "serious attitude" toward the negotiations under pressure from the SDI is concerned, the fact that the SDI is not a topic of discussion at the negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms does not tally with this proposition. The question in Geneva is about strengthening the 1972 ABM Treaty terms, not the United States' abandonment of this program. It is a question merely of both sides adhering strictly to the limitations of the existing accords and not engaging in actions aimed at undermining them.

**17. An ABM defense of limited efficiency would facilitate future negotiations on a reduction in strategic offensive arms inasmuch as it would ensure the relatively slight potential of "third" nuclear powers, the problem of the consideration of which has repeatedly been a serious impediment at the negotiations.**

"Third" nuclear countries really are disturbed at the prospect of a devaluation of their forces as the result of the deployment by both the great powers of broad-based ABM systems. However, a consequence of this anxiety is the accelerated buildup of these countries' nuclear potentials—both numerical and qualitative. By the mid-1990's, and only then, according to the official version,

will a decision on the expediency of the deployment of a broad-based ABM defense be made, the number of warheads on the strategic delivery systems of France and China will have increased several times over, and Great Britain will be embarking on such an increase. The new delivery systems will possess greater penetrating capacity here.

Even if for completeness of the analysis it is assumed that a broad-based ABM defense is deployed, doubts as to its real efficiency and, consequently, misgivings concerning the nuclear forces of "third" powers will inevitably persist. Even at the present time the SDI program is contributing to the young nuclear powers' more active participation in the race in these arms. And if the limited nature of the potentials of "third" countries makes it possible to place them outside of the Soviet-American negotiations which are under way, this could become impossible in the foreseeable future. The prospects of the creation of an ABM defense of limited efficiency would thus only complicate the strategic arms reduction process.

**18. An ABM defense of limited efficiency would make it possible to prevent damage from unsanctioned ballistic missile launches and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war.**

The probability of unsanctioned launches in peacetime is negligible thanks to the nuclear powers' developed system of control and communications of the strategic forces and the efficiency of the cutoff facilities. As a result of realization of the SDI the possibility of the unsanctioned start of a war would increase. The need for the superfast reaction of ABM components could exclude man's participation in the process of the adoption of a decision on their use. The survival of mankind would be made dependent on the reliability of the supercomputers controlling this system. Unfortunately, even the most sophisticated computers are not guaranteed against malfunctions, which authoritative specialists of the USSR and the United States have pointed out repeatedly.

For a reduction in the risk of the unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons it is essential together with technical measures (increased monitoring of the nuclear arsenals) to also take political steps aimed at a lowering of the levels of nuclear confrontation, as far as the complete elimination of these arms.

**19. An ABM defense of limited efficiency would keep a hypothetical small power or organization from using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes.**

The ABM system being developed within the SDI framework is optimized for intercepting ballistic missiles. But it is hardly likely that a hypothetical power or, even less, organization would resort for terrorist purposes to such a lengthy, costly and technologically complex project as the creation of a ballistic missile. There is a mass of incomparably simpler and more accessible methods—delivering a

nuclear weapon with a time fuze, for example, on a truck to the center of a large city, blowing up an ordinary merchant ship loaded with such munitions in the proximity of a large port or similarly arranging for a nuclear explosion on board an aircraft over a densely populated area. The progress in the sphere of miniaturization of nuclear weapons expected in the future will afford new methods for the perpetration of acts of nuclear terrorism. The struggle against them cannot be conducted merely by military-technical means alone. It is essential to seek political ways of solving the problem of international terrorism, by way of a strengthening of the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty included.

**20. The SDI program will advance civilian R&D appreciably and yield big dividends in nonmilitary spheres.**

The yields in civilian fields cannot, of course, be denied. The practice of realization of large-scale military projects in the United States testifies that such a process could occur on this scale or the other in this case also.

Among the possible results of the realization of SDI in the military sectors the supporters of the program cite such fine-sounding projects as the recovery of ore on asteroids, the construction of qualitatively new alloys under the conditions of space and the designing of optical computers using laser beams instead of electrons. However, bigger results would be produced by the direct financing of nonmilitary research in the said fields. The results of military research are classified and frequently cannot be used for commercial purposes. There is a whole number of examples of military contractors, government laboratories particularly, which feel little market pressure, having dragged out the development of new technology and of having been behindhand compared with parallel civilian research. There is also the likelihood that SDI would even undermine the most progressive branches of nonmilitary R&D inasmuch as it would swallow up a growing amount of federal appropriations and attract the most skilled personnel.

The debate surrounding the "strategic defense initiative" is not exhausted, of course, by the issues adduced above. Many disputes are arising in connection with the problem of the technical feasibility of this project or the other, the political and economic consequences of realization of the American program and questions of peace and stability in international relations. Nonetheless, the statements of the supporters and opponents of this program quoted above reveal, in our view, the entire contradictoriness of the United States' plans pertaining to the creation and deployment of a broad-based ABM defense.

At the same time this contradictoriness is not preventing the present American leadership continuing its attempts to "persuade" the USSR of the need for the creation and construction of ABM defenses, which was manifested distinctly at the time of the top-level meeting in Moscow, as also at the preceding meetings of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. Revealed in the

course of these meetings was the United States' manifest reluctance to understand that realization of the said plans would hardly contribute to an improvement in the climate of international relations and a better mutual understanding and growth of trust between countries of East and West. Besides the new dangers, they could open the way to an entirely uncontrollable nuclear and space-based arms race. All this only increases the seriousness of the debate on the problems of SDI, which will hardly become less urgent in the foreseeable future also.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".  
"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

### **General Reviews Progress, Prospects of SDI Program**

52000037 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 22 Mar 89 p 4

[Article by Major General V. Belous, candidate of technical sciences: "SDI: Philosophy of Doom. The United States: 6 Years Under the Symbol of the 'Strategic Defense Initiative'"]

[Text] The era of the fortieth U.S. president—the "Reagan era"—came to an end 2 months ago under the thunder of an artillery salute in Washington. The infamous "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI] holds one of the most important places in the legacy which he left to his successor in the White House. Of the 7 years of Reagan's presidency, the last 6 occurred under the SDI symbol. What have the last years shown? What results did this program bring at its intermediate stage, when its author left the political scene?

### **What Does the Antimissile 'Umbrella' Conceal?**

As is well-known, SDI was officially proclaimed on 23 March 1983, in the period when President Reagan, having declared the Soviet Union to be an "evil empire," was firmly convinced that major political problems could be successfully resolved only by relying on military might. According to the concept of the creators of U.S. policy, this program was called on to reduce the value of a potential enemy's strategic capability and to render his nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Moreover, they asserted that the implementation of the SDI program will ensure real security for the population, and that it will cover the territory of the United States with an impenetrable antimissile "umbrella." Under the alarming conditions of the second "cold war," which was unfolding at the end of the 1970's, such promises looked very enticing, and the antimissile program attracted a lot of attention at once.

SDI supporters widely publicized the scientific and technical achievements that were accomplished in recent years and that cleared the way for the creation of "exotic" weapon systems, and they pointed out the favorable influence that the new military technologies

had on the acceleration of economic development. They especially persistently stressed the "defensive" character of this militaristic program, assuming, not without reason, that it would be easier to sell to the country's population in this form. In fact, SDI is nothing more than a play on words, and its main purpose is to change the existing military strategic parity in its favor. The conclusion of the U.S. Office of Technological Assessment in this regard is typical: "The Strategic Defense Initiative is conceived as a component part of the process of Washington's acquisition of a first nuclear strike capability."

Research that has been conducted by scientists and the modelling of combat situations with the help of modern supercomputers have shown that even if both countries create a large-scale ABM system international stability in this case would be lowered sharply. This is explained by the fact that an aggressor who delivers a simultaneous strike on an enemy's outer space ABM echelons and strategic nuclear forces acquires many more advantages than under the current conditions of opposition and, consequently, can count on victory. This, undoubtedly, can nudge the hotter heads in Washington to press the nuclear button.

In the first years after the declaration of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," the prevailing theme in its evaluation in the United States was open euphoria with respect to the fantastic capabilities of the "exotic" future ABM weapon system. SDI advocates contended that the impenetrable antimissile "umbrella" is "just around the corner." Newspapers, journals and television broadcasts, with a truly American flair, showed fabulous pictures of the destruction of Soviet missiles with the help of lasers, electromagnetic guns and particle beam and microwave weapons. Animated cartoon video clips struck the imaginations of millions of television viewers not experienced in military matters by the astounding simplicity with which enemy missiles were blown up after having scarcely left their silos, and warheads that miraculously survived broke up into little fragments long before approaching U.S. territory.

The widely publicized spectacular demonstration ("circus tricks") of "Star Wars" prototype weapons contributed to this to a great degree. As a rule, they were timed for the most important foreign policy events, and their purpose was not only to influence the Congress of the country to extort budget appropriations for SDI, but also to carry out a "technological deterrence" against the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the political elite of the country, these demonstrations were to reinforce the position of the United States in negotiations with the Soviet Union, forcing it to be more compliant. Tests conducted in September of 1985, on the eve of the Geneva summit meeting, were very typical examples of such an approach.

During the first test on the White Sands test range, a stage of the liquid-fuel "Titan-1" missile was set up, and its empty tanks were then filled with compressed gas. To

achieve a great psychological effect, it was painted and marked like a Soviet missile. The chemical laser MIRACLE, which was set up at a short distance, illuminated the tank wall. As a consequence of the powerful heating, the tank lost its stability and exploded as a result of excessive internal pressure. Commenting on this demonstration, General J. Abrahamson, who was the director of the SDI program at the time, not concealing his enthusiasm, reported that the laser "literally broke the item into pieces."

The second experiment demonstrated the capabilities of the antisatellite system ASAT to destroy outer space targets. The F-15 fighter, with a suspended 2-stage SRAM-"Altair" missile, took off from Edwards Air Force Base (state of California). The American satellite "Solwind," which had served its time, was used as a target. As a result of a direct hit by the launched missile, the satellite was destroyed over the Pacific Ocean at an altitude of about 450 kilometers.

In the opinion of U.S. specialists, these demonstration tests were a success; however, the Geneva meeting showed that the "deterrent" salvo did not achieve its objective. Tests held before subsequent summit meetings were not of such an obvious "pressure" nature.

#### How Much Do Exotic Weapons Cost?

SDI research gradually gathered speed, and by 1987 it had assumed priority significance among all military research programs. About 20 percent of Pentagon appropriations for R&D is earmarked for the purpose of creating a large-scale ABM system. According to calculations of Western specialists, more than 80 billion dollars was spent on the military space program during President Reagan's term of office. In addition, they direct attention to the speedy growth in these expenditures. Thus, while NASA and Pentagon expenditures on space programs were about the same in the beginning of the 1980's, in 1986 they constituted \$7.3 and \$15.8 billion respectively.

Such a swift stream of space dollars had an extremely beneficial effect on the scale of profits of military industrial concerns. Published data of the U.S. Office of Management and the Budget notes that in 1985 the amount of profits from military orders was more than double the profits from civilian production, based on approximately the same technological processes. For the period from 1972 to 1987, aerospace and electronic firms that comprise the main industrial base of SDI doubled the volume of orders. However, these were only the blooms, and the berries were to appear when the United States got into the production of the appropriate weapons. SDI advocates readily admit that, to receive super profits, it is necessary to put the manufacture of space systems on a production line basis.

In the opinion of Nobel laureate H. Bethe, who was a participant in the "Manhattan Project," the cost of an orbital station with a chemical laser on board will amount

to about \$5-to-\$10 billion. But for the creation of an impenetrable "Astrodome" over the United States, it is calculated that hundreds of such battle stations will have to be launched into outer space. For comparison, we will mention that expenditures for one nuclear missile submarine reaches \$2 billion and for a nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier, \$3.5 billion. According to calculations of the same H. Bethe, to ensure that the ground-outer space laser system will work (lasers on the ground and reflecting and battle mirrors in outer space), there will be an energy requirement for 300 electric power stations, with each putting out 1,000 megawatts. This will require an expenditure of not less than \$100 billion.

Deployment of a large-scale ABM system using exotic weapons will require the kind of expenditures which, according to the most modest estimates, will be measured not in billions but in trillions of dollars. Senator W. Proxmire, estimating the cost of an outer space strike weapon, came to the unhappy conclusion that, taking transport outlays into account and the costs of maintaining it in a combat mode, the expenditures would reach \$2 trillion. R. Bowman, director of the Institute of Space Research and Safety Problems came to approximately the same conclusion. It will be recalled that \$15 billion was required for the "Manhattan Project"; \$22 billion, for the Apollo program (landing a man on the moon), and \$20 billion for the creation of a squadron of space shuttle craft.

Setting SDI into motion, the American administration tried to bring the major countries of the Western world into its orbit so that, with the help of their scientific and industrial potential, the SDI program could be assured a pace that the Soviet Union would not be capable of and would hopelessly lag behind.

Of equal importance in these plans are calculations that, having drawn their allies into the SDI net, the United States will be able to enmesh them in bans on trade in "strategic" commodities and advanced technologies with the Soviet Union. This will substantially limit their entry into the world market and will ensure strengthening the position of large U.S. capital in it.

SDI rather quickly met with support on the part of prominent political figures and owners of military concerns in Great Britain and the FRG. "Memoranda of mutual understanding" with the governments of Israel, Italy and Japan followed.

Inconsistency in the leadership of a number of NATO countries led to the fact that, refusing to participate in the SDI program on a governmental level, they at the same time do not hinder the participation of individual industrial companies in it.

#### What Is Behind Electronic Intelligence?

However, symptoms that are alarming to the military-industrial complex have appeared in the background of a generally favorable picture. The sources of the beginning

process of the sobering of broad public circles in the United States goes back to the 1985-1986 period.

It became clear gradually that laser assemblies could not in any way guarantee the illumination needed to destroy a missile. Electromagnetic guns imparted too low a velocity to projectiles; they were distinguished by a rate of fire that was too slow, and, in addition, they were of such a large size and weight that there was no hope of putting them into outer space in the foreseeable future. The huge dimensions and weight of particle accelerator-prototypes of particle beam weapons with relatively low power made their combat utilization very problematical.

According to an accurate determination by one of the specialists of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the distance that separates a prototype weapon of a future ABM system from its operational models is approximately the same as from a kite to a Boeing-747. Transport problems have also been added to these complications. In deploying ABM into outer space, it will be necessary to launch thousands of tons of different kinds of cargo: orbital platforms, reconnaissance systems, various weapons, power plants, fuel, etc. Specialists have calculated that about 5,000 space shuttle flights will be required to form the outer space echelon for a large-scale ABM system.

Many prominent U.S. scientists who criticize SDI turned the attention of world opinion to the fact that this fully automated strike-reconnaissance system, which is based on the wide use of computers, will have to function without error under conditions of great uncertainty and enemy counteraction. The ABM command and control system must ensure uninterrupted and flawless reception, the storage and processing of information about thousands of enemy missile launches, thousands of warheads, and dozens and hundreds of thousands of decoys over the entire flight distance. It is planned to assign these functions to high-speed computers endowed with "artificial intelligence."

The ABM system must deliver the first massive strikes within several tenths of a second after receiving the signal (possibly a false one) of missile launches by a probable enemy in order to destroy them while they are still in the boost stage, and before reentry vehicle separation and the ejection of decoys onto the trajectory. Part of the data that is needed for an adequate estimate of the situation rests in the hands of a potential enemy, and he, keeping them a great secret for a certain time, will not fail to use them in a critical situation. Such a surprise can put the "artificial intelligence" in a bind, and at a critical moment it will testify to its own failure. The beginning of the war will not depend then on political figures, but it will be determined by the reliability and threshold of achieving various ABM elements, and the accuracy of computer operations and programs stored in them. It will be possible to turn over to a museum as an obsolete anachronism the "black suitcase" which the U.S. President can use now to remove the blocking from the "electronic locks" of nuclear weapons, which places them in a combat situation.

The technology study group of the U.S. Department of Defense came to the conclusion that the program for the command and control of the ABM system at the very least will contain 10 million lines of code. The assertion of a number of American scientists that such a program without defects cannot be created in principle is well-founded.

Considering that strategic offensive and defensive weapons are also closely interconnected and will operate simultaneously under combat conditions, it should be assumed that the entire military and political doctrine of the United States must be recorded with a mathematical code in the computer's memory. This model of combat operations will, undoubtedly, reflect the logic of the thinking of its creators who gather under the SDI banner—representatives of the most aggressive U.S. circles. In essence, this "black box" will store the entire "philosophy" of nuclear war. The well-known Czech writer Karl Chapek, long before the invention of computers, the atomic bomb, and other types of weapons of mass murder, warned mankind about the sad fate of people who put their faith in automatic devices. Future "universal robots" put into near-earth space under the mask of SDI will acquire unlimited authority over people. Mankind may be drawn into a maelstrom of mass destruction before it will be able at least to evaluate the suddenly arising danger of an unexpected strike from outer space resulting from an accidental automatic machine failure.

In developing methods of solving various tasks from human activity practices, mathematicians isolated an entire class that is integrated under the general designation "games." These tasks describe the conflict of opposing interests of parties who dictate a different strategy to them for the attainment of assigned tasks. A special place is given to war in these games, and, from the point of view of the computer, it is a purely mathematical task.

To its electronic "mind," human life is of no value—it is only a unit of measurement thrown onto the scale. The very concept of "victory" for the computer denotes an impassive calculation of dozens of millions of lives lost by each side, hundreds and thousands of large and small cities razed to the ground, and huge territories transformed for a millenium into a lifeless wasteland. Even at a moment that is most fateful for the destiny of world civilization, it is not stopped by a thought such as the insight of J. Kennedy: "We do not need victory with radioactive ashes in our mouths!"

The low reliability of computer systems, even those that are much less complicated than those in the future large-scale ABM system, is confirmed by the numerous failures and malfunctions that could have led and which frequently did lead to difficult consequences. In the conduct of the first 20 flights of multiple-mission spacecraft, American specialists in five cases discovered failures and malfunctions in the operation of onboard computers that were checked repeatedly. This led to launch delays of an overall duration of 24 hours.

Here is another example. During the Anglo-Argentinian conflict in the area of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, one of the best ships of the English navy—the destroyer Sheffield—equipped with a modern automatic air defense system, was sunk. During the investigation into the cause of its destruction, it turned out that English specialists did not take into account the recent introduction of the French anti-ship “Exocet” missile into the weapons inventory of the Argentinian navy. As is known, this missile is in the inventory of the NATO countries, and it was fed into the command and control program of the ship air defense system and counted as “friendly.” Therefore, during the flight run of the missile toward the destroyer, the electronic countermeasures and air target destruction systems were not turned on. As a result of this error in the program, the missile easily overcame the air defense system and sent the destroyer to the bottom with a direct hit.

#### Is A Victory Possible Before the “First Shot”?

It would seem that such “information for reflection” would arouse U.S. ruling circles to review their former positions with respect to SDI. This would be even more natural inasmuch as the perestroika that has started in the USSR and the entry of the new political thinking onto the world arena have created a favorable situation for a rethinking of the realities of the end of the 20th Century.

However, this has not occurred, mostly because the real masters of the United States continued to look at the surrounding world through the prism of power politics. Simultaneously, they did not give up the hope of dragging the Soviet Union into a space weapons race, exhaust it economically, and ruin it and gain a victory “before the first shot.” The thesis that “we will arm the Russians to death” is still a part of the arsenal of the ideological henchmen of SDI. Moreover, they do not conceal their hopes that, as relations between the USSR and the United States soften and the level of military opposition decreases, the center of gravity of the confrontation of the two powers will move more and more intensely from the purely military sphere to a military and economic sphere. Under conditions of military strategic parity, nuclear war is equivalent to suicide and, therefore, it must be avoided. However, betting on the prevailing military and economic potential of the United States, they assume that they will be able to use it to bring pressure on the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that the SDI program fits perfectly into the concept of “competing strategies,” about which a lot has been said recently in the speeches of U.S. political and military figures. Moreover, the impression is created that the main propositions of the concept were worked out during the course of work on SDI. As is known, its essence is to develop the kind of military technologies at a maximal pace that would require tremendous expenditures by the Soviet Union which would not, in the final analysis, guarantee an adequate

response. This should create a decisive U.S. superiority in the main directions of the military opposition of both sides, and which would grow into military strategic superiority. Therefore, despite the very modest successes in the creation of fundamentally new weapons for the prospective ABM system, they have not abandoned SDI, but decided to change the priorities in the programs somewhat.

This “re-evaluation” of views was rather graphically reflected in the country’s military budget for the 1987 and 1988 fiscal years. They provided for increased appropriations for the development of kinetic weapons, first and foremost, missiles, at the expense of some delay in the pace of work for creating “exotic” types of weapons.

Despite the blunt pressure of the administration, the U.S. Congress in the middle of 1987 asserted a “narrow” interpretation of the principles of the ABM Treaty, which to a certain degree limited the freedom of action of SDI apologists. However, the administration was able to compensate for the inflicted damage owing to the very important concurrence it got to conduct demonstration tests of systems for the detection and destruction of enemy missiles.

The Pentagon has planned to conduct 20 tests of various elements of the prospective ABM system in the next 5 years. The Defense Department’s procurement council has sanctioned a move to the “Milestone-1” stage for six of the SDI programs. This stage envisions conducting tests of elements intended for “early” deployment in the ABM system.

The conduct of tests contradicts the principles of Article V of the “Treaty on the Limitations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System,” which clearly fixes the obligations of the United States and the USSR: “Each of the parties is bound not to develop [sozdavat], test and deploy ABM systems or components that have a naval, air, outer space or ground mobile basing.”

It should be noted that SDI advocates continue, although with less ardour than previously, to discuss the non-nuclear nature of SDI. However, in evaluating the possibility of intercepting a warhead by various battle systems, military specialists in the United States have long since come to a conclusion about the advantages of using powerful thermonuclear and neutron charges. It is not superfluous to recall that the antimissile system “Nike Zeus” was worked up with thermonuclear equipment, and that the interceptors of the “Safeguard” system, which was deployed in the middle of the 1970’s around Grand Forks Air Base (state of North Dakota) carried neutron warheads.

Quite a few statements can be cited to show that the assurances about the non-nuclear nature of SDI, as they say in America, “have flown out the window.” Still another method of combating flying warheads and their decoy escorts is being developed, in particular within the framework of the “Prometheus” program. It is based on

the use of the energy of a nuclear explosion of a relatively low yield to accelerate small metallic particles to a velocity of several dozens of kilometers per second. High velocities are a highly destructive capability.

It will also not be superfluous to mention that one of the keystones of SDI, a nuclear-pumped "salvo fire"-X-ray laser weapon, is a variety of nuclear weapons of the third generation. Some American military specialists let the cat out of the bag that the X-ray laser has a dual purpose and that, should it be necessary it can be used to deliver strikes on ground targets. One of the reasons why the United States is hindering reaching an agreement on a total ban on nuclear tests is its secret desire to get this "Star Wars" weapon for itself no matter what happens.

#### **Does a Position of Strength Make Any Sense?**

The U.S. political system has given the President of the country considerable authority and has guaranteed him a high degree of influence in making important decisions in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, a lot depends on what kind of foreign policy course the 41st President of the United States will choose. Appearing before Congress on 9 February in a programmed speech, G. Bush unequivocally let it be understood that he is a consistent supporter of the policy "from a position of strength." "There can no longer be any doubt," he said, "that we made peace stronger throughout the world by relying on strength."

Naturally, G. Bush could not be silent on SDI either. If former plans remain in force, then at the completion of the research stage the President and Congress will have to make a decision in the beginning of the 1990's about the deployment of a large-scale ABM system. At the present time, neither the United States nor the USSR have weapons in outer space that could destroy any targets. Therefore, a decision on placing strike weapons in outer space will be of a fatal nature. Despite this, G. Bush declared that he will "energetically pursue the implementation of the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.'"

The Soviet Union is ready to continue the dialogue with the United States in the spirit of realism, frankness and goodwill. In the military sphere, the question is first and foremost about a steady movement toward the signing a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons while retaining the ABM Treaty. However, as previously, SDI continues to be the main obstacle on this path. Of course, they can hardly count on the fact abroad that the Soviet Union will destroy missile silos and underground command posts in which hundreds of millions of rubles have been invested without firm guarantees that the arms race will not spread to outer space. One would like to hope for a victory of the new political thinking and common sense which will rise above the existing stereotypes and established dogmas and clear the way for real international security and a non-nuclear, firm and uncoerced peace.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### Commentaries See NATO Policy Disarray at CFE Talks

#### Surprise French Proposal

36200122z Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Mar 89 p 12

[Analysis by Karl Feldmeyer: "Unpleasant Surprise in Vienna: NATO Disarmament Proposal and the FRG"]

[Text] The Vienna CFE conference has opened with an unpleasant surprise for the FRG. Just prior to the start of the conference French Foreign Minister Dumas stated that the FRG would "receive special treatment" along with the Benelux countries. This statement increased the Bonn government's concern about whether it was right to go along with the negotiating proposal put forward by the NATO countries in Vienna. The profound reaction in Bonn government circles to the French foreign minister's statement can only be understood if one takes the historical background into account. It goes back to 30 May 1986, the date on which the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Halifax decided to establish a so-called High Level Task Force. The task force was given the job of working out a joint NATO proposal in response to General Secretary Gorbachev's offer to enter into negotiations on conventional arms between the Atlantic and the Urals.

At the working group's very first meeting in June 1986 it became apparent that France's position differed from that of the other members of the alliance. The French position dissented from the U.S. proposal which called for treating the area between the Atlantic and the Urals as a unit and for arms limitations to apply to both pact systems, i.e., NATO and the Warsaw Pact. France was opposed to alliance-to-alliance negotiations, calling instead for negotiations between sovereign nations which are members of the two pact systems. For the same reason, France rejected the idea of alliance-related arms limits. From the start, France also insisted on not going back to the failed precepts of the MBFR negotiations, i.e., with regard to limiting the areas covered (the FRG and the Benelux countries on the one side and the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR on the other) and with regard to the negotiating issue, i.e., troop strength. In rejecting any attempt to revive the MBFR area limitations, France's took a position which conformed in every respect with that of the FRG. The FRG had no interest in a special disarmament zone which would separate it and the Benelux countries from its principal allies.

This situation created the need for a compromise. By July 1986 the FRG had already put a draft proposal on the table which took the French objections into consideration. The draft called for dividing the entire disarmament area into regions and for limiting disarmament to the principal weapon systems. In addition, the FRG draft took France's rejection of alliance-wide arms limits

into account. It called for establishing a northern, a central and a southern region, largely following the NATO command areas in such a manner that it took in the force potentials confronting each other in the central region. In other words, it was based on military-operational criteria which is the proper way to achieve disarmament.

But it quickly became apparent in the discussions of the working group that this proposal had no chance of being adopted. France was not looking for a military-operational solution but a political one. Its aim was to insert the WEU [Western European Union] into the negotiating process as an independent region despite the fact that combining the FRG, the Benelux countries, and France in the center with the British Isles and Italy in one large disarmament zone made no sense from a military point of view. All the other NATO countries turned the French idea down.

But France still carried the day in the High Level Task Force discussions. From that point on, the primary goal was to formulate a NATO proposal based on political concerns inside the alliance and their implementation rather than on the militarily effective aspects of disarmament. In the ensuing rounds of talks, Italy succeeded in its efforts to be included in the central region in spite of the fact that this made no sense from the point of view of geography. The real reason behind it was only mentioned in passing although everyone was aware of it. Like Great Britain, Italy hopes that the closest possible integration into the politically most important region of Europe will enable it to exert the greatest possible influence, perhaps most of all on the special relationship between the FRG and France, a relationship closely watched by all the other members of the alliance.

Italy's stand prompted Spain and Portugal (as well as Denmark, for good reason) to ask to be included in the central region. It was a matter of course that Great Britain would also be included because France was unwilling to accept a disarmament status different from that which applied to the only other nuclear power in Europe. Any hopes that the NATO members would reach a consensus among themselves were dashed when the Turkish Government refused to go along with the proposal, calling for regionalization based on NATO's northern, central and southern Europe areas instead.

That is where the issue stood until 23 February. On that day, the British members of the High Level Task Force presented a new proposal which corresponded exactly to one submitted on that same day by NATO's Supreme Commander Europe. It called for dividing the disarmament area from the Atlantic to the Urals on both sides of the pact frontiers into four regions which would form concentric circles around a Central European core. But contrary to the wishes of the FRG and France, the "core" would consist of the old MBFR area, i.e., the FRG and the three Benelux countries on the western side and the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR on the eastern side.

England, Italy, France, and Denmark, i.e., the principal European allies, would be included in the next-largest region. A similarly enlarged region would include Spain and Portugal. The fourth region would include the remaining NATO member states, i.e., Turkey and Greece in the south, and Norway and Iceland in the north.

The initial German reaction was negative—which conformed to the decisions reached by the Bonn government. Subsequently, German agreement to the proposal was made contingent on four modifications: the projected central region would have to extend beyond the MBFR area; it would also have to include parts of Soviet territory; it should not be allowed separate France and the FRG in matters of arms policy and it must be larger than the Jaruzelski zone. (It extends the MBFR area to Denmark on the western side and to Hungary on the eastern side.)

It was clear to the German side that the British proposal amounted to more than a mere attempt to overcome the Turkish objections. The proposal's political significance is such that it establishes distinctions in arms control policy between the FRG and its principal allies and thus opens the door to treaties which might impose different and more far-reaching obligations and controls on the FRG than on France and England. In the interal discussions, in fact, no one denied that this is the real political core of the NATO proposal.

It was quite striking that both the American and the French representative immediately agreed to the proposal submitted by NATO's Supreme Commander Europe and supported by Great Britain. The French member of the working group recalled statements made 1 year ago by French President [Francois] Mitterand citing the specific need for arms reductions in the FRG, the GDR, and the CSSR. French support for the proposal was virtually immediate and most resolute—which raises the question of collusion among the three nations [i.e., the U.S., Great Britain and France].

After all, based on the demands they had raised from the very outset, i.e., no alliance-wide limits for Europe and no return to the MBFR precepts, the French would by rights have had to turn down the British proposal which contained both of these features, i.e., alliance-wide limits and a return to the MBFR area as the core disarmament zone.

The negative response by the FRG on 23 February did not hold up. The Bonn government even dropped its plans for restating its reasons for objecting to the MBFR area in a letter to its three principal NATO partners, i.e., France, England and the United States prior to the next meeting of the High Level Task Force. At that next meeting on 2 March the FRG's rejection of the proposal was more restrained. When the task force met again 2 days later, on 4 March, the Bonn government agreed to the proposal on condition that the Western proposal include a statement to the effect that it was an indivisible package deal which would not allow for the conclusion of

partial agreements for the core zones. A statement to that effect was incorporated in the proposal. Still, the Bonn government only gave its approval, despite gravest internal misgivings, after an unequivocal statement was included in the NATO proposal and in an Intra-Alliance Understanding which ruled out any special treatment of the core zones (and thus of the FRG) with regard to disarmament. In fact, the final language called for the exact opposite, i.e., the disarmament proposals for the four regions are to be considered one unified package and can therefore only be agreed upon and implemented as a package. Disarmament in just one of the core zones thus is inadmissible.

The Dumas announcement that the FRG would be given "special treatment" at the disarmament talks strikes at the very core of the German conditions for agreeing to the joint proposal. It is therefore fully appropriate that the German foreign minister intervened immediately, pointing to the impact of this statement on German agreement to the NATO proposal.

#### **'WEU' Zone Details**

*36200122z Bonn DIE WELT in German 10 Mar 89 p 5*

[Analysis by Lothar Ruehl: "CFE Talks Focusing on Central Europe Again: Dangerously Close to East Bloc Security Zone"]

[Text] The upshot of the Western proposal presented in Vienna which calls for a conventional balance between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe is the reemergence of a Central European core zone patterned after the MBFR negotiating model for a reduction of forces in Central Europe. The proposal points up the potential risk of focusing negotiations on this area and its specific characteristics, i.e., the dense concentration of troops and the presence of foreign stationed forces, particularly on German soil. Any such focus which is implied in the NATO proposal calling for four large, different-sized regions could result in a special arms control status and thus a security policy distinction as between the FRG on the one hand and France and Great Britain on the other. This risk would become acute, if an attempt was made to proceed on a zone-by-zone basis and to conclude an agreement on Central Europe within its narrowest limits.

A statement by French Foreign Minister Dumas in Vienna clearly illustrated this risk. Dumas spoke of "certain countries, e.g., the FRG," which would "receive special treatment because that is where the most forward forces are stationed." Dumas' statement indicates that the negotiations might well focus on the German and Central European areas.

Dumas did point out that France would "keep an eye on all steps which more or less affect the organization of the defense of the two countries," i.e., France and the FRG.

At the very least however, the reemergence of the Central European region in these new talks, with the two Germanies at its center, the three Benelux countries to the west, and the CSSR and Poland to the east, does reestablish a political demarcation line between the FRG and France and between it and Great Britain, Denmark and Italy as well. In the east, on the other hand, the three western military districts of the Soviet Union in which the bulk of the Soviet reinforcement troops for Central Europe are stationed as well as Hungary are excluded from this narrow, central zone. This construct comes dangerously close to the East's concept of a Central European security corridor—a concept which Dumas categorically rejected. Nevertheless, the maximum density of troop concentration and the presence of the bulk of the Soviet forces west of the Soviet frontier and that of American, British, and French forces stationed in the West do provide an objective rationale for limiting the talks to Central Europe.

The origins of this central region are to be found in the political differences among the NATO partners (particularly in the divergent interests of the United States and France) and in the attempt to establish the political identity of the WEU in arms control negotiations with the Warsaw Pact.

From the start, France pressed for a stronger WEU identity, initially excluding both Spain and Portugal, while objecting to uniform arms control measures in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and to the overall forces limits for both sides which were related to this concept. The result of the subsequent intra-alliance discussions is reflected in the present interlocking NATO proposal. While calling for the establishment of an overall limit of 40,000 battle tanks, 33,000 artillery weapons and 56,000 infantry armored vehicles, i.e., 20,000 tanks, 16,500 artillery weapons and 28,000 armored vehicles for each side, the proposal also introduces a second, regional limit for an enlarged central region. In the West, this central region is to cover the new WEU area including Spain, Portugal, and Denmark and in the East, all of eastern Central Europe including Hungary plus the following six Soviet military districts: Baltics, White Russia, Carpathians, Moscow, Volga, and Urals.

Under the proposal, each side is to have only 11,300 battle tanks, 9,000 artillery weapons and 20,000 infantry armored vehicles in this region. The Western proposal subdivides the region still further into an area covering the old WEU minus Spain and Portugal but including Denmark in the West and eastern Central Europe plus Hungary and the Baltic, Carpathian and White Russian Soviet military districts in the East. Under the NATO proposal, each side would be limited in this region to 10,300 battle tanks, 7,600 artillery weapons and 18,000 armored vehicles.

NATO might have been satisfied with this regional solution which excludes the countries on the northern and southern flank as well as the coresponding Soviet

military districts of Leningrad in the north, Kiev, Odessa, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus in the south. On 23 February, however, SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] introduced a new model patterned after the old Central European area covered by the MBFR talks. The model was initially supported by France and subsequently by all NATO members after the United States strongly endorsed it. This proposal calls for limiting each side to 8,000 battle tanks, 4,500 artillery weapons and 11,000 infantry armored vehicles in the old Central European MBFR zone minus Denmark, France, and Great Britain in the West and minus Hungary and Soviet areas in the East.

It is hard to tell what made SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] submit this proposal at a critical stage of the NATO consultations. It is known, however, that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were intent from the start on preventing the inclusion of France as well as Great Britain and Italy, the two West European nations where U.S. air and sea units are stationed, in any zone of reductions and limitations in Central Europe that included the FRG. At any rate, the American interest was underscored in the days immediately preceding the Vienna meeting in a letter by Secretary of State Baker to the Bonn government. In that letter, Baker voiced his strong support for an acceptance of this very narrow central region inside which the bulk of U.S. forces in Europe confronts the Soviet forces stationed in Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The U.S. Government has assured Bonn that it is not working toward a Central European zone disarmament concept. In fact, the same upper limits for both sides are to apply in all regions. Under the Western plan, the armed forces outside the Central European region would also be reduced on the basis of parity, i.e., the reductions would affect all Soviet forces in Europe.

Nevertheless, this leaves open the question of what the long-range political objectives of the United States might be. The American interest in excluding Great Britain, France, and Italy from the limitation of forces in Germany and Central Europe might indicate the existence of plans for military flexibility freed from arms control treaty obligations in Central Europe and for the political consolidation of U.S. alliance positions in the rest of Western Europe to guard against possible future developments in European politics and in the arms control field.

#### **Bonn's Growing Discontent**

36200122z Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German  
10 Mar 89 p 12

[Commentary by Gerd Bucerius: "What Good Is a Master Plan: Bonn Unable to Agree with Allies on Principal Issues"]

[Text] Are the FRG and the U.S. still friends? The emotional ties going back to the Cold War era and the

Berlin airlift have given way to day-to-day aggravation. Reagan and Shultz became estranged from us and the American press has been cool to hostile for some time now.

During the past few days we got a clear indication of Washington's dislike of Bonn once again. Joseph Fitchett, the Bonn correspondent of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, summed up these sentiments in a long article which appeared in the paper's 1 March issue. "The tension between West Germany and its principal allies on the modernization of nuclear weapons brings a larger problem to light," Fitchett writes, "i.e., a growing resolve on Bonn's part to reformulate alliance policy: on military issues, arms control procedures and economic questions."

In this dispute, Fitchett observes, England and France, the two principal allies, have sided with the United States. As far as England (i.e., Mrs. Thatcher) is concerned Fitchett is right. France, for its part, is not tipping its hand. But as for us, it is safe to say that we stand alone. That may not be a catastrophe, yet; the more so since the FRG position on this issue is the right one and that of the United States is not.

What is the FRG after? "More than most of its allies," Fitchett writes, "West Germany seems to think that Western security can be made stronger than heretofore by relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances, there is less of a need to rely on military preparedness...To be sure, Kohl has not allowed himself to be led astray by Soviet blandishments. But diplomats fear that Bonn may soon seize the opportunity of strengthening its world role by acting as a spearhead of a new Western policy vis-a-vis a Soviet bloc that is on the move." "A world role," if you please. "These differences between Bonn and its allies," Fitchett goes on to say, "have the potential of undermining NATO and West European unity," (something of an exaggeration at present and probably in the future as well, I would say) "of relaxing the pressure on the Soviet Union to continue the liberalization process at home and to grant more freedom to the countries of Eastern Europe."

In last week's issue of DIE ZEIT, Helmut Schmidt criticized the Bonn government for not having put forward or even worked on a master plan for the (military and economic) negotiations with Moscow. But what should such a blueprint contain, if the FRG is at odds with its allies as regards all the major points that might be included in such a plan? Under the circumstances, no one can come up with a plan.

It is not merely that we and the United States do not speak the same language. We think differently. Helmut Schmidt developed a long list which also includes economic assistance for the East Bloc. Everyone of us can subscribe to all of this; but almost all of it will make Washington even angrier. With regard to disarmament our allies would like to hold back; but Schmidt would

like to forge ahead. That is right but it hardly serves to strengthen the alliance at this juncture. As far as I can see, there is almost no issue on which we can all agree. The United States and England would like to exercise caution in following Gorbachev provided he is really serious and is able to prevail at home. Kohl and Genscher are prepared to make concessions if need be to help Gorbachev in his struggle against the conservatives inside the Soviet Union.

There ought to be a master plan, but there won't be—except perhaps one that runs counter to German convictions. Will the alliance break up on this issue? The interest of both sides in preserving it is too strong for that. Without the United States we would be lost. Without Europe the United States would be lost.

Given the trust the allies placed in him when he held the post of chancellor, Schmidt believes that the situation would never have become as critical in his day as it is at present. I have met very few people as convincing as Schmidt in the power and precision of their arguments. I do not think I am doing an injustice to Genscher when I say that Schmidt's firm style of government created greater harmony. Would that style have prevailed over the empty phrases being bandied about today?

Let me add a word to some marginal remarks made by Schmidt in his article. "I admit that the Bonn government's unfortunate tactical maneuvers on the Rabta issue and the elusive positions taken on the so-called modernization issue will have a long-term negative impact on Bonn's trustworthiness in American and British eyes," he wrote. In my view, the government acted cautiously and responsibly on the Rabta issue. The Americans were continually kept informed about what we were doing both in and with respect to Libya. The parliamentary control commission was kept informed at all times. [President] Bush knows by now that his attack via THE NEW YORK TIMES was tactless. The allies (with Genscher in the lead) were not in agreement with the downing of the two Libyan aircraft ("in self-defense") and the plans for bombing the Libyan poison gas plant. In response, the choice was made to launch verbal attacks on the FRG.

The Lance dispute is a reflection of the debate going on within the alliance. Originally, Kohl agreed with most other NATO countries that the Lance missile should be upgraded. Many media journalists were of the same opinion, e.g., Christoph Bertram in the 17 February issue of DIE ZEIT. But Kohl came to understand that the public would not go along with the decision to modernize at this time. In fact, the majority of the people would turn it down. The actual decision is now to be postponed until 1991-92. This is also the view of Theo Sommer, DIE ZEIT's editor-in-chief. He feels there should be no decision on modernization for the next 2 years. It could still be made at that time, if it turned out that Moscow was either dragging its feet or not playing fair on disarmament.

Does it make sense to heap all the blame on Kohl and Genscher, i.e., on Kohl in particular? That is bound to lead to false conclusions. The quarrel with the United States would hardly be worth mentioning if it resulted in military cooperation between the FRG and France under French leadership the cornerstone to which was laid in a statesmanlike manner by Helmut Schmidt (and Giscard D'Estaing) and which was courageously and farsightedly carried forward by Helmut Kohl.

### **SPD's Biermann Criticizes NATO Nuclear Strategy**

*PM0404101689 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET  
in Norwegian 16 Mar 89 p 14*

[Report on interview with Social Democratic Party defense adviser Wolfgang Biermann by Erik Sagflaat: "Cold Warriors Destroy Will To Defend Nation"—date, place not given]

[Text] "We have a problem with the NATO bureaucracy in Brussels. There the view is that the initiatives from the Soviet Union are not to be relied on, and that nuclear deterrence must be maintained. It is said that Gorbachev could fail, that he is simply a PR man, and that he is out to strengthen the Soviet Union in order to be able to threaten NATO later.

"These attitudes will result in ever decreasing support for NATO strategy from those member nations which do not have nuclear arms. At the same time the will to defend the nation will be undermined. In West Germany today there are a million people who refuse to do military service. This is not due to pacifist convictions, but is because defense involving nuclear arms is seen as lunacy."

So said Dr Wolfgang Biermann, special disarmament adviser to the West German Social Democrats, in an interview with ARBEIDERBLADET.

"To a certain extent we can say that Gorbachev learned the SS-20 lesson; that is, that Soviet attempts to achieve a military advantage rebounded. Gorbachev realized that unilateral attempts to achieve security must lead to mutual insecurity. This is why the Soviet Union today accepts the principle of joint security," Dr Biermann said.

"This is also a challenge which the new U.S. Administration must meet, and an even greater challenge for the Social Democratic Party of Germany, because the leadership in the Soviet Union has taken up many of our ideas—for example, the ideas of "joint security" and "structural non-attack capability"—and will continue to put forward far-reaching arms control proposals on the basis of them.

"The NATO bureaucracy has to realize that these ideas have over time also become more or less accepted by conservative politicians and some military leaders in West Germany.

"The problem also has its roots in what a U.S. officer described as 'NATO's nuclear theology.' Nuclear arms have become a sort of fetish and have to be perfected and modernized at almost any cost," Biermann said.

[Sagflaat] How can we get away from this?

[Biermann] NATO's strategy today takes as its point of departure stopping an attack in its initial phase inside the other side's territory using tactical nuclear arms. What we have to arrive at is a reorganization which will make surprise attacks impossible. There have been proposals for 50-percent reductions in strategic nuclear arms. Why not propose a reduction in conventional arms down to 50 percent of present NATO levels? With such a proposal NATO could again seize the initiative in the disarmament debate. And we could create a situation in which first use of nuclear arms would no longer form part of NATO strategy.

[Sagflaat] But at present there is no suggestion of removing the short-range nuclear arms. On the contrary, there is talk of modernization and rearmament.

[Biermann] It would be impossible today to deploy new longer-range nuclear missiles in West Germany. It was possible in 1983 because there was a clear Soviet threat. Today 1,500 Soviet warheads have been removed. Even those who were in favor of the deployment of medium-range missiles do not want the new short-range arms.

[Sagflaat] How can we arrive at a new and more stable strategic situation in Europe?

[Biermann] It is useless to try to do everything at once. We envisage a plan in three phases, each phase taking 3 years.

In phase one we must reach agreement on a balance in conventional arms. We have to reach agreement on removing the differences which exist and to get rid of tactical nuclear artillery completely.

In phase two we must begin to implement what has been agreed upon. Also, we must begin negotiations aiming at stability at a level involving half the present number of weapons. Forces must be reorganized to reduce the chances of surprise attack. Offensive weapons such as tanks, artillery, and tactical missiles must be withdrawn from a security zone along the border. I also envisage the possibility that offensive weapons—which people must have lest the worst happen—could be put in depots under international supervision. In general the greatest importance must be attached to confidence-building measures. In phase two we must also begin to make drastic reductions in the number of existing short-range missiles, with the goal of getting rid of them completely in 10 years.

In the third phase everything that has been agreed upon must be put into practice, under strict verification. In this way it will be possible, given the political will, to reach solutions which make war impossible, because the capacity to launch an attack has been renounced.

[Sagflaat] Is it possible to get the NATO generals to agree to such a plan?

[Biermann] Even generals have begun to ask questions about today's accepted attitudes within NATO. What we have to do is give the generals the task of working out an alternative defense system based on forces half the size of forces today. It is the politicians who must define the conditions under which the generals are to work. But politicians need to take the lead more than they do today.

[Sagflaat] How do you assess the chances of agreement on conventional arms, given the many problems we face in this field?

[Biermann] I agree that these negotiations could be difficult. On the Western side alone there are 16 different countries which have to reach agreement. I believe that regional solutions must play a greater role, with increased responsibility placed on each individual country in each individual region. For example, West Germany, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia should get together to voice their interests. The individual countries in Europe cannot simply sit back and wait for Brussels or Moscow to find a solution for the whole region.

[Sagflaat] Is that realistic?

[Biermann] It is a question of power, and of political pressure. If public opinion is not brought in, nothing very much will happen. This is an issue which must set its stamp on the public debate and play an important role in elections in particular. It is here that objectives have to be decided. We cannot leave arms negotiations in their entirety to military experts. Very clear objectives have to be set—such as the halving of military forces.

#### **Defense Minister Scholz: 'There Must Be' SNF Modernization**

*LD0204084489 Hamburg DPA in German  
0714 GMT 2 Apr 89*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz is in principle ready for talks with his GDR counterpart Heinz Kessler. In an interview with Deutschlandfunk, he nevertheless once more linked this topic to the order-to-shoot on the German-German border. [passage omitted]

Scholz rejected the view that because of positive developments there is no longer a threat in the Eastern bloc. Threat does not merely mean acute danger of war, but also "military superiority of the other side, which continues to exist at a basic level." Such superiority offers

opportunities for political pressure and blackmail. "If armament against this does not exist, literally through one's own armed forces, then one is no longer free, and one is no longer capable of having a policy," Scholz said. "One is only free, sovereign and self-determined if one affirms one's self-assertion and one's willingness to act."

Regarding modernization of short-range nuclear missiles, Scholz pointed out that the current "Lance" missiles will no longer be deployable by the mid-nineties. "This makes it fully clear that there must be restructuring here, replacement, and modernization." It was "really a secondary issue as to when the fully concrete decision on this will be made, and in particular as to what must be decided at the NATO summit in early summer this year, when the overall plan for security, disarmament and arms control will be adopted." A zero solution on short-range weapons can be ruled out, he said, and what is needed are equal, lower top limits.

#### **Defense Minister Scholz on Defense, Short-Range Missiles**

*AU0204160189 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network  
in German 0905 GMT 2 Apr 89*

[Interview with Defense Minister Rupert Scholz by Guenter Michler; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Michler] Mr Scholz, it is not an act of unfriendliness but a factual statement if one claims that as a politician you are presently far from being everybody's darling. Opinion polls suggest that you are unpopular, and papers speculate on whether you will survive the expected cabinet reshuffle. How do you cope with all that?

[Scholz] I do not think that this is something one has to cope with. One must see reality and one must ask what is behind this reality. As far as the cabinet reshuffle and speculations that you mentioned are concerned, I would like to stress that I do not participate in speculations at all. What is more important is the question: Why is a defense minister unpopular in our country? I think that there are a number of reasons that do not concern the person but are linked with issues. We are living at a time that, in security-political terms, could be described as a time of hope, during which more fair weather is possible, but which is and continues to be a time when bad weather has to be expected any time. This is the task of security policy, the task of the defense minister, and the task of the Bundeswehr. These are not issues that meet with general approval from the outset because some people are asking whether we still need all this. In this connection, one of the defense minister's principal tasks is to remind the population of things that they do not want to hear. It is quite clear that somebody who addresses unpopular issues is not everybody's darling.

[Michler] Foreign observers are surprised about the problems that defense officials are facing in this country. THE TIMES of London suggested last week that the main reason for your unpopularity within the cabinet is the fact that you loyally pursue NATO policies.

[Scholz] I have read this report in THE TIMES. This is certainly an exaggeration. Our population and the leading political forces in our country, including large parts of the opposition, clearly support NATO. It is quite obvious that the alliance is the essential foundation on which the defense minister bases his work. However, we do not have an alliance crisis in our country. There are no signs of such a crisis at all.

[Michler] There are hints that the mood in the Bundeswehr is not very good. Jet pilots, for example, are complaining that they are being described as air hooligans by the public, that they have been left in the lurch by the politicians. How do you want to prevent increasing numbers of highly qualified pilots from resigning?

[Scholz] Let me first make a general statement on the so-called—I deliberately use the term so-called—bad mood among the Bundeswehr. There is no bad mood among the Bundeswehr. I have convinced myself personally of this fact in numerous talks at all levels. The mood in the Bundeswehr is good. However, we do indeed have serious problems in a sphere that you just mentioned, the sphere of the Air Force, of flight formations. There has been an ongoing discussion about low-altitude flights. Low-altitude flights are necessary, we cannot do without them, even if this were popular. Low-altitude flights are needed within the framework of military exercises, to ensure security and air safety. We will make efforts to reduce the flights, but we cannot abolish them. There is no doubt that for many years these flights have been a great burden for the population, particularly in the seven areas where flights at altitudes of 75 meters are carried out. However, this does not entitle anybody in this country to identify the soldiers who are only doing their duty with these inconveniences and to defame them by accusing them of being air hooligans or similar things, as you just mentioned. These soldiers are only doing their duty. In fulfilling their tasks, they really carry out extremely hard work. This is not a pleasure. To be able to master sophisticated aircraft like military combat planes under low-altitude flight conditions, to carry out exercises, is extremely difficult. It hurts to hear from soldiers about the outrage which confronts them. I had a discussion with the spouses of pilots of a fighter bomber wing in northern Germany shortly before Easter. What the spouses told me was horrifying. Even their children are being attacked in the schools. Something has to be done about this. What happens here is unacceptable. I expect everybody, including those who bear political responsibility, to defend and support these pilots, these soldiers. They are entitled to our support, because everything they do they are doing for us, for all of us.

[Michler] It is not surprising that the population complains about noise pollution. What is irritating is that the complaints are increasing while low-altitude flights are objectively being reduced, that in most of our Western neighbor states low-altitude flights are accepted without complaints, whereas a popular movement is forming in our country against low-flying aircraft. How do you explain this?

[Scholz] I do not know whether one can speak of a popular movement. However, one thing is certain: There is a protest potential in our country that is rather unique by international standards. I have familiarized myself with the situation in other countries and have tried to find out how the mood is there. In Great Britain, for example, where the frequency of low-altitude flights can be compared with that in our country, there have also been complaints, but only in isolated cases. This means that the population in Great Britain is not as annoyed over the burden as the people in our country. One has to ask why this is so. Is it—as some foreign observers have put it—German psychology? I do not think so. I think that in connection with the low-flying problem something has emerged that goes far beyond the issue concerning the exercises of our Air Force. Fortunately we are experiencing the longest period of peace in recent German history. We have reason to believe that this will remain so. This country, however, which is responsible for forward defense in Europe within the Western alliance, has for decades carried the burdens linked with military exercises. A total of 900,000 soldiers are deployed in the FRG, of whom about 500,000 are Germans, the rest soldiers of allied friends. These soldiers must carry out exercises, and not only in the air; the exercises also involve tanks and artillery systems. Exercises are necessary in all fields, and maneuvers must be held. The fact that all this happens in such a densely populated country like the FRG is a great burden for the population. This must be acknowledged and respected. I have the impression that all this has concentrated on the low-flying issue, that a culmination has been reached here. One must admit that low-altitude flights really represent a great burden, for the above-mentioned regions in particular.

[Michler] How would you define the operative minimum that is required in the sphere of low-altitude exercises? There must be a definition for this.

[Scholz] This is exactly the issue that is currently under discussion. I have made it clear from the very beginning that the operative minimum must be ensured. The term operative minimum is very complicated because it involves aspects of air safety, air technology, training methods, and military necessity. For this reason, details can only be worked out within the Western alliance by all air forces concerned. This is being done at present. Great efforts are being made to define the operative minimum as soon as possible. As soon as a definition is worked out, we will be able to initiate corresponding measures to reduce flights.

[Michler] Mr Scholz, you stated recently that the operability of the Armed Forces does not depend on a potential threat. Does this correspond to reality? Is it not true that the population is less and less willing to bear the burden of defense—low-altitude flights are only one example—because the feeling of threat has decreased? Should this situation not be a cause of concern for the Bundeswehr?

[Scholz] My statement was not aimed at the operability of the Armed Forces as such. To maintain Armed Forces and to keep them operational is necessary to ensure external security. This means that in connection with external security unfavorable future developments must be taken into consideration. One must be prepared. However, the feeling prevails in our country that positive developments have been initiated in the East. Gorbachev also stresses that he wants disarmament. Initial promising and successful steps have been adopted at disarmament conferences. Therefore people are asking why we still need all that. The threat has vanished, they claim. These people, however, overlook two significant aspects: For one thing, the threat continues to exist. A threat is not identical with the acute danger of war, which certainly does not exist today. Military superiority of the other side, however, which continues to exist at the elementary level, also constitutes a threat. Such a superiority may lead to political pressure and political blackmail. If one does not take the necessary precautions, by maintaining armed forces, one ceases to be free, one ceases to be able to pursue policies.

This leads to the second decisive point, the question concerning a country's sovereignty and self-determination. One is only free, sovereign, and self-determined if one is self-assertive and willing to affirm this. I think that this has been neglected during discussions in our country over the past decades. This aspect has not been given sufficient attention. The only thing that was closely observed were the specific, highly dangerous situations in East-West relations. We are living at a time when considerable progress is being made, or can be made, in the sphere of detente, and suddenly people think that the threat has vanished. Why do we need all this, they ask. This is a false, shortsighted attitude. What is decisive is to remain capable of defending oneself, in other words we need an operational Bundeswehr. Then we will be in a position to pursue a successful policy of detente, and we will be successful in East-West relations.

[Michler] Chief of Staff Wellershoff has recently made the headlines with controversial statements about the Soviet disarmament policy. Is Wellershoff entitled to comment on politically explosive and controversial issues? Do you share his view—I am quoting Wellershoff freely—that Gorbachev's disarmament gestures are basically an attempt to deceive the West?

[Scholz] Well, he did not use these words. However—and he is certainly entitled to do this—he expressed a warning and cautioned the West. This is certainly one of

the chief of staff's tasks. This does not mean that he has a political mandate to do that. By the way, these statements have been taken from specific documents for discussions within the framework of political education. Let me give you another example: He discussed the concept of coexistence in these documents, and made statements to the effect that coexistence is another way of continuing the class struggle. Some people, above all opposition members, got very excited about these statements. This is the classical concept of coexistence as it has been used since the days of Lenin. When people previously heard the term peaceful coexistence, under Brezhnev for example, they did not realize that this stood for something completely different, that this represented an aggressive policy. It is possible that today, under Gorbachev, who also refers to this term, a different, really peaceful concept of coexistence is being used or worked out. This has not been denied by Admiral Wellershoff. He says and rightly points out that it is necessary to observe these developments carefully so that we know where we stand.

[Michler] Mr Scholz, a member of the Executive Board of the Metal Workers Trade Union has recently called on FRG citizens to refuse to join the Bundeswehr. The Social Democrats are distributing posters saying that low-flying goes before a fall, which suggests that the Bundeswehr actually poses a threat in times of peace. Are these isolated cases or symptoms of something?

[Scholz] I hope that these incidents are isolated cases and not symptoms. Both actions are extraordinarily irresponsible. What the trade union did represents a violation of the Constitution because the basic law of conscientious objection is an individual right of conscience. It is not a political weapon for the masses. It was used in this way by the trade unions. This constitutes a breach of the Constitution. In addition, this has endangered or threatened to endanger the positive developments and contacts that have taken place between the Bundeswehr and the trade unions over the past years. Therefore, I am grateful that the chairman of the German Trade Union Federation, Mr Breit, has clearly distanced himself from the action of the metal workers union.

[Michler] There used to be agreement in this country between the government and the opposition on essential defense policy issues. Does the consensus between the government and the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]—I deliberately exclude the Greens—still exist?

[Scholz] Basic consensus between all democratic parties is necessary in the field of defense and security policy. Countries where this consensus is not guaranteed will not really be able to defend themselves. In our country, this consensus has not been damaged basically. However, I want to be cautious in this respect. I think that today the SPD is deeply divided over security policy. The party literally speaks with two voices. There is one group that clearly supports the Bundeswehr in a very

positive manner, that stresses the necessity of defense and backs the Western alliance. There are, of course, different opinions on various details, but this is part of democracy. However, there is another group that questions defense as such, that wants to have nothing to do with the Bundeswehr, that wants to keep the Bundeswehr behind barrack doors, that rejects public pledges, as can be seen from the resolutions adopted by the SPD Congress. These developments are a cause of concern and sadness. I am sad if I see things not from the viewpoint of a party politician but of a defense minister who must try to maintain a basic consensus, who needs it—not for himself but for the cause.

[Michler] The modernization of Lance missiles has for months been the subject of heated discussions. You are convinced that their modernization is indispensable. Are you sure that in this way you have defined the government's attitude correctly?

[Scholz] The government's position has not been worked out in all details. However, there is agreement on the most important aspects within the government and among the coalition. Chancellor Kohl has made it clear repeatedly that we cannot do without nuclear weapons because only nuclear weapons ensure absolute peace in Europe. This means that another zero option in the field of short-range missiles can be ruled out. This being the case—I would like to emphasize this—it is necessary to keep operational a sufficient potential of such weapons in the future. The missile that you mentioned, the Lance missile, will no longer be deployable by the middle of the nineties. It will literally be rusty and fit for the scrap pile, or whatever expression you want to use. This makes it completely clear that restructuring, replacement, modernization—whatever expression you prefer—are needed in this sphere. This must be carried out. The question is—this will be discussed in the near future, and in my view this is really a secondary issue—when the fully specific decision on this will be taken and, in particular, what must be decided at the NATO summit in early summer this year, when the comprehensive concept for security, disarmament, and arms control will be adopted, which was accorded particular importance by the Germans.

This leads to the next point on which we are also in agreement. Precisely in the field of short-range missiles, there is a massive superiority—1 to 16, 1 to 17—in relationship with the East bloc, and there is an inferiority on our side. For this reason, the FRG is particularly interested in working out an arms control position in this field. [passage indistinct]

[Michler] An arms control position that rules out a third zero position?

[Scholz] Yes. What we need in the field of short-range missiles, and what applies generally to disarmament, are

equal, lower top limits. That means that the other side must reduce its weapons massively because it enjoys a considerable superiority at the above-mentioned relationship. However, a zero option can be ruled out because it would not bring more security but more insecurity, and disarmament and arms control must never bring insecurity but only security.

[Michler] Mr Scholz, at the end of last year a meeting between the defense ministers of the two states in Germany seemed possible. You expressed interest in inviting Army General Kessler to visit the FRG. Is this still topical?

[Scholz] A meeting between the two defense ministers is not only a security-political issue, not only an issue that concerns a meeting between counterparts from two countries, but it is also a Germany-political issue. A meeting has to be seen in such a context. If you examine the underlying philosophy of our Germany policy you will see that it is characterized by steadfastness on the one hand and by the readiness for dialogue on the other to achieve something for the people in the divided Germany. As far as the military sphere is concerned, you know that shots are still being fired at Germans on the other side. This is awful. It is irresponsible, awful, and terrible. However, this is why special efforts must be made by everybody in our country to do everything, however modest his means may be, so that in Germany we will at last get away from this Eastern order-to-shoot. This is the background to a possible encounter or meeting which I deem quite possible.

[Michler] Does this mean that you are ready to hold talks with Kessler on condition that the order-to-shoot is lifted?

[Scholz] I do not want to talk at the moment of preconditions in the sense of conditionality, but of course we do entertain expectations and hopes. If I can contribute something toward this at any time, I will very willingly do so.

[Michler] Let me ask you a final question, Mr Scholz. Recent elections in the Soviet Union have shown that a comprehensive reform process has been initiated there. Power structures and patterns of thought are collapsing in large parts of the East bloc. Is it unrealistic to expect that completely new prospects will open up for the Germany policy?

[Scholz] In my view one must not think, hope, or argue on a short-term basis in connection with Germany policy, the German issue. Reforms in the leading East bloc nation, the Soviet Union, which holds the German card in its hands, as people like to put it sometimes, are of course encouraging signs for us. However, I do not think that the reforms will have an immediate and tangible impact on the German question.

## Missile Modernization Conflict Viewed

### Effect on Relations with Allies

AU0504134189 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Apr 89

["g-n" commentary: "In Guenzburg"]

[Text] In line with a recent tradition in German-French consultations, the top politicians show each other their nice places in the provinces. This time it is Guenzburg in Bavarian Swabia, located—and this is of political importance—in the constituency of Theo Waigel, chairman of the Christian Socialist Union. The most important issue of the talks in Guenzburg obviously was the question of the replacement of the Lance missiles. One can also say: the French attempt to make the FRG Government give up its policy of stalling and delaying the issue of modernization. The decision concerns a weapons system—however, it is even more important that this decision will show whether the allies can find a joint assessment of the changes in the Soviet Union. In this respect the FRG Government differs within itself and is in disagreement with its most important allies—Washington, London, and Paris. The problem here is that that country which is most dependent on allies does not seem to really notice that this conflict does the most harm to itself.

### CDU on Modernization

AU0504134089 Hamburg DIE WELT in German  
4 Apr 89 p 4

[Ruediger Moniac report: "Missiles: Geissler Proposes Package Deal"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—Heiner Geissler, secretary general of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], wants to make the modernization of nuclear weapons with a range of up to 500 km (short-range nuclear forces), which NATO intends to carry out over the next few years, conditional on, among other things, the course of the Vienna negotiations on conventional stability in Europe (CFE). The issue, which will probably also be the most important topic to be discussed at the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May, has gained a completely new aspect by Geissler's suggestion. He drew up some sort of "package deal" between possible CFE results in Vienna and the decision on missile modernization.

On the occasion of NATO's 40th anniversary, Geissler told journalists that the decision on the modernization of short-range nuclear forces need not be made at the Brussels summit. There, NATO only has to maintain the "option" for modernization. The date for NATO's decision on modernization will be later, in 1991-92, according to Chancellor Kohl. Besides, this option depends on "whether concrete disarmament steps can be agreed on in Vienna or anywhere else." Answering a question by DIE WELT, the CDU secretary general confirmed this

by saying: "Of course, the questions concerning modernization are directly linked with the question of disarmament, but also with nuclear disarmament."

In contrast to Geissler's attitude, the CDU "Federal Technical Committee on Security Policy" decided to clearly support the continuing availability of nuclear weapons to NATO. According to Committee Chairman Markus Berger, at the next summit NATO has to "establish the qualitative and quantitative minimum of nuclear weapons in and for Europe." It must be made clear that this category of nuclear weapons is an "indispensable link with the strategic potential of deterrence of the United States." [passage omitted]

### Kohl Says U.S. Conventional, Nuclear Forces Needed To Defend Europe

LD0304182489 Hamburg DPA in German  
1733 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated this evening that the NATO political conception, laid down in 1967 in the Harmel Report, is "still as relevant and with as promising a future nowadays as then." It exists for the "preservation of sufficient military strength and political solidarity to achieve more stable relations between West and East through dialogue and cooperation." The goal is the creation of a fair and lasting peace in an undivided Europe, Kohl stated.

NATO needs the Federal Republic and vice versa. On the basis of its geostrategic position and the strength of the Bundeswehr, the Federal Republic befits a key function in the alliance. The chancellor said word for word: "We need NATO because it guarantees for us peace in freedom and security, and only the firm establishment of the alliance offers us the possibility of bringing influence to bear in a structural way on West-East relations, on arms controls and disarmament, too."

NATO's defense capability furthermore requires the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe. The Europeans have the task "of strengthening the European pillar." Peace and freedom are not to be had for free. The alliance is more than a conventional military alliance. It is a "community of peace and value," Kohl stated.

### Companies Supply Iraqi Secret Research Center

#### Report in STERN

LD0204154489 Hamburg DPA in German 1444 GMT  
2 Apr 89

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—According to the Hamburg magazine STERN, the State Prosecutor's Office and the Bielefeld customs investigations branch have begun investigations relating to the participation of German firms in a secret military research and development center in Iraq. The magazine reports that on 20 March the offices and apartments of four managers of the

company—the Bielefeld investment firm Gildemeister Projekta Co. Ltd.—responsible for the DM400 million project Saad-16, were searched and numerous documents were confiscated. This was confirmed by State Prosecutor Jost Schmiedeskamp.

In reaction to a similar report in THE WASHINGTON POST at the end of last week, the United States expressed its “great concern” about the fact that Iraq could acquire “nuclear capabilities.” Citing Israeli sources, THE WASHINGTON POST had reports that Iraq was secretly working on the development of nuclear warheads for a medium-range missile that is also under development.

According to STERN a number of other German firms are involved in the affair. Among others are Messerschmidt-Boekow-Blohm (MBB) with its subsidiary MBB Transtechnica, Siemens, and the Rheinmetall subsidiary Aviatest. The Munich company MBB, Siemens, and Rheinmetall confirmed to the magazine that they have exported to Iraq. But all the exports had been authorized by the FRG Government; permits had been issued.

The magazine report was supplied to DPA in advance.

#### **State Prosecutor Investigating**

*LD0204173489 Hamburg DPA in German 1550 GMT  
2 Apr 89*

[Text] Bielefeld (DPA)—The Bielefeld State Prosecutor's Office still has to investigate whether the Gildemeister Company has committed an offense under the foreign trade law, State Prosecutor Heinz Hense confirmed in response to an enquiry. At present they are examining whether the sale of equipment to Iraq is subject to authorization, and if so whether this was granted, the Bielefeld State Prosecutor's Office spokesman said.

### **DENMARK**

#### **Soviet Diplomat Urges Danish Initiative on Baltic Naval Curbs**

*36130052 Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish  
8 Mar 89 p 4*

[Article by Jorgen Dragsdahl: “Soviet Criticism of Low Danish Profile Toward Invasion Threat”; first paragraph is INFORMATION introduction]

[Text] Retired ambassador says, “But in other respects Denmark has shown great intellectual ability in the disarmament debate.”

If the Danes are really worried about Warsaw Pact landing craft in the Baltic, their diplomats must be much more persistent than they have been in the past in emphasizing this problem with the Soviet Union and its allies.

This advice comes from many years of experience with East-West matters obtained in the Soviet foreign service. The man who said it Tuesday in an interview is Ambassador V. J. Yerofeyev of the Europe Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

#### **Surprise**

The recently retired diplomat was until December employed in the division of long range planning in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the leader of which is Ambassador Lev Mendelevich, who in the mid-80's was the senior Soviet representative in this country. While in that post he participated in the preliminary work on the unilateral Soviet disarmament initiatives, and the advice came after a question about why amphibious forces are not included in the Warsaw Pact's reduction of clearly offensive elements in its forces.

Ambassador Yerofeyev reacted with surprise when he heard about concerns over the Warsaw Pact's invasion capabilities with the strength of its amphibious forces in the Baltic which a number of politicians, including Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and various military officers, have discussed in the Danish debate.

“I do not understand this concern,” he said. “It is hardly a real danger that you see. Actually Denmark could be more active on this issue, as we have an entire system of consultation possibilities through which everything can be discussed. In the past we have complied with Nordic viewpoints in many of our initiatives.”

He said that the problem could also be discussed if negotiations are begun regarding a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone. It could also be raised by Denmark during the recently begun negotiations in Vienna which are focusing on conventional ground forces in Europe, he said. Of course naval forces are officially excluded, but the Soviet Union has always believed that they ought to be included.

#### **No Nordic Concern**

Yerofeyev's surprise was also due to his experiences at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, where he was one of the four leading Soviet negotiators. The parties reached an agreement which limits exercises with amphibious forces and opens the possibility of participation by foreign observers. When this question arose it was due mainly to demands by the Mediterranean countries. “The Baltic was not discussed in Stockholm; we were a little surprised that there was no concern about the Baltic and the northern ocean areas in that forum,” said Yerofeyev.

Yerofeyev is in Denmark with a delegation which was invited by the Danish-Soviet Association. So when he officially stated on Monday evening that “non-offensive defense was invented in Denmark,” that seemed to be a

very courteous gesture. But he insisted to INFORMATION that it was not merely a friendly comment motivated by the needs of a friendship visit, or an opportunistic political maneuver.

#### Boserup

"That is really not just a compliment," he said. "Denmark has great ability when it comes to intellectual participation in disarmament questions. Intellectually you are much better prepared than France, for example, where I spent 10 years."

To support his statement he emphasized three things:

"There is the Danish scientist, Anders Boserup, who has especially made us aware of the possibilities of non-offensive defense, which I consider to be a very good indication. It came from him, and therefore I said that you invented it," said Yerofeyev.

In the second place he emphasized the security policy debates in the Folketing. "You have had many real discussions which reflect a very extensive understanding of the many aspects of the subject. Perhaps they did not lead to much in practice, but they showed great intellectual ability."

Finally he mentioned Denmark's contribution during the Stockholm Conference, which was led by Ambassador Skjold Mellbin. "I am certain that the success of the conference was due to the neutral and alliance-free countries. But Denmark played a major role in the internal deliberations of the NATO countries, so we overcame the six or seven crises that arose during the conference. The Danish role was not openly forward, in that they did not outwardly distance themselves from the NATO group. The Atlantic discipline was working. But Ambassador Mellbin was very active in the alliance's discussions. It was courageous of him to oppose the NATO line."

In connection with the negotiations in Vienna, the ambassador's greatest concern is that they are stuck in a debate over data and balance. And that the NATO countries reject negotiations on naval forces.

"There is a danger that we are getting into an irrational process with no end," he said. "It would be best if we quickly began negotiations on non-offensive structures."

"The discouraging American attitude in connection with naval forces is a serious problem, because it causes suspicion on our part. The question is: If we are to change the doctrines so that they are purely defensive, and if we are to change the ground forces in a non-offensive direction, why does NATO want to keep such an overwhelmingly large naval force? It should at least be possible for the West to express a willingness to take up the subject of naval forces."

## FRANCE

### Independent French Nuclear Deterrence Policy Backed

35190112c Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Yves Guena, former minister (Rally for the Republic) and currently chairman of the Pericles Club]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It can be imagined that as sometimes happened in the past, Europe will speak with a single voice on major world problems. But considering how far Europe has slipped into an attitude of renunciation and follow-the-leader in response to recent developments in connection with the Middle East issue, it is vital for France to retain the possibility, when it so desires, of speaking by itself, acting by itself, and refusing to go along with anyone else. The Socialists must say whether they are determined to defend at all costs that national independence to which the president of the Republic says he is attached. And the current opposition must say whether it still wants that restoration of national independence which was called for in so many words in its 1986 election platform. Above all, those who supported General de Gaulle's action or claim to take their inspiration from it must say loud and clear that they will not agree to let anyone tamper with France's independence.

### Our Strategy of Deterrence

The most serious aspect of the independence issue is what one may read here and there under the heading of "European defense." Here again, it is not possible to use pretenses as a shield or to hide behind ambiguities. The fact is that West Europe is divided between two strategies. France has chosen the strategy of nuclear deterrence, which dissuades any aggressor from taking action against it because the threat of retaliatory destruction is unacceptable to the aggressor. The other European countries have rallied behind the strategy of flexible response, which calls for defending Europe by means of vast conventional confrontations to which could be added, if necessary and if the President of the United States wishes, the more or less massive use of tactical nuclear weapons.

There will not be, nor can there be, a joint European defense if the European countries do not adopt the same strategy. We are waiting for a strong statement that France will not and cannot agree to subscribe to the strategy of flexible response. That would be a choice with no way out even if NATO strategy were to assume a modified or misleading form for the occasion. For the moment, and despite the confusion in public opinion in the FRG, our partners are sticking to the other strategy. As long as things remain as they are, there can be no talk of joint European defense. In any case, the instruments of our national nuclear deterrence must remain solely in

the hands of the president of the Republic for the reasons which Francois Mitterrand mentioned, just as his predecessors did before him. [passage omitted]

### **Government May Propose Eureka Military Research**

35190112a Paris *LE MONDE* in French 1 Mar 89 p 5

[Article by Jacques Isnard]

[Text] The General Delegation for Armament (DGA) is studying the possibility of proposing to the Europeans that a military Eureka program for upstream research be established along the lines of what already exists in the field of civilian research. Yves Sillard, who was recently appointed head of the DGA and who was French coordinator of the Eureka civilian program from 1986 to 1988, has broached the idea to his British colleague, Peter Levene, before they discuss the possibility with their counterparts on the European continent.

In France last year, military research and development accounted for over 36 percent of national financing for industrial, technological, and university research. Over 26,000 people are involved in that activity solely in the establishments under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense.

Out of a total of 29.2 billion francs devoted to R&D—one-third of the military equipment credits for 1988—the French Ministry of Defense allocates nearly 5.5 billion francs to so-called upstream research, excluding nuclear research.

At the first European session of the Institute of Higher National Defense Studies (IHEDN) last 15 November, Prime Minister Michel Rocard said it was necessary to stop trying to cooperate on finished products and to do so instead as far upstream as possible—on the technologies which will go into new weapons and which, when all is said and done, will determine tomorrow's technological and operational environment.

By "upstream research" is meant that pivotal phase which makes it possible, through limited but sufficiently demonstrative experimentation, to define and explore the operational application of a technical concept with a promising future.

### **Flexible Formula**

In Europe, each research unit is in the habit of "working in its own corner." But since human and financial resources are now growing scarce in key sectors, the idea of pooling know-how is winning acceptance, it being understood that exchanges must be mutual and balanced and that fields such as nuclear research may be excluded.

On the strength of what has already been done in the civilian sector, Sillard has come up with the idea of proposing to his European partners that they set up a

structure for cooperation in upstream military research that will be as flexible as the Eureka program currently is. That cooperation could vary in its details according to the number of countries involved and the topics chosen by them.

A Eureka military program would be carried out at the level of what is called exploratory development—that is, by producing experimental models or demonstrators making it possible to gage the suitability of a new technical concept for meeting an operational need. The states would not pool their funds. Upstream cooperation would be left entirely up to a decision by industrialists, who would choose their partners in complete freedom. The only guarantee in this free-choice cooperation is that the states can announce that they are ready for government financing if a concept validated by demonstration interests them.

Such arrangements can be instituted on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements among the countries belonging to the Independent European Programs Group (GEIP), which is an association of NATO's European member states (except Iceland) for cooperation on armaments.

## **UNITED KINGDOM**

### **Foreign Secretary Howe's NATO Remarks, Soviet Reaction Reviewed**

LD0404144689 London *PRESS ASSOCIATION*  
in English 1345 GMT 4 Apr 89

[By Tom McMullan, *PRESS ASSOCIATION* diplomatic correspondent and Chris Moncrieff, chief political correspondent]

[Excerpt] Senior Soviet officials in London, to prepare for tomorrow's visit by their president Mikhail Gorbachev today, attacked Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe over his "primitive" view of NATO's role in the world.

In a statement marking NATO's 40th anniversary, Sir Geoffrey and Defence Secretary George Younger pointed to its role in helping change the Soviet approach to the world.

But Mr Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs in Moscow, told a press conference to explain Soviet foreign policy: "We should not go in for so much centralism. NATO is not the centre of the world nor the centre of the universe. The Soviet Union does not take the view that everything else is going around NATO. This is a primitive view and incorrect."

The sharp response was taken as a clear indication that frank exchanges can be expected between Mr Gorbachev and Mrs Thatcher when they meet at Downing Street on Thursday. But in an hour-long briefing, the Soviet advance guard gave no indication that the talks might end in acrimony.

Mr Nikolay Shishlin, consultant to the Communist Party's Central Committee, said both countries faced many challenges. "We have to move forward towards co-operation and trust," he said "We have to realise, politically speaking, that Britain is not an island and the Soviet Union is not a gigantic invulnerable mass of land but a fragile, if large, part of today's world."

Last night, Sir Geoffrey warned against the dangers of "old thinking" in the Soviet region. He said: "If we were to react to the Soviet changes by assuming they were complete and irreversible, by dismantling our own defences, then it is unlikely we would continue to see changes of that kind." Changes in the Soviet Union were "not irreversible", he said, urging more openness over chemical weapons and further progress on human rights.

His comments came just before a pre-recorded television broadcast in which he warned against "the Russian bear" and the danger of Mr Gorbachev "beguiling" Western opinion. [passage omitted]

#### **Defense Secretary Younger Skeptical on NATO Arms Cuts**

LD0404145189 London PRESS ASSOCIATION  
in English 1405 GMT 4 Apr 89

[By Paul Harris, PRESS ASSOCIATION chief reporter]

[Text] Defence Secretary George Younger today gave President Gorbachev another clear indication of Western caution over his arms reduction promises.

He said Russian rhetoric, which the Soviets referred to as defensive sufficiency, "cuts little ice with NATO."

He was speaking at the NATO headquarters in Northwood, Middlesex, to mark the 40th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The message was given on the eve of the Soviet leader's visit to Britain and 24 hours after Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe stressed the need for the West to keep its guard against the Soviet Union.

Mr Younger said NATO was built on a common commitment to freedom and democracy, and had always been a defensive alliance, based on the need to deter aggression.

"The new Soviet rhetoric of 'defensive sufficiency' may seem impressive in some quarters. But it cuts little ice with an alliance that has been concerned solely with defence since its inception.

"The single most important point to make about NATO—and a particularly appropriate one on its anniversary day—is that it is a success.

"The strength and resolution of NATO has been a key factor in bringing about the long overdue changes now under way in the East."

The defence secretary went on: "Of course, it is too early to know whether all Mr Gorbachev's plans will be made good, and even if he succeeds, it will only be a first step.

"But let there be no doubt—the change in atmosphere, and the promised reductions, are welcome to us. They provide the proof, if proof were needed, that our policies are the right ones."

Mr Younger said in the future "We will continue to seek increased security at lower levels of forces.

"But in doing this we will keep an eye on Soviet capabilities and intentions. We will continue to seek dialogue, but we will do so while maintaining our security."

Mr Younger sent a "special birthday telegram" to other NATO headquarters using the base's sophisticated message system.

The North Atlantic Treaty, which formally established NATO, was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949 by 12 nations, including the UK.

Earlier, the base celebrated the anniversary by taking hot tea to five Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament members demonstrating in the snow outside the main gates.

10  
22161

40

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103  
5285 PORT ROYAL RD  
SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

### SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301 (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.